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Abstract. 
The conceptual theory and quantitative development of a model for 
the evaluation of life safety in building fires is presented. 
The model is a systemic approach to life safety in fires that is 
applicable to any scenario. The model has been developed by 
distilling from the current understanding of fire events, the 
fundamental factors which may describe a safety system. The 
relationship between these factors in reality is complex and 
dynamic. This is represented in the model by assigning 
relational links between factors. 
The paucity of data about fires is generally restrictive for 	- 
modelling purposes; a structured group of experts in the fire and 
associated professions was employed to create a set of values to 
depict the potential relative contributions of factors to life 
safety. From this, the concept of actual performance is reached 
by the subjective analysis of performance and its deficiency. 
This approach (bottom up) allows for application of the model to 
any event that may be defined in terms of its constituent factors 
and their performance. The use of this will allow for 
equivalence of safety considerations and implications of designs, 
changes to design and mode of use of buildings. The scope of the 
model and the manner of distillation of the factors means that 
any scenario can be analysed for implications of changes to any 
or a number of factors (for example design, usage or aspects 
associated with the fire itself). The model is so structured as 
to allow the user to evaluate the general level of safety of a 
defined scenario; identify those factors which perform better 
than the minimum acceptable standard and those which are 
deficient; and to focus on the potential implications associated 
with each factor. It is a powerful tool for the rationalisation 
of the fire and building regulations into a comprehensive, 
consistent and performance-orientated approach to the provision 
of life safety in occupied buildings. 
The thesis describes the development of a systems model for 
evaluating life safety in building fires. The model is discussed 
in conceptual and developmental terms. The development of the 
model was done using a structured group process. The model is 
arranged hierarchically and modified wiEh an interactive network 
to represent the inter-relationships of factors to life safety 
both directly and indirectly. 	Representation of time in fire 
events is made by five notional time stages. 	The model is 
designed as a general systems model and may be applied to any 
building/ people/ environment scenario, at the design, in-use, or 
post-fire stages to evaluate the life safety. 
Trade-offs and equivalence for factor contributions may be made 
using the model as a datum tool. The six key areas handled are 
capability of occupants to escape, building route layout, smoke 
release, smoke movement, smoke control, and fire spread. 	Sub 
factors of each are discussed. 	The criticality of each of the 
factors to sub-system functions is also discussed, and 
interactivity between factors is modelled in a manner to allow 
implications of factor deficiency to be identified. 
Studies of the applicability of the model to two scenarios were 
made, one a proposed building with a need to make a significant 
amount of assumptions; the other a fire scenario in an existing 
building. 
Potential relative contributions are • derived from the direct and 
indirect (interactions) influence of factors on life safety (for 
or against) and may be used to evaluate scenarios on a deficiency 
in actual performance basis (estimated). 
Keywords.. Fires, Life Safety, Systems, Evaluation, Equivalence, 
Points Schemes, Time, Expert Systems. 
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Readers Note 
(-1) 	Definitions of factors attributed to "(Delphi)" are 
definitions originated by the author and agreed and used by the 
Delphi group - the quai ititative development of the model is based 
on these. The nature and intended use of the definitions was 
primarily for guidance in the development of the model. They are 
included as used. 
(2) 	Two types of parentheses are used in the text. 	The 
traditional (parentheses) are used for references in the normal 
manner.  
[the _[squared_parentheses] are used asa shorthand reference to 
factor or relationship. 	Such references are used broadly; to 
indicate where a statement, discussion, diagram, or quote 
relates to a factor in the model, supporting or justifying its 
inclusion, or potential relationships, within the system. 	These 
references are indexed in appendix 1. A sample passage: 
Design of building layouts should take into account the disabled 
(Goldsmith (134) [169,166]. Disability may be of a physical 
nature and limit the potential for movement [248]. The use of 
prosthetics, such as wheelchairs will affect width requirements 
(101]. 
Conventionally, (134) indicates the reference source. 	[169] 
relates to the effect poor Mobility may have on the potential 
contribution of Ease of Use of routes (an interaction). [166] 
notes the effect the Ease of Use of routes may have on the 
potential contribution of Mobility (hence, designing for the 
disabled) (another interaction). [248] represents the 
relationship between Physical Capability and Mobility (potential 
impact), and [101] that Mobility may affect the potential 
contribution of Width of Route, particularly when narrow 
(interaction). 
Note that the interaction references indicate some modification 
of the potential contribution of the subject factor. 
iv 
In some instances the indexed relationship will indicate a 
potential impact of one factor onto another factor in the system. 
These relationships were used for the development of the model. 
However, the final values derived for the factors in the model 
relate them to Life Safety, and in a number of cases the 
references refer to this relationship. 
The thesis is sub-divided into three main sections. 	The 
first section deals primarily with the conceptual model, and 
includes abstracts of the developmental and applications 
exercises. The two other sections deal with the development and 
application of the evaluation tool, and form the majority of the 
appendices. The diagrams are included in separate volumes. 
The reports included in appendices 5 and 6 are provided for 
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Introduction 
Fires in buildings degrade the environment, creating a risk of 
damage to property and occupants. 
The extensive variability of fire scenarios is determined by the 
types of building and their use, the capability of the occupants 
using them, and the nature of the internal environment. Coupled 
with a lack of total understanding and co-ordination of knowledge 
about fires, this complexity means their occurrence and nature 
tend to be at least partly unpredictable. 
Perhaps as a consequence of this, fires often appear to be 
considered as entities. An alternative, and recognised, approach 
is to consider fires as aspects of everyday systems. Marchant 
(1), for instance, has described fires as a 'quiescent threat'; 
the emergence of fire as a systemic failure. Such failure may be 
partial or catastrophic. The occurrence or extent is almost 
always the result of a chain of failures. 
Parts of the Fire Safety System have been, and are being 
researched. This has provided a considerable amount of 
(fragmentary) information, available for use in the design and 
maintenance of relatively safe buildings. The vast majority of 
buildings that are not having fires is evidence of partial 
success; that fires occur is evidence of incomplete success. 
A systemic approach is needed to solve a systemic problem. This 
has been recognised by a number of workers in the fire safety 
field (research, design and legislative areas). 
An acceptance of the systemic nature of fires presents the 
opportunity to control their occurrence and outcome, subject to 
an understanding of the system. 
Fire Safety and Whole Building Performance. 
Marchant defines the principal function of a building as 
providing an environment which is safe, comfortable and efficient 
for the tasks that are to be carried out (2). 
In 1979 the International Standards Organisation identified and 
defined fourteen aspects of Whole Building Performance, including 
Fire Safety (ISO (1979)(3)(also Marchant (2,18)). They are:- 
Stability. 













There is a complex inter-relationship between Fire Safety and the 
other performance aspects, however it can be differentiated in 
that it is the only factor not in normal daily use (2). It is 
apparent that Fire Safety should be considered as a sub-system of 
the micro-system Whole Building Performance. 
The functions of Fire Safety are the maintenance of Life Safety, 
Protection of Property, and Continuation of Activity (2). The 
protection of people and property are both socially accepted as 
being important. The means required and consequences of design 
and usage of buildings differ. Means of achieving the safety of 
people and property do overlap, but in some instances they are 
not concomitant (conipartmentation and egress facilities, for 
example). 
The time scale of a general fire event has been discussed by 
Marchant (4), who notes a range of time stages/phases between 
ignition and decay of a fire. Early time stages are of 
particular importance for the Life Safety sub-system of Fire 
Safety, latter ones for the Property Protection sub-system. See 
diagram Cl. 
The development of a systemic understanding of Fire Safety 
IN 
requires that each of the two main sub-systems, Life Safety and 
Property Protection, are understood individually and in 
combination. See diagram C2. Schmidt (1975)(5):- 
"The systems concept for life safety and fire protection requires 
that many systems be looked at simultaneously, and inter-related 
to find the best solution for the particular building. One can 
no longer be parochial and look at the requirement of only one 
particular system. The building must be seen as a whole." 
The first step is the modelling of each sub-system. This thesis 
is concerned with modelling the Life Safety (sub-) System. 
Life Safety Levels 
Control of the design or usage of a building determines the level 
of safety attained, and lies with three main bodies:- 
Owner! User - Owners affect building performance by their 
design requirements, which will be related to the intended use of 
the building. 	Different occupancies will have different 
performance requirements. Additionally, the manner in which the 
building and its contents are used will affect the performance. 
Changes to any aspect of the usage, brought about for any reason 
may change the Whole Building Performance. The importance of the 
owner/ user should not be underestimated. Pauls (1986)(6):- 
"Use and management can defeat good construction as well as 
support it, use and management are often our only line of defence 
to cope with faulty design and construction." 
Insurance - The standards set for building performance by 
insurance are predominantly concerned with property protection 
and continuation of activity. This influence is more significant 
in the USA, but is gathering pace in the U.K. (1985)(7). 
Legislation - Life Safety is one of the principal goals of 
the Building Regulations, and Fire Safety. 	Legislation is 
KA 
concerned with common standards of safety for any user of a 
building. 
There have been considerable reservations expressed about the 
approach and current status of the regulations. This is 
partially a consequence of themanner of their derivation 
(Everton et al. (1983)(8)). The other main restrictive aspect of 
the growth of the regulations and the limited manner of their 
targeting is reported to have been a lack of understanding and 
often an incomplete appreciation of fire safety. In addition, 
there is also a disparity in some instances between regulatory 
standards and research on performance of factors. Fire Safety 
legislation is reported to have been poorly co-ordinated and 
complex (a result of its development). Everton et al. (1983)(8) 
also note that:- 
"the building regulations have been the target of considerable 
criticism. They are recognised as being too complex, difficult 
to comprehend, inflexible and incapable of accommodating new 
technical developments." 
Existing Fire Safety Legislation in the USA is also reported to 
be poorly co-ordinated and complex, as a result of its 
development. Roux (1974)(9):- 
"In the history of building codes and regulations, one finds a 
nearly universal use of the singular approach to answer a given 
problem, in most cases exclusive of the other singular approaches 
to answer other problems. Granted, many of these singular 
approaches were dictated by the need for immediate action after a 
particularly devastating and/ or publicised fire. The urgency of 
the then-political situation probably did not permit any overall 
analysis of the problem that had resulted in the subject fire 
In looking at any modern building code, the end result is a book 
of redundancies that are gross and unfitting to today's task of 
constructing needed, safe buildings of reasonable cost." 
The Fire Precautions Act (1971) is solely concerned with Fire 
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Safety and applies to occupied premises. 	It is particularly 
important because it deals with the continuing fire safety of 
buildings, strongly influenced by the nature of use. A number of 
uses of buildings (or parts of a building) have been designated, 
generally places of public access. 
Assessment is based on the means of escape and any requirements 
considered necessary to secure it. This will include 
unobstructed routes, warning information, and fire fighting 
equipment. In cases where the first proposed use of a building 
is designated, it is a requirement of the Fire Precautions Act 
that the Local Authority consults with the Fire Authority. It 
was intended that bringing the Fire Precautions Act into 
operation would render existing, fragmented statutory provisions 
obsolete. There have been administrative problems with the Fire 
Precautions Act, 1971 (Everton et al. (8)). 
Developments 
Legislative change was a recognised necessity and is underway. 
Following a review of the Building Standards Regulations, to 
rationalise overcomplexity, and to avoid inconsistency of 
interpretation by enforcing authorities; the new Building 
Regulations (England and Wales) came into force in November 1985. 
These Building Standards Regulations have control in new and 
existing premises. 
The new regulations are based on functional statements allowing a 
flexible approach to achieve performance standards. Technical 
material in the form of approved documents explains how the 
performance standards might be achieved. An extract from an 
Approved Document to the Building Regulations (1985):- 
"The document has been approved by the Secretary of State as 
practical guidance to meeting the requirements of the above 
Paragraphs in Schedule 1 to the Regulations, but there is no 
obligation to adopt any particular solution in the documents if 
you prefer to meet the requirement in some other way." 
The concept of Fire Safety packages is thus introduced and 
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further expanded in section 6.46 (Approved Document B)(10):- 
"To ensure a satisfactory standard of fire safety in shopping 
complexes, alternative measures and additional compensatory 
features to those set out in this document would be 
appropriate." 
Section 6.47 also noted the requirement to consider fire safety 
proposals (for shopping complexes) as a comprehensive fire safety 
package; the concept of trade-offs is addressed in 6.60 and 6.66. 
Parnell also noted the emerging concept of Whole Building 
Performance in a paper dealing with legislative changes 
(1986)(11). Quoting the 1985 Building Regulations:- 
"Varying the provisions. 
0.34 In some of the sections 1 to 6 there is guidance about 
varying the provisions in the main text in situations where the 
provisions might prove unduly restrictive. In deciding whether a 
standard set out in this document is unnecessarily onerous in 
particular circumstances it is necessary to consider the fire 
safety of the building as a whole. This includes taking account 
of a variety of factors to a greater or lesser extent depending 
on the case. Factors to take into account are whether the 
building is new or existing; the construction and properties of 
the materials; fire hazard and fire load; space separation from 
boundaries and other buildings; means of escape in case of fire; 
ease of access for fire fighting; and the provision of any 
compensatory features such as sprinklers or automatic fire 
detection systems." 
Similar changes are proposed for the Scottish Building Standards 
Regulations. Franklin (1986)(12) reports a complete review of 
the content and form of Scottish Regulations to approach that of 
England and Wales. The new Regulations will be a statutory 
instrument which will (also like the England and Wales 
Regulations) lay down functional requirements backed up by a 
series of qualifying standards published separately as technical 
r;i 
memoranda. 	The review of the system is to rationalise over- 
complex Building Standards Regulations and to avoid problems of 
inconsistency of interpretation and enforcement. 
In respect of the regulations for England and Wales and Scotland, 
'approved' or 'designated' persons would be able to supervise 
plans and work to be carried out, also issue certificates of 
compliance with the regulatory requirements. 
A consultative document on the review of the Fire Precautions Act 
1971 (1985)(13), proposed changes to the Fire Precautions Act 
including possible extension of designation to all building uses 
(see also Marchant (1984)(4)). 	It was proposed that buildings 
put to designated uses must be registered. 	The person(s) 
controlling the use of such premises would be obliged to achieve 
an acceptable standard of Fire Safety. This is a similar 
approach to the Health and Safety at Work Act (1974). The duty 
of the Fire Service is to police this. 
Discussing the Review of the Fire Precautions Act 1971, a Home 
Office/Scottish Office Consultative Document on Fire Safety and 
Safety at Sports Venues (1986)(14) concluded:- 
"The Government is also satisfied that the modified proposals 
will enable essential fire safety standards to be maintained and, 
where necessary, improved, while.. .facilitating a more flexible 
approach to the achievement of appropriate standards.": 
Pauls notes the wider implications for incorporation of Fire 
Safety into design (1975)(15): - 
"Changes in attitudes toward safety may be required on the part 
of many designers and researchers to improve both the process Of 
environmental design and the end product. For example, safety-
conscious design is too often equated with code-determined 
design, an approach which may lead to buildings that serve 
neither the normal nor emergency needs of their occupants. This 
is particularly true of many new buildings incorporating non- 
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traditional design and occupancy features not anticipated when 
safety standards and codes were prepared. With all buildings, and 
particularly unusual ones, it is desirable to adopt the 
philosophy that "maximum freedom in design becomes possible only 
when safety can be included and adequately treated as a design 
consideration" (Hutcheon, N.B.)." 
The focus on overall performance (rather than on individual 
parts):çandeveidei( 1986 )( 16 ) gives new design scope. The 
benefits of this are potentially considerable. Marchant (2):- 
"recognising that the performance concept can be applied to fire 
safety design, it becomes possible to approach the design of 
every building with no pre-conceived notions about the fire 
safety measures that have to be incorporated but only a 
statement of performance to be attained which can be derived from 
a consideration of the potential hazard; the number of people 
that could be expected to be exposed to the fire danger and the 
value of goods that would be threatened" 
The effective adoption of such thinking in design and usage of 
buildings would minimise the occurrence and extent of Fire Safety 
System failures. 	The understanding of implications throughout 
the system of change will be impotant. 	The result would be 
.a reasonable and flexible design system for building fire 
safety." (Wakamatsu (1982)(17)). 
However, if equivalent safety is to be created and maintained, 
there are a number of aspects that need to be considered. 
If Fire Safety packages are an option, and Fire Safety 
legislation is aimed at common standards of safety for all 
building occupants, then the relative contribution of any 
component in a fire safety package must be known (Ii) (not 
obvious from the Regulations (Marchant (18))). Further, since 
Fire Safety is inter-related to all other performance factors 
(2), the implications of (a) changes in fire safety packages on 
the rest of building performance, and (b) changes in any other 
aspects of building performance on fire safety components and 
packages must be considered. 
Consistency between Building Control (design stage) and Fire 
Brigade (in-use) assessment of Fire Safety is essential. 	This 
will 	place demands on 'Approved Inspectors' and Fire Service 
personnel. 
The increased Fire Safety responsibility of the owner/user will 
produce an increased demand for consistent, comprehensive advice 
on effective measures to satisfy (minimum) standards. 
The first steps towards being able to achieve, compare, and 
maintain equivalent safety levels are:- 
To understand the nature of the Fire Safety System (and its 
relationship in the Whole Building Performance system), 
based on 
An understanding of the components of the Fire Safety 
System, such as the Life Safety System and its sub-
components. 
Life Safety Modelling 
A systemic tool for the evaluation of Life Safety is an essential 
complement to the design and usage of building in a safe manner. 
A difference in Life Safety associated with different occupancies 
is noted by Harrison (1974)(19) in a paper dealing with the 
aspects of life safety in high rise buildings. He notes that 
performance aspects may tend to be different in different 
occupancies in similar building types. Life Safety will be 
affected also. 
Such is the extent of variability of circumstances and factors 
involved in fires, it is tempting to think of each fire as being 
unique. 	However, there are a number of factors potentially 
common to each fire. 	The nature of the contributions of the 
ci 
building, people, and environment to a scenario are dynamic and 
inter-active. The scope of possible activities of building 
occupants involved in fires creates a complex Life Safety System 
(since people are not merely responders to the environment 
(Miller)(1983)(20). An understanding of the relative importance 
and criticality of factors in different fire scenarios is 
necessary if a universal level of safety for all occupants of all 
types of building can be created. 
The safety system output is the result of interactions between 
all the internal contributory factors. This is dynamic. To be 
effective a model must also be capable of modelling safety at the 
design, usage and post fire stages. Each factor requires to be 
evaluated in the context of its scenario. Marchant notes that 
real situations are complex and need to be analysed into small 
fractions (1986)(21). He also notes that:- 
"There is much knowledge and skill needed to synthesise the 
fradtions into a coherent whole for a specific grouping of 
people, fire and buildings." 
The co-ordination and embodiment of knowledge about the 
relationships between fractions is a potentially powerful tool 
for the building designer, evaluator and user. 
The legislative opportunity and functional motivation for the 
systemic approach to Life Safety is apparent ., and this has been 
recognised by a number of fire safety workers. Some researchers 
have proposed outline solutions (e.g., Roux (1973 (22), Van 
Bogaert (1978/79)(23,24), Wakamatsu (1982)(17), Bukowski 
(1985)(25)). For a number of reasons, discussed in the thesis, 
these are unsuitable for direct incorporation onto an evaluation 
tool. 
A Systems Evaluation of Life Safety in Fires 
The first step towards the development of an evaluation toot is a 
model of the general potential 	importance of factors in 
/6' 
scenarios, which may in turn be applied to the analysis of any 
specific scenario. This thesis describes such a model for the 
Life Safety System. The factors potentially contributing to Life 
Safety in general fire events are identified and defined. The 
qualitative and quantitative relationships between the factors 
and the nature of interdependencies are described. The relative 
contributions throughout fire events for the system factors are 
derived. Additionally, the criticality of individual factors is 
identified for use in evaluating key Fire Safety improvements 
required for building/people/environment scenarios. Further, the 
model may be expanded to incorporate new knowledge. 
The modelling approach described provides the range of 
professionals involved with fire safety decisions with a tool for 
the evaluation of Life Safety for any particular building and 
occupancy experiencing possible fires. This tool is applicable 
to proposed and existing buildings. 
1/ 
A conceptual model for the evaluation of Life Safety in Fires 
Life Safety in Fires depends on a number of identifiable aspects, 
which may be considered as components of a Life Safety System. 
The protection of people is a continuous necessity, which depends 
on the performance of these aspects individually and in relation 
to Whole Building Performance (Marchant (26,2)). 
Evaluation of the Life Safety System requires that the system is 
defined, all the salient factors are identified and their 
relationships represented. 
Fires are complex. They are dynamic, interactive processes and 
involve a large number of components (diagram C3). Attempts to 
understand them have resulted in the development of models, 
mostly dealing only with aspects of the whole subject. The scope 
of such models is generally specific and may be deeply complex. 
The exceptions are relatively encompassing but shallow. 
The development of any model usually simplifies reality by 
limiting the factors involved. It is important that all the 
relevant factors are included and their inter-relationships 
represented. The validity of the model should not be adversely 
affected by any assumptions made. - - 
The models developed embody the state of the art knowledge of 
Fire Safety Engineering. Much of it is crucial to the 
development of an Evaluation Tool for the Life Safety sub-system. 
However, for a number of reasons, that do not necessarily 
detract from the value of the models themselves, they are 
unsuitable for direct incorporation into an Evaluation Tool:- 
The models represent different sub-sets of the Fire Safety 
System, although there may be some overlap. 	They may not be 
primarily concerned with Life Safety. 
The complexity of fires has resulted in a variety of 
1.2 
modelling concepts. Some areas studied lend themselves readily 
to quantification (e.g., combustion dynamics (27)), others do not 
(e.g., behavioural aspects (28)). The range of approaches (26) 
includes mathematical, analogue, psychological and physical 
models (e.g., Predtechenskii and Millinski (1978)(29), Peschl 
(1971)(30), Stahl (1979/80)(31,32), and Barrett  and Locklin 
(1970)(33) respectively). 	Some are suitable for, and have been 
computerised. 	Fault tree analysis may also be used (see Beard 
(34,35,36)). -- - - 
	 j 
Studies have produced a range of levels of models. At the 
extremes; 'top-down' models, used to decompose the fire safety 
system; and 'bottom-up' models to synthesise a subset. 
Each model considers an incomplete list of factors, and 
represents only a fragment of the whole. Consequently, all the 
inter-relationships cannot be adequately modelled. 
Simplifying assumptions which do notunacceptably affect the 
freestanding validity of the model may limit its inclusion in a 
model of 'wider scope. 	Models may be incompatible because of 
contradictory or inconsistent assumptions. 
The variety and unpredictability of fires restricts data 
availability in some areas of study, particularly behaviour 
related aspects (Canter (1985)(28)). 	Other areas (such as 
structural stability) are relatively easy to obtain empirical 
evidence from tests. 
The concepts of models tend to reflect the nature and 
availability of input data. 	There is a problem of accuracy, 
amount, and type of data. In some instances it has been 
necessary to resort to using synthesised data. This is discussed 
in more detail later. There is also a problem of testing 
certain models and data for the same reasons (26). 
The dynamic nature of fires depends on the changing relative 
importance of contributing factors. An evaluation tool should 
model this. 	Some models are static (e.g., Cathey (37)). 
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Representivity of the model is restricted to the point in time 
chosen for analysis. Others are dynamic (e.g., Mitler (27)), but 
may be deterministic (e.g., Cooper (38)). Some also exclude the 
dynamic aspects of fires (e.g., Evers and Waterhouse (39)). It 
is also important that the inter-relationships that occur between 
factors in events should be represented, for example; Bfires 
(Stahl)(1979!80)(31,32) which models how the reactions of people 
to the environment may affect their safety. Models of sub-
sections of the Life Safety System may omit interactions between 
people and fires (e.g., Cooper (38), now being expanded to 
include this (40)). In many models there is no explicit statement 
of relative contributions or their dynamic nature. 
Life Safety depends on the occupants, the building, and the 
manner in which they use it (26,23,24). Aspects of each of these 
may change. 	The evaluation of Life Safety to establish that 
safety levels are maintained and equivalent will require a model 
of 	general enough scope to allow a wide range of specific 
scenarios to be modelled. 	Such models require to be applicable 
to proposed and existing buildings. Many models do not handle 
the necessary variety of scenarios (e.g., Alvord: board and care 
homes/ multi-family dwellings (1983,'5)(41,42,43); SCICON, a smoke 
movement model, is limited to tall buildings (see Evers and 
Waterhouse (39)); Shields and Silcock; evaluation of dwellings 
(44)). As a consequence the coverage of the models is limited. 
In such instances, the variance between scenarios makes direct 
comparison of models impractical. 
There may also be restrictions concerning the applicability 
to time stages in an event. 	During a fire the relative 
contributions of factors are variable. Time stages with distinct 
characteristic activities (fire or people orientated) are 
identifiable (Sime (1985)(45)). The models would each require to 
model the difference in the relative importances of factors and 
so the dynamic nature of safety throughout the event. This is 
not always the case (e.g., Evacnet+ (1982-84)(46-51) handles only 
movement for escape (post detection and planning); uncertainty in 
detection delays may lead to omission from models or assumptions 
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(e.g., Alvord (41,42,43)); on the other hand, most smoke movement 
models are valid throughout the event (e.g., Barrett and Locklin 
(33))). A consistent model(s) is required for each of the 
different times in the life cycle of a building, also. 
(10) The output and input requirements, and assumptions of models 
may not match (e.g., Evers and Waterhouse (39) and Barrett and 
Locklin (33)). 
The incompatibility of the models currently available for 
different areas of the fire problem, in respect of the 
assumptions, goals and input/output characteristics, means they 
are not concomitant (nor could they be expected to be). Initial 
studies on the practicality of amalgamation of a number of key 
models for different aspects of the Life Safety problem indicated 
a significant enough mismatch to make the result suspect at the 
least - the meaning of output from a composite model would be 
indeterminable, and its value correspondingly uncertain. 
Further, many of the models are closed - they cannot be expanded 
to include new ideas and knowledge. There is a need for an 
expandable model that can absorb deve Iopments in knowledge and 
data availability - that can grow with the knowledge base - and 
also help indicate knowledge shortages. 
The requirement for a consistent, systematic, and systemic 
approach to the evaluation of Life Safety is not satisfied by the 
current<ly fragmentary knowledge. The derivation and adoption of 	- 	- 
a systems approach is essential. 
Systemic approaches. 
"In causal thinking and research the task is to single out, from 
a multitude of data, pairs of acts between which there is a 
necessary connection. In system thinking the task is not to find 
direct relations between items but to find the super-ordinate 
system in which they are connected or to define their positional 
value within such a system" Angyal, in (52). 
The problems of individual models (including Legislation) 	and 
the need for a systems approach has been discussed by several 
researchers, world-wide (e.g., Roux (1973)(22), Wakamatsu 
(1982)(17)) and a number of systems models have been conceived 
and developed. 
Schemes have been devised for the evaluation of the safety of a 
building. A brief review is worthwhile. 
Roux (1973)(22), noting a "fragmentation of approach to fire 
protection", discussed the need for a conceptual approach to fire 
safety in all types of buildings. 	A "systems approach to fire 
protection", based on a success tree, was introduced. 	It is 
defined as:- 
"The concept of viewing the fire problem as a set of 
interrelated, interdependent parts working together for the 
overall objective of the whole." 
Diagram C4 is an overview of the model, developed by an NFPA 
(National Fire Protection Association) Committee, and termed the 
Decision Tree (Roux (1973/4)(22,9)). 	The model is based around 
the attainment of Fire Safety Objectives (which may be one or all 
of':safety to life, protection of property, or continuity of 
operation). 	It is hierarchical in structure, each box 
representing a goal for the lower levels, and a method for the 
higher (1974)(9). 	More detailed versions of the Decision Tree 
show an influence of fire management on fire prevention. 
A Building Fire Safety Model has also been developed (1974)(9), 
based on the Decision Tree and the time stages of a typical fire 
development sequence. 	A lack of knowledge about some of the 
boxes is reported to have restricted its usefulness to a check 
list in the design process (1980)(53). 
Van Bogaert (1978/79)(23,24) has identified three components of 
Fire Safety, and analysed these into their respective sub-
factors. He identifies Safety as depending on the building (a 
constant), the contents (variable), and the occupants' behaviour 
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(highly variable). Diagram CS indicates (one-way) relationships 
of the factors which affect the impact of the components on 
safety. He identifies building usage as being particularly 
significant. 
Wakamatsu (1982)(17) discusses proposed work to meet the need for 
"a reasonable and flexible design system for building fire 
safety". Development of the system will relate knowledge on the 
outbreak and growth of fire, fire resistance of building 
structures, movement of smoke, and the behaviour of occupants 
(see diagrams C6,C7). This is expected (17) to provide the 
systematic framework necessary for optimum combinations of 
predicted or evaluated fire safety means. This will allow a more 
flexible approach to the attainment of required safety levels in 
proposed or existing buildings. 
Nelson and Levin (1982)(54) have applied a systems approach to 
existing property in a specific type of occupancy scenario. 
Other conceptual models and schemes and uses of systematic 
analysis have been developed, eg; Fire Safety Evaluation of 
Healthcare facilities (Nelson and Shibe (1978)(55)); 
Identification of Cost Effective Fire Safety Retrofits in 
Healthcare Facilities (Chapman (1980)(56)); Fire Safety 
Evaluation (Points) Scheme for Patient Areas Within Hospitals 
(1982)(57). 
Panzhauser (1985)(58) has outlined the potential application of a 
general inter-actions scheme (GIAS) to human behavioural aspects 
in fires. Diagram 08. 
Bukowski (1985)(25) has identified and outlined the relationships 
between a number of major components of a fire hazard model. He 
includes aspects of the fire; detection and suppression 
techniques; smoke movement and control; and occupant behaviour 
and evacuation; to provide an output describing the consequent 
hazards in terms of the location, time and factor(s) related to 
Life Safety and Property Protection. See diagram C9. 
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Shields and Silcock (1986)(44), reporting studies on an 
analytical hierarchy process (restricted to the evaluation of 
fire safety in dwellings), have identified a number of inter-
related factors. See diagram CIO (also diagram C2). 
Requirements of a Systemic Model 
A consistent, realistic, and adequate systems approach to the 
evaluation of Life Safety requires to tackle a number of aspects. 
A model should allow consistent and representative comparisons 
for equivalency purposes. 
The power of analysing the particular lies in understanding the 
general. A model should be generally applicable to allow 
comparisons between different scenarios. 
It should also be applicable to proposed and existing buildings. 
The identification of the appropriate questions and confirmation 
of the adequacy of current approaches to Life Safety is 
necessary. 	Identification of the aspects necessary indicates, 
for a number of reasons, that 	the systemic models mentioned 
above (22,23,24,17,54,58,25,44) still give incomplete coverage to 
allow representative Life Safety evaluation and comparisons - 
further development may alter this situation. 
The development of a systemic model as a base for an evaluation 
tool would give the following advantages:- 
Studies of Life Safety Systems using evaluation tools may 
help identify what causes failures. A trend may be more easily 
spotted and interpreted following collection of the appropriate 
information. 
A particularly powerful property of a systems model is that 
of general applicability. 
The model will consolidate existing knowledge, help highlight 
areas short of knowledge, and so increase understanding and 
awareness of the Life Safety System. Marchant (1980)(26):- 
"At present many simple combinations of the components of fire 
safety are understood (for example fire duration and severity are 
influenced directly by component geometry, window openings and 
the quantity and distribution of fuel). However, little 
knowledge is defined on the relationships between cognitive maps 
of buildings, fire safety education, compartmentation, the smoke 
release characteristics of combustible materials, and 
communication systems in complex buildings. The use of models, 
especially those containing interactive networks, may be useful 
in improving our knowledge of such complex relationships." 
A set of relative contributions will allow the user to match 
actual performance to acceptable (Marchant (26)). 
Changes to design can be evaluated, and the change in 
implications of design. 	The scale and complexity of the Life 
Safety System means that the systematic manual re-evaluation of 
design changes is laborious. 
A model for the evaluation of Life Safety in building fires will 
require to cover all the key aspects common to all scenarios. 
Fire safety has a contribution to buildings during each of the 
life cycle stages (59), and its evaluation is necessary at the 
design and usage stage - and if a learning process is to occur - 
after a fire. 
The model behind the evaluation tool. 
The conceptual complexity of a Life Safety model obviously 
requires to be great, but so too is the potential consistency 
arising from singular assumptions, and also the value of the 
output - particularly to an evaluation exercise. Although more 
widely applicable than other models, this approach can still be 
viewed only as an aide to professional judgement, rather than a 
substitute for it. 
Basic conceptual assumptions of this model are that Life Safety 
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is dependent on systemic performance; that systemic performance 
is the product of dynamic inter-relationships between a large 
number of sub-factors; that systemic failures occur generally as 
a result of a chain of partial or complete failures in the sub 
systems or between factors; and that there may be some key 
factors whose individual performance is critical to the overall 
performance of the system. The failure of such factors alone can 
lead to serious injury or death (partial or total failure of a 
Life Safety System). 
It is necessary to define carefully the scope of the system and 
the range and type of factors and inter-relationships to be 
modelled in it. Emery (1981)(52) defines a system as:- 
"A set of interrelated elements, each of which is related 
directly or indirectly to every other element, and no subset of 
which is unrelated to any other subset. 
Hence, a system is an entity composed of at least two elements 
and a relation that holds between each of its elements and at 
least one other element in the set. The elements form a 
completely connected set that is not decomposable into unrelated 
subsets. Therefore, although a system may itself be part of a 
larger system it cannot be decomposed into independent 
subsystems." 
Factors - A complete statement of the factors included in the 
system will define the domain of the model, but not the internal 
relationships. 
Diagram CS is a table of those factors considered for the 
quantitative development of the model to produce the evaluation 
tool. The listing covers factors in the tertiary and higher 
levels of the model. 
Diagrams - The factors included in the model may be displayed 
diagrammatically: Diagrams Cli - C18. 	This gives some 
information about defined relationships. Initial studies 
produced hierarchical frameworks of a greater depth than shown 
in these diagrams. 	The relationships these initial frameworks 
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represented (particularly the inter-relationships between 
factors) were not followed up to completion, because of the 
developmental problems caused by scale (and data problems caused 
by the fine distinction between factors). An early version of 
the model is reproduced in diagrams3)390436. This is discussed 
more fully later. 
It is important that the scope and definitions of the factors 
included in the model are adequately and unambiguously stated. 
The interpretation of the structural content of the model and the 
implications of its structure (and development) should be 
available to users. 	This a particularly important aspect of 
model development if the result is going to be "user friendly", 
representative, consistent (internally and externally), and 
generally accepted. The qualitative and quantitative development 
of the model is fully reported in the thesis (see appendix 2). 
The salient factors comprising the Life Safety System having been 
identified and defined (discussed in the development abstract and 
appendix 2, sections 1 and 2 later), their relationships maybe 
analysed. 
Each of the identified factors in the system may potentially 
contribute in any fire scenario. In practice some do not, and 
many or all may perform sub-optimally. Most do not directly make 
an impact on Life Safety, rather they work through one or more 
other factors (an indirect impact). 
There will be a further series of indirect interactions occurring 
which will have a potential influence on Life Safety. Discussion 
of these relationships will be put aside temporarily. 
The first step in evaluating any scenario is to start with the 
abstract concept of a potentially optimal scenario of factors, 
and to evaluate its actual performance by considering the 
performance of each factor in the Life Safety System 
individually, and in its systemic, interactive place. 	It is 
logical therefore that a model should take this approach also. 
The model may then be used as a gauge of potential relative 
contributions - and any identified deficiencies may be evaluated - 
for any scenario. The advantage this approach offers is that any 
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• 	scenario can be so analysed (functionally) in terms of potential 
and actual (deficient) performance. 	The model becomes 
universally applicable to any Life Safety System scenario. 
A preliminary step towards the performance analysis of factors 
and their influence of this on Life Safety is the identification 
of the factor relationships. For this reason a statement of the 
definition of each factor and its inter-relationships may be made 
(the core of the developmental exercise). 
There. are a great number of factors which are relevant to 
successful escape, each having different degrees of influence for 
all, or part, of the duration of the event, in some, or all 
scenarios, but not necessarily for all members of the threatened 
population. The study of these factors, their inter-
relationships and dependencies within the fire event system is a 
worthwhile exercise. 
It has been noted elsewhere that there are a number of variable 
factors involved in a fire emergency scenario that make it 
difficult to obtain a fire safety rating of a building (Berlin 
(1982)(60)) - for instance the location, severity of a fire, and 
the relationship of the occupants. to the imposed threat. 
Impacts - If each factor identified as having a potential 
contribution to Life Safety is analysed to see which other 
factors affecting Life Safety directly depend on it, and which 
factors it directly depends on, a qualitative hierarchical 
ordering of the relationships to Life Safety may be derived 
(shown in diagrams Cli - C18). These relationships are further 
discussed in the developmental abstract and developmental 
sections (1) to (3). 
The further down the hierarchy the narrower the scope of the 
factor. It should not be assumed that these factors will not be 
critical to Life Safety. The higher up the hierarchy 1 the 
broader the scope of factors - there appears to be relatively 
little research done on the factors at this level. 
For instance, consider escape routes as an example of the direct 
relationships between factors. See diagram C19. The capacity of 
any particular route is a measure of the amount of people it can 
carry or hold. The Width [258] and Length [259] of the route 
affect the dynamic and static capacities. However, the capacity 
of the route [300] is a function of the width and length (refer 
diagram C19), and the clearing capacity (ie; the dynamic 
capacity), is dependent on the nature and relationship of the 
width and length of the route (including any relationship between 
width and length). Except as a design principle in the sizing of 
routes (width rules) it cannot be said in true terms that the 
width or length of the routes depends on the capacity (since area 
= w x 1). The directional nature of these direct relationships 
emerges. In turn, the contribution of the Escape Route Layout 
[323] to Life Safety depends directly on the Exit Route Capacity 
[300] and the Ease of Use [299] of the routes. The diagram 
indicates the relationship between the factors (throughout the 
thesis direct relationships are represented vertically on such 
diagrams). - 
For the purposes of the development of the model the Objective is 
Life Safety and the factors and sub-factors relating to it are 
termed Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary level factors. 	The 
objective depends directly on Primary level 	factors 
P1,P2,P3 ... Pn. See diagram C20. Each primary factor depends 
directly on secondary level factors, for example; P1 depends on 
S1.1, 51.2, S1.3. ..S1.n. And the secondary level factors depend 
directly on tertiary level factors. 
Thus primary level factors and the objective depend indirectly on 
tertiary (and lower) levels in the hierarchy. Referring to 
diagram C19, Escape Route Layout [323] is a primary level factor, 
Exit Route Capacity [300] and Ease of Use [299] are secondary 
level factors, and Width [258] and Length [259] are tertiary 
level factors. Hence, Escape Route Layout depends indirectly on 
Width and Length of Route (also on sub-factors of Ease of Use 
[254,255,256,2571). 
The term given to describe a direct relationship is Impact. If a 
secondary factor depends on a tertiary factor, the tertiary 
factor is said to have an impact on the secondary factor. Hence, 
Width impacts on Exit Route Capacity [258]. This is discussed 
also in the developmental abstract and developmental section (5). 
Impact definition (Delphi):- 
Impact: An impact occurs between a lower and a higher factor in 
the hierarchy. The levels must be adjacent, and existence of an 
impact between two factors implies dependence of the higher on 
the lower. 
It is assumed possible for a factor to have several sub-factors 
impacting on to it (e.g., Width and Length impact onto Exit Route 
Capacity - diagram C19). This is congruent with the trend for 
the development of a hierarchical framework (a tree). But it is 
also assumed that any factor can only impact onto one factor in 
its relevant context. Hence Width of Route does not impact onto 
any other factor except Exit Route Capacity. 
Common Factors - Some factors may affect Life Safety in a number 
of ways. For instance, the internal (or ambient) temperature 
partly determines the ambient stack effect (diagram C14 [267]); 
also fire stack (diagram C14 [271]), and smoke control by 
dilution and removal (diagrams C15,C17 [311]). In some of these 
cases it contributes to create a threat [267,271], in others to 
maintain safety [311]. 
The multiple significance is represented by 'common' factors, 
differentiated by the variations in potential nature and 
magnitude of their contribution to the Life Safety system. 'See 
developmental abstract and developmental section (3) for more 
details. 
The process of defining impacts was used to draw up the direct 
relationships of the factors to Life Safety. The result was a 
twelve tier: hierarchy (diagrams 390-436, and- referred to. 
earl ier). 
The deeper the hierarchy the greater the decomposition of the 
system and the more specific the contribution and definition of 
the factors (factors in the upper tiers were less specific, and 
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more identifiable than those at the lower levels). The further 
down the hierarchy the smaller the relative contribution to Life 
Safety, and the less information available about the factor 
generally. Consequently, the more difficult it was to be sure 
that all 'nth level' factors were in the same band of relative 
contributions. 
Also, the deeper the model, the greater the number of direct and 
indirect inter-relationships to be modelled and the more 
difficult it becomes to create and use the model. Data shortage 
means that very soon the increased decomposition of the system 
relates to increased data assumption and derivation. 
The model was rationalised and clipped to provide the three tier 
model used as the basis for the rest of the conceptual and 
developmental processes were based. See also developmental 
sections (1) and (2). This was further justified by:- 
Availability of data in the specific form needed 	for the 
model was limited, and if data was to be derived by the Delphi 
process (as occurred), then a sensible limit to the amount 
required, and its usefulness, would limit scale of applicability. 
Most existing models could be defined in terms of the factors 
to tertiary level. 	The model is based on and reflects current 
knowledge. 
Initial studies of fire safety research indicated an 
understanding of the higher levels was lacking compared with some 
of the aspects of the lower levels in the hierarchy. 	In such 
cases a 'top-down' approach (Dennet (1983)(61)) is suitable to 
co-ordinate existing knowledge and provide directions for further 
work. 
Most other models available at the time dealt with aspects 
covered by these levels or slightly lower. 	Many 'top-down' 
(e.g., Van Bogaert (23), 'bottom-up'(e.g., Cooper (38)), and 
lateral (e.g., Stahl (31)) approaches could be matched within 
this range of levels. 
The specific nature of knowledge requirements (and scale) in 
making expert judgements on contributions to Life Safety may 
have caused problems with expert availability if greater depths 
had been used (similarly for the model constructor). The initial 
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model development required to be made using a single group of 
experts if consistency was to be maintained. 
(6) 	The objective of the research exercise was to establish 
whether a representative Life Safety Systems model could be 
created, and this posed practical limits on the complexity of the 
pilot model. 
The ordering of the hierarchy and the arbitrary cut off chosen 
for the present model structure in no way restricts the model 
from expansion to a more complex and deeply derived approach. 
However, current data availability and commitment to collection 
and co-ordination makes it difficult to see an opportunity to 
expand it in this way in the near future. 
The flexible nature in which the contributions of factors and the 
relational links are arranged is designed to facilitate the 
inclusion of other models as assumptions or sub-routines - this 
may be particularly valuable to the professional user; familiar 
enough with the Fire Safety problem and the model's architecture 
and output characteristics to interpret accurately the meaning 
and limitations of the output, and possibly to tailor it to 
individual use. This is also a feature of the proposed 
development of a Life Safety Systems Expert System (appendix 7). 
Factors in the Life Safety System may contribute to the safety of 
the occupancy (termed 'pro-safety') or to the nature of the 
imposed threat ('pro-threat') - it is necessary to define 
carefully the nature of the contributions made by each factor - 
particularly in cases where there may be ambiguity (e.g., smoke 
may provide ambiguous cues for the detection of a fire (manually 
or automatically), but is also a threat to Life Safety. 
Time Stages - There are a number of definable time stages (or 
phases) in fire events that relate to the activities of people 
(see Sime (1985)(45) and Marchant (1976)(62,63)), and others that 
relate to the state of the fire (e.g., Beard (1981/3 (34,35,36), 
Lerup (1976)(64)). 
The relationship of these notional time phases for people or the 
fire to real time is flexible. Phases may be short or long (Aoki 
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(1978)(65)). 	Generally speaking, short phases associated with 
the available time, and long phases associated with the required 
time will give an imbalance of a potentially hazardous nature 
(cf. Summerland, Bradford). 
The factors in the system may be divided broadly on the basis of 
their potential contribution to the threat or safety of the 
occupants. From this the factors contributing to the time 
available for escape (Tavail) and those contributing to the time 
required for escape (Treq) may be identified. Studies have been 
done on the balance between the time available (a function of the 
contributions of the pro-threat factors) and the time required (a 
function of the pro-safety factors) (Sime (45), Marchant (63)). 
Cooper's ASET model is based on it (40). Diagrams C21,C22 relate 
the factors determining time required and available for this 
model. 
The contribution of factors is more complex than suggested by a 
simple balance. Interactivity between factors within the system 
(particularly between threat and safety factors, eg; fire 
fighting (Lerup (64)) creates a dynamic nature of contributions 
that cannot be realistically subdivided to provide a balance. 
It is more satisfactory to express the contributions of all 
factors in relation to a single set of time stage criteria. The 
relevant time stages for a Life Safety Sub-System of Fire Safety 
are the people activity stages, and these may be defined. Any 
potential interference with safety caused by the contributions of 
the pro-threat factors (e.g., smoke movement, smoke release, fire 
spread) may be modelled for each of the people activity stages. 
The potential impact (and hence contribution) of factors to Life 
Safety may vary between and during stages. 
The greater the number of time stage sub-divisions, the more 
potentially realistic the model. However, a large number of time 
stages, each with a potentially different nature and magnitude of 
contributions, would make the creation and manipulation of the 
model difficult. The adoption of sufficient time stage divisions 
to represent the general phases of an event would be sufficient 
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for a developmental exercise. 
Progress in the identification of time stages (reported by Sime 
(1985)(45)) has produced models based on a number of time stages. 
See diagram C23 shows some examples: (a) Caravat9 and Haviland 
(1967)(66); (b) Marchant (1976)(63) - see also diagram C24; (c) 
Stahl, Crosson and Margulis (1982)(67); (d) Cooper (1983)(40), 
Cooper and Stroup (1985)(68); and (e) Maclennan, Pauls and Sime 
(1985)(45). A variation on these time balances provides the 
basis for the time stages for a general fire event involving 
people. Diagram C25 shows the five time stages derived for this 
model in sequence, and gives the definitions used for the event. 
It is assumed that during each main time stage in an event the 
contribution of the factors to the safety of occupants carrying 
out activities identified with the defined time stage, would be 
constant. The greater the number of discrete time stages the less 
significant this assumption is. 	The five time stages are an 
accepted level of distinction (63,45). 	Variations in magnitude 
of potential impact between time stages were catered for. 
The characteristic people-activity stages are the criteria 
against which safety, or escape potential, can be assessed. It 
is these time stages that are most relevant to the modelling of 
events involving people. Generally people will pass through a 
series of stages with some associated (flexible) time 
requirements. 
People may not enter all the phases (if escape is not ensured) - 
but those stages that are entered must be in order - there is a 
relational rule of order of stages (1-5). 
The potential contribution of the pro-threat factors are 
determined for each stage also. 
Note that each phase must come in sequence, although the duration 
of each is variable for people in events (also groups and 
crowds). The duration may be very short, eg; stumbling across a 
fire gives a very rapid step from detection to perception 
(T(detection)-l(perception) stage). 
Work has been done on the determination of typical Act Sequences 
for people in a number of roles, in different occupancies and 
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different fire events. Correspondingly, different activities 
throughout the event may be associated with different roles and 
circumstances. Peoples activities may be influenced by their 
perception of the event.Sime (1985)(45) suggests that people make 
a subjective judgement of the balance between time available and 
time required. These are termed the "Perceived Time Available" 
and "Perceived Time Needed". Sime suggests that the Perceived 
Time Available may be influenced by the Perceived Time Needed, 
and hence result in the coping behaviour activities often 
associated with fires. 
A typical event for a person starts with detection of some 
ambiguous cue. The ambiguity of the cue may be in its origin or 
it may be recognised • but' not given full credibility- without 
reinforcement of some sort (Sime (45)). Examples of ambiguous 
cues may be found for any of the senses and include noises such 
as breaking glass, the sight of other people's activities: 
A person's experience:of fires may influence the amount 
of reinforcement required before an ambiguous cue is 
treated seriously. The serious treatment of cues leads to the 
start of the next notional time stage in the fire event for the 
person, perception. 
There will always be some delay between the detection and 
perception of a fire, although the actual duration may vary 
considerably from someone who stumbles across a fire (possible 
example of nurse Goodall, see appendix 3) to a person who may 
respond slowly for a number of reasons. 
Perception is the start of the stage when plans for any action 
will be made. Obviously for people who require assistance for 
starting or are totally immobile, the plans and expectations for 
movement for escape will be limited. 
The time requirements in each of the stages for recognition and 
action will depend on the number of people amongst other normal 
variables of scenarios. Further the role of the individual may 
play a significant part and should not be underestimated (Sime 
(69)). Leadership formation in the post perception stage may be 
important and is mentioned by several researchers (Roytman 
(1975)(70), Bryan (1977)(71)). See later. 
-217 
Following the formation of a plan, the 	next stage involves 
action for escape (this is distinguished from 	movement for 
investigation or general movement associated with ordinary 
building usage prior to perception and detection of a fire 
respectively). 
The stages of an event involving movement for escape have been 
broken down for regulatory purposes in to a number of stages. 
This is discussed later (and diagram C26). Movement for escape 
is distinguished for the purposes of this model as being movement 
to the relative safety provided by protected routes or refuges 
(stage 4), and movement within a protected route (or waiting for 
rescue in a refuge) to safety (stage 5). Note that escape does 
not necessarily involve egress. 
In many ways the potential impacts of factorson:stages 4 and 5 
are similar. The fundamental difference relates to the factors 
associated with protection measures, and resulting interactions 
between factors. 
The contribution of the building/people/and environment factors 
will be dynamic and differ in potential and actual relative 
contribution in each of these five stages. 
Some factors will not have any potential contribution to Life 
Safety in some stages of the event. For example, the usage of 
routes for escape (ie; contributing to Life Safety) will not be 
relevant until stage 4 when movement for escape occurs (ie; after 
perception and planning) and it is important for a model to 
reflect this. 
The importance of the early stages of an event imposes a greater 
emphasis on those factors involved. 
Interactions - In reality the contributions of factors to Life 
Safety are not simple enough to be described in terms of impacts 
only. The interactive relationships put aside earlier are now 
considered. 
Many components will not be discrete. The effect any factor has 
on Life Safety is influenced by the inter-relationships of 
30 
factors within the system. There will be an interactive network 
within the system. Indirect factor contributions are the result 
of the influence of one or more factors on other factors. It is 
important to identify for each factor in the model any other 
factors that may affect it (and consequently its potential impact 
on Life Safety) and any other factors it will have a potential 
effect on. 	This is also discussed in the developmental abstract C'j —," A s.  
and development sections (7) and (8). Definition:- 
Interaction: An interaction is between two factors in the model 
framework. It describes the potential knock-on effect between 
the two factors, but note that interactions are considered as 
being directional, ie; there may be an interaction of A on B 
whilst there is no interaction of B on A. 
Firstly, note that the dictionary definition discusses 
"interactions" as being reciprocal, an action or influence on 	
'L- 
each other. Clearly it is contradictory to define interactions 
as being anything other than reciprocal "Interaction" came out 
of a search for a term to describe how a network of inflifences, 
not necessarily reciprocal, could affect the impact of factors on 
the objective during the event. There are factors that influence 
another factor without themselves being influenced. 	A more 
accurate term may be "influence", however the term adopted for 
the development of the model was interaction and it has been left 
as such throughout the thesis. 
Theoretical and observational studies indicate general inter-
relationships between factors within the system which may modify 
the effect of the factors on the system (and its objective). 
Examples of such interactions have been identified for 
psychological capacity, ie; psychological capacity influences the 
contribution to life safety of knowledge about the event [53] 
(e.g., Stahl (31,32)). This interaction happens to be reciprocal 
[36]. 
Note the way in which the relationship references are used, ie; 
[53,36]. 	Each refers to an (interactive) relationship that 
modifies the impact of the subject factor. 	Hence, [53] means 
31 
Psychological Capacity interacts onto Event Knowledge, so 
modifying the potential impact of Event Knowledge on Training 
[251] (and hence Life Safety). 
Interactivity alters the potential contribution of a factor by 
modifying it, ie; potential contributions are affected by 
potential interactions. The contribution itself is assumed to be 
of a similar nature. For instance, the obstruction of an escape 
route by a queue modifies the contribution of that escape route 
to Life Safety [9 or 1 03], the people waiting at the back are 
not getting any contribution of the route to their Life Safety 
(and the ones in the queue are getting less than they could be!) 
- the potential contribution of the escape route is still of a 
similar nature. The obstructive queue modifies its potential 
performance. 
The qualitative analysis of the potential interactions, and the 
quantification of those interactions identified is discussed in 
the development abstract and development section (8). The six 
conceptual sub-sections following this each deal with a primary 
factor and its sub-factors. Potential interactions are discussed 
qualitatively in reference to supporting references. 
Incorporation of the quantitative values of interactions is done 
using the formula shown in diagram C27. The origin of the 
formula is discussed later in the developmental abstract and 
appendix 2, section 9. . . 
Such types of formula have been successfully used (e.g., (57)) 
and the same modification policy is adopted here, although the 
formula differs. There was only one formula applied during 
development of the model, and this was because:- 
(1) The scale of developmental work required for the use 
of each formula was excessive. 
• (2) 	The amount of developmental work that could be done was 
_restrictedJjmj. yJJ.flle. . 	 -- - 
(3) The aim of the applying the formula was to indicate whether 
the development of the model was practical. The performance of 
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the formula was evaluated subjectively, using a criterion of 
• apparent representivity of the results. - 
Note there is no distinction made between interactions of 
positive and negative factors. An interaction is viewed as 
increasing the potential contribution of the subject factor, 
regardless of its nature, by increasing the significance of the 
subject factor to Life Safety. 
Net Safety/Threat - The quantification of the relationships 
identified in the model was used to create values for the 
relative contributions for all the factors to Life Safety. This 
required matrix multiplication techniques, and is discussed in 
the developmental abstract and developmental section 11 
Summing the potential contributions for each time stage, noting 
the difference in nature of contribution of pro-safety and pro-
threat factors allows the derivation of a series of values 
representing the balance of safety and threat at each time stage. 
These are termed net safety/threat values. This is discussed 
more fully in developmental abstract and developmental section 
13 
These values may be displayed diagrammatically as a net 
safety/threat diagram. The net threat /safety diagram (see 
diagrams C28,C29,C30) presents a partial picture of a Life Safety 
evaluation exercise for a building scenario. This is derived by 
evaluating the actual contributions of factors in terms of 
performance deficiency and using this to adjust the potential 
relative contributions. - 
Some factors will be critical to the continuing safety of the 
occupants. The criticality of the factors to Life Safety is an 
important further aspect of system performance (particularly the 
mode(s) of failure). There is a distinct possibility that the 
total failure of a critical factor in the event will cause injury 
or death directly (e.g., physiological capability) or indirectly 
(e.g., event knowledge). This will not be indicated by the net 
safety/threat value alone. 
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The concept of a listing of critical values was considered an 
essential extension of a systems model. Derived, it allows the 
user to explore the implications of the failure of a critical 
factor. 
Incorporation of criticality analysis allows for a more 
representative analysis of Life Safety. The principle is to 
compare factors evaluated as deficient against an index of 
critical factors. Those deficient and critical may cause partial 
or total systemic failure (a chaining effect may occur). This is 
discussed in the developmental abstract and developmental section 
(14). A list of critical factors is included. 
As with the ordinary evaluation processes, performance is 
assessed by the individual, the effectiveness of the model will 
be dependent on the expertise of the user. ' - 
Other Aspects: Single and Multi-space modelling 
A number of models of aspects of fire growth and smoke 
release/movement are being developed as multi-spatial 
applications (e.g., FAST: two layer with vent mixing and lower 
layer contamination (Jones)(1984)(72); Harvard VI; lower layer 
fixed at ambient conditions (Gahm)(1983)(73)) following initial 
studies on single space models (e.g., ASET: smoke filling 
(Cooper)(38); Harvard V.X: time dependent room fire (Mitler and 
Emmons)(1981)(74)). 
Multi-space models for people movement have also been developed 
(e.g., Stahl (1979180)(31,32), Berlin (1982)(60)). A long term 
goal for systemic Life Safety modelling is a multi-spatial model. 
Similarly to the developmental process for other models, it is 
necessary to limit the scale of the model in the initial stages. 
The model may be expandable to multi-space by an interface of 
input and output information from each space. See schematic in 
diagram C31. This fairly straightforward concept, would require 
a lengthy and complex mathematical process to implement it in 
evaluation, particularly where more than two spaces link. A two- 
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way information transfer will be necessary for each time stage 
and adjacent time stages, to model the potentially reciprocal 
relationships between the spaces. 
Occupancy Size 
The concept of the factor Mode of Escape (discussed shortly) is 
related to the capability of the appropriate section of the total 
building population (and more specifically related to the 
assumptions inherent in the model; the appropriate section of the 
population in the single space being considered). This is termed 
the target population. The scale of this consideration is likely 
to vary with the building type, as the number of people in a 
space may be the whole population (e.g., a stadium), a group or 
groups of people (e.g., offices) or individuals. The values 
assigned in an evaluation may be affected by the size (and 
capability) of population threatened by fire and its products, 
and served by the building and smoke control. 
Potential and Actual Performance 
The actual performance of factors determines systemic success or 
failure. 
Factors determining Life Safety rarely perform to their full 
potential. Deficiency may be assessed using minimum standards or 
some other required performance level as the criterion. 
Standards may be derived using comparative tests on individual 
items. Malhotra notes the need to use tests as tools for 
achieving fire safety, rather than as goals in their own right 
(1984)(75). 
The potential relative contributions derived for each factor are 
modified by the evaluated performance in the actual scenario 
being analysed. 
A material that emits a particularly low amount of toxic gas, or 
someone who is more familiar with a building than could normally 
be expected will have a 'super-optimal' performance. In such 
cases this may act to balance up other deficiencies of factors it 
is. related to. A pro-threat factor will have a lower 
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contribution, a pro-safety factor will have a higher 
contribution. 
Factors evaluated as substandard (e.g., an excessive toxicity, or 
poor building knowledge) will have their contribution adjusted 
accordingly. A pro-safety factor will have a lower contribution, 
a pro-threat factor will have a higher contribution. 
there is a requirement for information on performance for the 
evaluation of potential and actual contribution of factors. 
Information Aspects and The Delphi Group 
Problems of information availability have been mentioned earlier. 
It important that available or synthesised data is reliable, 
consistent, representative, and applicable. This is a 
significant and recognised problem with Fire Safety (26), and is 
emphasised by the range of aspects involved in a systemic 
approach. 
Some of the identifiable factors affecting Life Safety are 
tangible, and relatively 'hard' data is, or could be made, 
available for the assessment of acceptable performance, eg; the 
physical width of an escape route. Direct simulation models of 
tightly definable aspects may be drawn on as sub-routines to 
provide "less hard" data. 
Some factors are chance variables (76), eg; the likelihood of 
ignition occurrence, and with suitably tight definition, values 
may be derived or abstracted for some cases. 
Information on less tangible aspects such as mobility and 
assistance requirements for degrees of non-ambulancy, 
communication effectiveness, and behaviour under stress is less 
easily quantified and may be unavailable. This is termed 'soft' 
data. 
A great deal of the data available to evaluate aspects of the 
building/people/environment sub-systems of Life Safety is for 
reasonably adverse conditions, and is either collected under such 
adversity or after the event, and subject to distortions. Canter 
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notes that the majority of this information is also for syStemic 
failures (1985)(28). 
The near-miss event is a relative success, and any information 
about such events could be useful (see also 
(1986)(16))J Near-miss events, and successful minor events are 
not always reported. Neither is it practicable to determine the 
severity of all recorded fires from current statistical records. 
Canter, discussing sources of information about human behaviour 
in fires, notes that much of the current knowledge about building 
fires comes from newspaper reports, special commissions of 
enquiry, or technical studies (1985)(28). Technical studies also 
provide a good deal of available information on aspects not 
related to human behaviour, eg; materials performance or burning 
in fires. 
He notes significant drawbacks of each type of information 
source, and states that better information sources can often be 
people with direct experience of fire. Techniques of obtaining 
information directly from those involved in fire incidents may 
critically affect the data collected. 
It was important that data of a general nature was available for 
this model, so as not to restrict applicability (a very necessary 
flexibility in an equivalence tool). 
To provide information which is otherwise unavailable on the 
relative importance of factors to Life Safety and the 
contribution of interactions to the system, it is necessary to 
create data. Harmathy proposes subjective judgement or 
probabilistics as alternatives to incomplete and incongruent data 
(1982)(76). Subjective judgement isthe fundamental approach and 
sets the questions for probabilistic studies or estimates. 
The problem of information sources is disdussed also by Marchant 
(18), who notes that the data required is not always available. 
In such cases, he proposes the temporary use of synthesised 
'points data. This technique has been successfully used in the 
creation of an evaluation scheme for patient areas in hospitals 
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(1982)(57) and is an approach adopted by Silcock and Shields 
recently (1986)(44). 
The need for data for the development of this model was met using 
the same approach. A structured group process was used to create 
subjective values for the potential relative contributions of 
factors. There are a number of technique variations, but 
generally the approach adopted is one of two (Jillson (77)); the 
anonymity group or the delphi technique. In each, a group of 
experts (normally 10 or more) is assembled. Jillson notes that 
the selection of the delphi group and its administration is a 
critical determinant of the outcome. 
Linstone (1975)(78) notes that:- 
"a group of experts each knowledgeable about one aspect of a 
complex system does not necessarily comprise expertise about the 
total system." 
It was intended that there should be ten group members - 
comprising five members from Edinburgh University (including the 
author); experts with knowledge in fire dynamics and smoke 
release, smoke movement and control, human aspects of fire 
events; and members of Building Control and the Building 
Directorate of the SOD, a Senior Fire Prevention Officer, a 
psychologist and a physiologist. The psychologist and 
physiologist declined to participate in the group, and so the 
membership was eight. 
The other members were: 
Dr. Eric Marchant. 
Dr. Dougal Drysdale. 
Mr. Peter Franklin. 
Senior Fire Prevention Officers, 
Lothian and Borders Fire Brigade 
Dr. John Morgan. 
Mr. Ashley Price. 
Mr. Chris Miller 
The term Delphi technique takes its name from the Greek oracle 
Delphi (famed for its ambiguity!) - the technique generally 
Is' 
consists of sending mailed questionnaires to an expert 	panel. 
Although the members of the group need not be anonymous, their 
individual responses to the questionnaires are. The process 
works on a re-iterative basis and subsequent questionnaires are 
accompanied by feedback from the previous questionnaires. 
The process should reduce variation in 	individual responses 
towards a consensus. 	Delphi technique may be used for 
qualitative and/or quantitative tasks. 
The anonymity group •process involves a face to face approach, but 
responses are again anonymous. Dalkey (1969)(79) states that face 
to face discussion tends to make group estimates less accurate, 
whereas more often than not the anonymous controlled feedback 
procedure made the group estimates more accurate. This is 
supported by Linstone (78) and wherever practicable from a 
comprehension point of view the latter was adopted. 
In the event, the process adopted was a combination of these two 
techniques, although the group was termed a delphi group. This 
arose because of the needs of the group for presentation of the 
concepts, to allow for a consistent approach to the problems both 
within the group at any given time, and for the duration of the 
information gathering process. 
A combination appeared to be the most appropriate method of 
gathering information. Some elements of the development process 
were qualitative, others were quantitative. Generally the 
concept was presented and discussed in meetings rather than by 
using mailings only. 
Information mailed as an introduction preceded the meeting 
itself, although this appeared to be of limited help. The scale 
of the model as it became more complex, and involved more 
decisions, required more in-depth accompanying notes and the 
exercises became excessively time consuming (comment based on 
feedback from group members). The Delphi process was used for 
eleven months. 
The quantitative development process is discussed fully in the 
developmental section of the thesis (appendix 2). 
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Sub Domains 
The fire safety system may be split into a number or aspects, 
concerned either with the provision or continuation of safety, or 
the presentation of threat ie; its degradation. Each of these 
domains and their sub-factors inter-relate in the system - they 
are discussed in separate sections because of the complexity of 
the system. Inter-relationships are included. 
Mode of Escape 






(j). Mode 21 Escape 
Escape is defined broadly as the avoidance of a threat imposed by 
a fire and its products. The fire may threaten the total 
population or a fraction of it. Egress is one mode of escape. 
The nature of escape is influenced by a number of factors; 
Occupant capability (Flarchant and Finucane (1978)(80)) [297], the 
Layout of building spaces (Caravaty and Winslow (8 and diagram 
C32)) [317], and the Environment inside the building (Heselden 
and Baldwin (82)) [218,219,220,221]. 
Escape problems may be created or exacerbated by the way in which 
people use buildings. 	In each scenario the performance of the 
population will be important [297,322]. 	It will depend on a 
number of factors. 
Fire Safety rèearch 'has tradif ion ally concentrated on reducing 	
T 
the likelihood of fire, or on the detection and control of its 
effects (e.g., fire and smoke spread). There have been 
significant advances. Less work has been done, and less progress 
made on understanding the behaviour of people in fires, and the 
contribution of this to successful escape. (Canter and Matthews 
(1976)(83), Jones and Pauls(1980)(84fl. 
Life Safety in Fires is closely related to people's actions. 
The regulation of Fire Safety requires assumptions of what people 
will do in the event of fire (Canter et al. (1980)(85), Appleton 
(1980)(86)). 	See diagram C33 [322]. 	Systemic modelling will 
also requiie this (Panzhauser (1985)(58), Van Bogaert 
(1979)(23)). A reasonably thorough understanding of the way in 
which people behave and interact with fires is necessary (Stahl 
(1978)(87)). Stahl (87): 
"Our ability to reduce the incidence of deaths and injuries due 
to building fires depends greatly upon our understanding of human 
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response during fire situations." 
There is no universally accepted model of human behaviour in 
fires (87). Sources of information for behavioural research are 
case studies, surveys, laboratory simulations, and computer 
simulations (Canter (1985)(28)). Canter notes there are problems 
with each of these techniques. Case studies are difficult to 
apply generally, surveys reflect the researcher's perspective. 
It is difficult to create representative conditions in laboratory 
experiments, and there are problems establishing the validity of 
computer models. 
Stahl (1978)(87), commenting on lack of rigour in the design and 
analysis of research into human behaviour, suggests that the 
apparent problem of understanding behaviour may be one reason for 
indeterminacy of research findings. Canter recommends the 
development of a model for behaviour in fires that links with 
existing physical models of fire and smoke behaviour (28) 
[218,219,220,221]. 
In the last twenty years a number of researchers have identified, 
and carried out work on, the importance of the behavioural 
aspects of people in fires (e.g., Wood (1972/0)(88,89)), Pauls 
(1977/80)(90,91,92), Canter (1980)(85), Sime (1983)(93), 
Quarantelli (94,95), Bickman et al. (1977)(96), Bryan (1977)(71), 
Lerup (1976)(64)), Stahl (1979/80)(31,32)) [322]. Interaction 
between people and fires has been increasingly recognised as 
significant to the outcome of events [218,219,220,221]. Diagram 
C34 illustrates the potential interaction between people and 
fire. 
People's reactions to the changing environment brought on by fire 
are an important aspect of Life Safety (Marchant (97) [247,248]. 
The effect of the stress induced by 	this is an important 
behavioural determinant (98,54) [34,35,247]. 	Foreman (1953)(99) 
refers to panic as inappropriate, negligent, and asocial 
behaviour. Bryan (1978)(100) does not regard the classical 
concept of 'panic' as useful for distinguishing behaviour as the 
terms adaptive or non-adaptive. Sime suggests panic is a concept 
of irrationality, applied by external observers to anxiety or 
'*2 
patterns of behaviour in events where the outcome is likely to be 
unfortunate, and that the retrospective (1978)(101) or 
anticipatory (1980)(102) employment of the term is less than 
useful. In contrast to the popular (press) use of panic to 
explain large scale tragedies, he fails to find evidence for 
panic being a major determinant of deaths. 
Discrepancies between definitions of panic need not invalidate 
their qualified use (Wenger (1978)(103)), however consistency 
would be powerful (101,100). Breaux et al. (1976)(104) call for 
an amendment of our ideas of what constitutes real panic. 
Quarantelli (94) discusses empirical observations and concludes 
that there is little evidence beyond anecdotal stories that 
behaviour under stress is less logical, rational, or functional 
than in everyday circumstances (see also Haber (105). 	Wood 
(1980)(89) also found little evidence of panic. 	Quarantelli 
suggests that if panic does occur in a disaster situation, it is 
almost never on a large scale (95)). 
Black (1978)(106) suggests that panic occurs when the possibility 
of escape co-exists with entrapment. Mawson notes that many 
authors use 'panic' for flight behaviour (e.g., Peschl (30), 
Hirai and Tarui (107)), occurring either when major physical 
- danger is believed present or imminent [36], and when escape 
routes are limited or closing (1978)(108). Breaux (1979)(109) 
has researched behavioural aspects of some hotel fires, and 
suggests that panic asarout occurs only in circumstances where 
- the subjective degree of freedom is limited. Diagraip C35 
illustrates the decreasing route options with time in a specific 
event. As the number of routes approaches zero, so the 
likelihood of panic as a rout increases (109). Quarantelli (94) 
supports the view that "panic flight" is goal-orientated. 
However, flight need not be maladaptive behaviour; it may be 
rational, if antisocial (106). - - 
Sinie (1985)(45,69) notes that an individual's misconceptions of 
the environment are sufficient to cause anxiety (also Foreman 
(1953) (99) ) [251,36]. He further stresses the importance of 
perceptions and their influence on behaviour in fires [31]. 
Perceptions of the dynamic balance between the time required for 
escape and the time available are significant in planning of 
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actions. 	Perception of these times appear to be internally 
elastic, and may be a reason for some cases of apparently 
maladaptive behaviour (e.g., packing clothes (Sime (69)). 	Other 
causes of such behaviour are suggested to be coping behaviour in 
the face of no degree of freedom (69). Quarantelli (94) proposes 
that feelings of impotency and isolation are significant, Black A 
(106) that frustration is a factor. 
It has been noted that the behaviour of people will vary with the 
type of scenario (Canter et al. (1980)(85)) - the important 
factors affecting this are the building [217], environment 
[218,219,220,2211, and the role of the occupants, which will be 
related to building usage (see also Bickman et al (96), Swartz 
(1978)(110)). 
Leadership is also an important feature of events (Darley and 
Latane (1968)(111,112), Rubin (1974)(113)). Jones and Hewitt 
(114), discussing leadership and group formation in relation to 
high rise building evacuations, draw a distinction between 
emergent (situational) and imposed (authoritative) leaders. 
Their position: 
"Sime (1983) takes the position that in order to maximise an 
occupant's ability to escape, the building designer must consider 
the important psychological aspects of people's response to a 
fire. The authors would go a step further by suggesting that, in 
addition to the psychological aspects, one must take into account 
the social and organisational characteristics of the occupancy, 
including what a person knows (or believes) of the situation, 
whether the person is alone or part of a group, the normal roles 
that people hold within the occupancy, and the organisational 
structure or framework. One factor that appears to be related to 
the chosen evacuation strategy of an occupant is the presence of 
leadership and the form which that leadership takes." [36] 
Sime reports findings from studies on exit choice behaviour from 
the Summerland Leisure Centre Marquee Showbar, which indicate the 
importance of behavioural criteria not generally assumed in the 
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design of escape routes (1985)(115). Diagram C36. Specifically, 
the hypothesis that person and place affiliation affects exit 
choice behaviour was upheld (93) [37,32]. Discussing this, he 
states: 
"The most important factors influencing the direction of movement 
were a combination of a person's role (and by definition, 
familiarity with a particular escape route), affiliative ties to 
individuals located elsewhere in the building, and consequent 
proximity to one exit or another." [32,33] 
Some researchers have approached behaviour in fires from the 
attitude of stimulus and response, others assume a more 
interactive nature. Bickman et al. (1977)(96):- 
.the individual is depicted basically as a reactor to the 
environment (since the environment is largely an uncontrollable 
one for the individual); however, instances are included in the 
fire coping stage in which the individual impacts on the 
environment." [216] 
They identify a number of factors and sub-factors influencing 
behaviour, summarised in a table reproduced as diagram C37 
[248,249,252,253,33,298,254]. These are discussed where 
appropriate later. 
The nature of an individual's influence on Life Safety will 
depend on the type of situation (Canter et al. (85)). Lerup et 
al. (1976)(64), reporting on case studies of nursing home fires, 
suggest that rather than viewing occupants as respondents to the 
physical environment, it is more realistic to consider them as 
managers of the environment ordinarily or of their Life Safety in 
fire events. Their approach:- 
11 	 .nursing home workers and residents involved in fire 
emergencies be thought of as thinking, acting organisms, whose 
actions while dependent on contextual circumstances, are 
nonetheless somewhat predictable." (64). 
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Some relationship between people and the outcome of events 
emerges (also (58)) [322]. Canter (1985)(28) regards behaviour in 
fires as 	a reasonable attempt to cope with rapidly changing 
ambiguous circumstances." 	Further, Lerup et al. (64) state 
that; 
"An understanding of the interaction between behaviour and 
physical environment is essential in making a safer built 
environment." 
This is an equally 	reasonable requirement for a Life Safety 
Systems model [217,222,218,219,221,220]. 
Mismatch of performance requirements and supply, arising out of 
the way people respond and manage fire events appear to be 
commonly linked with Life Safety System failure (e.g., Sime 
(1980)( 1 02 ). 
It is important to distinguish between those factors identified 
as directly determining the capability of people and those that 
merely influence it in some way by interaction. The potential 
contribution of each will vary with time and must be analysed. 
Factors directly determining people capability in fires. 
The factors identified as directly affecting the capability of 
people are shown in diagram C38. The development of the model 
into a quantitative tool was restricted to the tertiary level 
because of the scale of inter-relationships to (manually) model 
for evaluations, and this forms the basis of the following 
discussions. See diagram Cli. Diagram C39 shows the position of 
people capability in relation to the rest of the Life Safety 
System [322]. Note that a hierarchical structure emerges. 
"Mode of Escape" is a primary level factor and the head of a 
major sub-domain. It models the combination of factors directly 
determining the ability of the members of the population to 
escape. 	The factors included in this section are shown in 
diagram Cli. Its definition is particularly important (Delphi):- 
"Mode of Escape - the term 'mode of escape 	is to do with the 
capability to escape of the fraction of the population of the 
building which is threatened. This concept is the ability of the 
threatened population to effect escape optimally from a unit 
level of threat that may be imposed by the degrading environment, 
assuming that if assistance is required it is available, at the 
time of the event relevant for any given fraction of the 
population. 'Mode of Escape', distinct from 'egress', is the 
mode adopted in the event, which need not be that intended 
originally." 
Note 
The choice of the term "Mode of Escape" is unfortunate because of 
its ambiguity. This became obvious during the Delphi group 
proceedings, but it was agreed that changing it may have created 
more problems than it solved. 
It does not refer exclusively to the mode (e.g., evacuate, use of 
refuge, etc.), but to the capability of people in an event to 
escape. This involves aspects of communication and training as 
well as mobility [296,297,298]. The adoption of escape modes, 
such as evacuation or the use of refuges, are not determined by 
the capability to escape alone. The nature of the escape routes 
and the environment are also determinants [217,218,219,220,221]. 
For the inclusion of people as a responding interactive factor in 
a Life Safety system, it is necessary to model the sub-factors 
that determine their performance. 
Capability to Escape 
Individuals with the required capability to escape from a unit 
level of threat are defined as having an optimal Mode of Escape. 
Deficiencies may arise in connection with the mobility of the 
individuals [297], or in relation to the availability or use of 
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information [296]. 	Specific populations may have super-optimal 
potential. 
Different individuals, groups, or individuals within groups (63) 
forming the total population may react differently to fire events 
(e.g., Beverley Hills Supper Club (1976)(92)), Summerland (Sime 
(116), Abe (1976)(117))(Shields and Silcock (1987)(118)). Canter 
et al (85) noted this. Occupants may adopt different modes for 
their escape. The effectiveness of this and the nature of the 
relationship to Life Safety will vary accordingly. 
Considerations for capability will differ with the size of the 
population (fraction) (118) (see diagram C38). The dependency on 
the number of occupants has been identified as a factor in mass 
flow experiments (e.g., Peschl (1971)(30) and theoretical studies 
(e.g., Kendik (1985)(1 1 9). 
In almost all circumstances, crowds are heterogeneous (cf.: much 
of the empirical data used in the design of escape routes assumes 
a homogeneous population (Shields and Silcock (118)). Work has 
been done on calculating the effective number of people in 
heterogeneous crowds - by comparing different categories of 
occupant against an index (Marchant (1976)(63), see also Alvord 
(1983/85)(42,41). This has been tabulated and is reproduced as 
diagram C40 [297]. 
The capability of occupants to escape, and their effectiveness, 
need not correspond to that assumed during design or at changes 
in usage or building format. In some instances this may be 
traced to the people's response (e.g., Beverley Hills Supper Club 
(1977)(1O2)(Shields and Silcock (118)); their capabilities (118) 
[297]; the information made available to them (e.g., Seoul hotel 
(1971) [296], Summerland leisure centre (1973)(69)); their 
knowledge of the building (Abe (1976)(117) [250]; or the 
facilities available for escape (e.g., Saint Laurent-du-Pont 
dance hall (1970), Osaka night-club (1972), Dublin Disco 
(1982))( 120)) [257,256,92]. A relationship between capability of 
occupants and escape route provision has been shown (e.g., 
Marchant (1976)(62)) [217,222]. 
Schwalm (1981)(121) reports the investigation of relationships 
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between attitudes toward fire preparedness [253], personality 
characteristics [33] and experience with fire(s) [62]. The 
effect these have on the time to detect cues, to chose potential 
actions in a simulated fire situation, and the appropriateness of 
action was studied to see if a correlation between 
characteristics and actions emerged. 
Normally stressful occupants were found to take longer to detect 
fire cues [21,23,25,27,29], whilst those concerned with fire 
preparedness and having a realistic perception of fires 
performed quicker [33], and more appropriately. 
Schwalm also reports a positive effect of experience on speed of 
detection and appropriateness of action [33,88,62,214]. In 
contrast, Wood (89) reports that occupants with previous fire(s) 
involvement tend to be more likely to return into buildings, and 
are no more likely to behave in a 'correct way' than others. 
The importance of stress on decision making has also been 
commented on by Marchant (97), and Stahl (1978)(122). 
Maladaptive, or ineffective, behaviour (e.g., returning into 
buildings (Wood (89)) may result in death. It is difficult to 
realistically evaluate behaviour from an external standpoint 
(102), and so little representative knowledge can be gained about 
such instances (see earlier). Wood (1980)(89) suggests 
examination of the behaviour of other occupants may give some 
clues, but their reluctance to be interviewed is commonly a 
problem. 
In other cases, actions may be unsuitable but with less than 
catastrophic results. This adaptive-outcome may be due more to 
the circumstances than behaviour (101). It is more practical to 
research these incidents provided suitable techniques for 
extracting representative information are employed. Canter 
identified and tackled this problem (1985)(28)). 
Canter (1985)(28) reports findings of studies of behaviour in 
fires and the effectiveness of actions. These are based on 
experiences in real fires, and relate only to those who 
successfully escape or are rescued. He determined a relationship 
of attitude to fire, preparedness [252,255], and recognition, to 
effectiveness of behaviour (see also 83) [33,36]. 	See diagram 
C41. 	A significant proportion of ineffective or even 
counterproductive behaviours in fires were noted (see also Wood 
(1972/80)(88,89), Bryan (1977)(71), Canter and Matthews 
(1976)(83), Schwalm (1981)(121)). 	Misinterpretation [57] or 
delaying actions appear to be relatively frequent (28). 	Data 
shortages are particularly acute in the behavioural area of fire 
safety (see earlier). 
Sime (1983/85)(93,115) suggests that affiliative behaviour occurs 
in many instances (e.g., Summerland (1973)(69)(see also 63)). A 
comprehensive comparative review of regulatory assumptions on the 
time-based capabilities of escapees and research findings was 
carried out by Stahl et al. (1982) (67)), to establish the 
technical support for regulatory provisions. In many areas, 
including behavioural aspects, technical support was found to be 
weak or unavailable. 
Research into the early actions of occupants in fires have 
indicated in some circumstances trends of likely activities. 
Bryan and Milke (1981)(123) report from studies of health care 
incidents on common actions of participants in fires. There was 
a tendency for evacuation and action for protection by those 
people who were in life threatening situations, whilst those in 
non life-threatening situations tended to act to fight the fire 
or alert others. An influence of environmental degradation on 
behaviour was noted. The patient characteristics, age and extent 
of smoke spread influenced the evacuation method used 
[297,219,220]. 
Other studies by Bryan (71) indicated four predominant first 
actions of occupants in fires; in order they were ' notify 
others', 'search for fire', 'call fire department', and 'got 
dressed' 
These results were compared against those of Wood (1972)(88) and 
generally corroborated his findings (71,124). 	More recently 
studies by Okishio and (the late) Handa (1985)(125) of human 
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behaviour in a hotel fire focused on the means of awakening 
(diagram C42) [18,20,237,241]; actions immediately after waking 
(diagram 043); means of becoming aware of the fire (diagram C44) 
[237,238,5,4,6,241,18,201; and actions following recognition of 
the fire event (classified in diagram C45). A significant degree 
of information seeking after awakening, and notification of 
others in the event is evident (also Edelman et al. (1980)(126)). 
The alarm was switched off at the time of the event, and this 
probably influenced these actions (cf.; 'cry wolf' effect 
(127,128)). 	Preparatory actions for escape and escape actions 
are also shown to be predominant in this event. 	Such types of 
activity have also been recognised and incorporated as coping 
behaviours into a model for human behaviour (Bickman et al. (96), 
Canter (28)). 
Other studies of behaviour patterns throughout a number of fires 
have been carried out. Kobayashi and Horiuchi (1987)(129) 
studied an office building fire. See diagram C46 [252]. They 
found two behaviours which characterised occupant behaviour. One 
behaviour, based on occupational responsibilities, involved 
taking responsible actions followed up by egress using a 
predetermined plan [252,253 ; 298]. The other, based on line of 
command, was to wait for instructions from a superior and then 
carry these out [296,164]. Knowledge and role have been shown by 
other researchers to affect exit choice behaviour (e.g., Sine 
(93,115) [298]. 
Canter et al. (1980)(85) have made studies of a number of fires, 
and variations between occupancy types and the roles of the 
occupants are identified. There also appear to be variabilities 
between the sexes ((28), also Wood (89) and Bryan (71)). Diagram 
C47 indicates decompositions of identified actions during fire 
events, termed Act Sequence Diagrams, for two types of building 
usage [237,242,21,251,57,238,4,6,218,219,220,221,296,3211. Canter 
et al. report that the development of the Act Sequence diagrams 
was made "without any need to refer to explanations drawing upon 
'panic' or 'irrational' behaviour models". Activities vary 
particularly after the early stages of the events, and suggest 
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people tend to adopt the role they consider appropriate (see also 
(28)). 
The development and testing of a behavioural sequence interview 
technique for post fire interviews to provide data is discussed 
by Keating and Loftus (1984)(130) (see also (28)). The technique 
is reviewed favourably, and their findings in field tests 
correlate well with the findings on activities by other 
researchers (e.g., Wood (88), Bryan (71), Canter et al. (85)). 
As indicated by diagram C39 there is some degree of interactivity 
between Mode of Escape and the rest of the Life Safety System 
(Stahl (32). It may be influenced by each of the other primary 
level factors [217,218,219,220, 221,322], and in turn may affect 
the contribution of the Escape Route Layout [222]. See diagram 
C48. 
Relationships between the information available [57,251,296], 
knowledge, and activity are shown to occur, and require 
incorporation into a Life Safety System. In a model with a time 
basis related to people activity the dynamic nature of 
performance is modelled also. 
The influence of the environment is represented by a potentially 
important set of interactions [217,218,219,220,221]. These are 
supported by Bickman et al. (96) who identified a number of 
characteristics of a fire, and physical environment that 
determine behaviour throughout the event. See diagram C49. 
These identified factors give strong support for the assumed 
impacts and interactions in this model [6,20,17,14,8,40,42,237, 
238,10,41,43,296,7,55,37,54,241,2171. 
The potential consequences of interactions are information for 
detection [237,238,240,241] (Bryan and Milke (123)), interference 
with escape (71), and injury or death [40,41,42,43,44]. The 
problem of environmental degradation and the nature of its 
interaction with people [218,219,221] is difficult to assess 
quantitatively. Representative experiments are impractical and 
post fire data, generally gained by interview, gives clues about 
successful escape mostly. Canter (1985)(28) reports on research 
into difficulty in escaping fires, based on questionnaires. He 
notes an influence of investigators perspectives on the type of 
data collected. Diagram C50 [219,223]. 
Data are required on the distance people will travel through 
smoke, and the problems environmental degradation presents (Stahl 
et al. (1977)(124)). Some work has been done in this area (e.g., 
Tashida (1975)(131)), further studies are planned (69). Rasbash 
(1967)(132) reports no general agreement on an "accepted" 
visibility, but notes that there is evidence of people refusing 
to enter visible smoke dilute enough to allow them to get to 
safety. Wood (1980)(89) reported a surprisingly large percentage 
of people moving through smoke when surveying behaviour in fires. 
Travel and activity problems may arise with large groups or 
crowds (e.g., '1979 'Who' Concert disaster in Cincinnati, Fruin 
(1984)(133), also Sinie (69,115)). Small sub-groups may form and 
delays occur whilst decisions are made (a feature of Fires 
(Stahl (1979/80)(31,32)). 	The emergence of leaders may also 
involve a necessary delay. 	Review of mass exit in groups has 
indicated injury to occupants (Quarantelli)(94) particularly when 
antisocial behaviour occurs in crowded situations. Direct 
physical injury (94) or death (133) may occur (97). 
The capability of a person, group, or crowd to effect escape is 
identified and defined as depending directly on three factors 
(diagram C51):- 
The Mobility of the population members [297] 
The Communication of information about the event [296], and 
Any knowledge they have which may be useful, broadly termed 
Training [298]. 
These three secondary factors require closer definition and 
analysis. 	Their direct effect (termed impact and defined 
53 
earlier) on the capability to escape 	will be determined by 
factors on which they depend. 	The contribution may also be 
influenced by factors that interact with them. This will modify 
their potential contribution to Life Safety (through their effect 
on Mode of Escape). 
It is worthwhile to consider the dependencies and inter-
relationships of each with the rest of the system:- 
Mobility 
Mobility depends on, and may be limited by the individuals 
psychological 	capacity, 	physical 	and/or 	physiological 
capabilities. 	See diagram C52 [297,247,248,249]. It is defined 
as (Delphi):- 
"The term mobility describes the overall ability of the 
individual to effect escape. Limitations of psychological, 
physical or physiological capability may all directly affect 
'mobility'. The breadth of the term leads to the prima facie 
inconsistency that an ambulant person (in normal language - a 
mobile person) may because of psychological reasons be classified 
as immobile." 
Mobility for escape is related to the degree of disadvantage or 
restriction of activity caused by the loss or reduction of 
functional ability. Disability may be very severe or almost 
inconsequential (Groner et al. (1981)(98), Goldsmith (134)). It 
may also be temporary. Disability may take the form of one or 
more physical, intellectual or emotional impairments. In 
addition, people may be handicapped (e.g., luggage, children) 
(Shields and Silcock (1987)(118)). There is likely to be a 
different population constitution with the variety of activities 
associated with different building uses. At the extremes, people 
may be more mobile than average, in other cases significantly 
less mobile, or immobile. 
Particular problems tend to arise and be identified with the 
immobile (Groner et al. (98)). 	Experimental research has been 
carried out, to establish and test techniques for compensatory aid 
to improve potential performance (Hackney hospital evacuation 
exercises (135), Hall (1980)(136)). Identified performance 
variables were the location and extent of the fire [165], 
building layout and escape route [166,167,168], patient type, and 
staff present. Additionally, work has been done on the 
comparative evaluation of patient mobility (Marchant and Finucane 
(80) [297]. See diagram C53 (and refer diagram C71). Marchant 
(1982)(137) notes that travel distance calculations based on the 
assumption of able-bodied occupants are not necessarily realistic 
(also Pearson and Joost (1983)(138) [247,248,249,46]. Rees and 
Wagstaff (1981)(139) have identified a number of problems which 
detract from realism of patient evacuation tests. See diagram 
C54 [247,248,249,251]. 
Stahl acknowledges the requirements of assistance and the 
implications for egress behaviour (1980)(32). Theoretical studies 
have been carried out by Archea and Margulis (140). 
The relatively mobile require consideration also. 	Pauls 
(1977)(90) gives a brief comment on the term "able-bodied 
persons". Taking office workers in Canadian office buildings as 
his "representative sample", he estimates that 3% of those 
usually present in high rise office buildings cannot, or should 
not, attempt to evacuate by means of crowded exit stairs. In 
addition to those with obvious physical difficulties, this 
minority includes people with heart disorders and convalescents 
from recent illness, surgery or accident [248,249]. Movement of 
these people to a place of safety will require planning and 
assistance from other able-bodied occupants. It could include 
their descending stairs behind other occupants who would be 
already travelling at a fairly slow speed characteristic of high 
density crowds. He also suggests their being carried or having 
elevators operated by authorised personnel to take them to 
safety. This is generally a less obvious mobility problem 
requiring compensation, and may be an area suitable for further 
research. 
Pauls (1980)(91) also notes that injuries during events may 
occur. These may give rise to obstruction [81] and assistance 
implications for others using the building [169]. 
Mobility is contextual. 	Circumstances of building layout may 
limit the effective mobility of escapees. 	For example, 
obstructions to movement caused by blocked/locked exits [165] 
(e.g., Saint Laurent-du-Pont (1970), Bradford football stadium 
(1985), Dublin Disco (1982), Kirkcaldy Nurses Home (1982)(see 
appendix 3)); the capacity of the route (Manchester Airport 1985 
(141) also (120)) [167]; its ease of use - affected by layout 
complexity; and difficult to negotiate or steep stairs may all 
affect mobility (Fitch et al. (1974)(141), Fruin (143)) [166]. 
To some extent the use of stairs will depend on people's 
familiarity - see Ease of Use section later. 
Such limitations may affect some people more significantly than 
others [81]. For example, inadequate attention to the pressure 
created across doors for smoke control, or the resistance of 
sprung hinges can effectively obstruct routes for some occupants 
(144,97,33,145) [165]. 
A significant aspect of group mobility are individuals' goals 
(Quarantelli (94). If all are aiming for the same goal (e.g., an 
exit) problems of crowding (Peschl (30)), and differential travel 
rates (146) may limit the crowd mobility [165]. See also 
Nakamura and Yoshioka (147); Stahl (1978)(122) incorporates this 
in his (computerised) model of egress behaviour. 
Where mobility is impaired there may be a requirement for 
compensatory measures. 	Full or limited assistance from others 
may be 	required (commonly in hospitals or homes) (98). 
Prosthetic equipment may allow the occupant independence. Space 
requirements may affect others (148,63). Special communication 
requirements to direct movement impaired, strength impaired, and 
life support equipment hindered people to refuges or other 
locations may be required (149 and diagram C55) [31]. Refer 
diagram C40 (Marchant (63)). 
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Studies by Nelson and Levin (1982)(54) in relation to small board 
and care homes have produced a system for measuring evacuation 
difficulty. Salient aspects of differences in resident 
capabiity have been identified (diagram C56)(332) [297] and a 
method for the derivation of relative values for evacuation 
difficulty developed (an evacuation difficulty index) (see also 
98). This is summarised by the sample worksheet in diagram C57 
[247,248,249297]. 
The scheme gives recognition to the ability and expected 
performance of the actual people in the event of a fire. 
Residents are evaluated on the basis of points assigned for the 
perceived risk they pose. 
A number of significant variable factors are identified as 
important and included in the evacuation difficulty index 
derivation [297,247,35,2481. They are:- 
Attitude of patients regarding resistance to evacuation * 
Mobility status $ 
Effect of stress on psychological capability* 
Assistance requirements $ 
Attitude to instructions* 
Waking likelihood * 
* relate to psychological capacity 
$ relate to physical /physiological capability 
The importance of training, experience and the effects of people 
is also recognised by Nelson and Levin (298,252,253]. 	The 
effectiveness of past fire drills is subjectively assessed for 
each patient [33]. 
On the basis of the variables an 'evacuation assistance score' is 
derived for each of the occupants. 
The summed evacuation assistance requirement, a value for the 
difficulty of assistance provision is derived. This is related 
s7 
to vertical travel distance [46] (noted as an important factor 
also from the Hackney exercises (135)) and combined with a staff 
score (the availability of assistance, a critical determinant). 
Diagrams C58,C59. 
The combination produces an 'E' score - an Evacuation difficulty 
score (see also Marchant and Finucane (80)). This 'E' value is 
used with equivalency considerations for the building 
evaluation!. The building is evaluated (diagram C60) and a set 
of values derived for the evaluated safety in respect of four 
aspects of fire control, egress, refuge, and general safety. 
Diagram C61. 
This is then compared against mandatory safety requirements in 
each area (ie; minimum acceptable standards) and the residence 
evaluated as acceptable or not in each context (diagram C62). 
The value of the 'E' scores indicates over-provision. Note 
though there is no allowance for trade-off between the four 
aspects (equivalent to the summing of the 4 net values and 
comparing them against a value). 	The need for further 
consideration of the factors is noted. 	After the net safety/ 
threat value has been derived, the factors are considered for 
individual criticality. 
Note the recognition of the factors in safety parameter values 
relating to threat (passively or actively) from fire; including 
control of material choice, detecting the threat and egress 
provisions. A similar conceptual technique has been applied to 
the evaluation of healthcare facilities (Nelson and Shibe 
(1978)(55)) and the cost effectiveness of fire safety retrofits 
in healthcare facilities (Chapman et al. (1980)(56)). 
Thoughtful design should allow for a predictable deficiency in 
mobility and, usage should reflect this also (Burgan (1978)(150)). 
The design compensation required will vary with occupant 
capability. The end result should be equivalence. 
A person's mobility is potentially important at all stages of a 
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fire event. 	It was considered as being critical and of high 
importance by the structured group. This is partly because of 
the breadth of definition. See diagram C63 for the relationship 
with the rest of the system [165,166,167,168,50,58,169,1O1,105, 
216,164]. 
A persons mobility may influence other factors in the Life Safety 
system. In particular a poor or exceptional mobility may produce 
knock-on effects. These are illustrated in diagram C63. Archea 
and l4argulis have examined the provision of assistance throughout 
the event in relation to a number of_ patient _requirement _levels 
(1979)(140). They highlight the importance of an understanding 
of human behaviour in emergencies to ensure occupant safety. An 
inter-relationship of behaviour with egress related physical 
design [222] and emergency planning (drills, training and 
educational programmes) [298] is identified. See diagram C64. 
The relationship between mobility and the building, and the 
effect this should have on escape planning was identified by 
Caravaty and Winslow (1970)(81) [165,166,169]. See diagram C32. 
Consideration of this inter-relationship from the design stage 
onwards is necessary. 
Note that a lack of mobility (in the broad sense of the 
definition) may restrict the build up of event knowledge [58] or 
the capability to fight a fire [216]. in the context of 
movement, it may mean that a route is less usable than it could 
be because of length [105], width [101], steepness or ease of use 
[169]. The value of building knowledge of routes and layouts 
within a building (established prior to an event) is diminished 
by an occupant's poor capability to use them (diagram C63) [50]. 
Some of these aspects of inter-relationships have been considered 
by workers studying fragments of the system (e.g. , Archea and 
Margulis (140)). These relationships are formalised within the 
structure of the model using the relational definitions of impact 
and interaction described earlier. 
There is a direct dependency of an individual's mobility on their 
psychological capacity, and their physical and physiological 
capabilities [247,248,249]. The importance of these factors is 
noted by Marchant (1976)(63). There is some potential 
contribution throughout the event, hence mobility has a potential 
contribution throughout the event. This is represented by an 
impact of each of the three tertiary level factors onto mobility. 
See diagram C52. These are the only factors on which mobility 
directly depends. 
Psychological capability. 
The psychological capacity of an- individual is an essential 
factor in the ability to perceive the event and plan their 
escape. It is defined as (Delphi):- 
"The conscious reasoning power of the individual to recognise and 
make decisions based on information and required knowledge and so 
to detect, perceive, plan and execute tactics during the event. 
Apart from mental limitations the capacity may be modified by 
sleep, alcohol, medicines, etc." [31,36,35] 
In 	some 	instances 	the 	psychological 	capacity 	is 
characteristically impaired. Long term limitations of ability may 
be the result of intellectual impairment, emotional disturbance 
or a combination of the two (96,98). The extent of handicap may 
vary. Loss of memory may occur as a consequence of the 
impairment. 
The capacity for alert and rational thought may also be modified 
in the short term by factors such as fatigue, alcohol (Hopkinson 
(1984)(151), Pauls and Jones (84); drugs (e.g., Barbiturates, 
Flurazepam tend to raise detection thresholds, amphetamines, 
caffeine to lower them (152,153,84)) [35]. Studies on required 
stimuli for awakening have been done by a number of researchers 
(e.g., Pezoldt and Van Cott)(154). Occupants who take sedatives 
or tranquillisers to help them sleep,' or have a severe hearing 
impairment require special consideration for assured awakening 
(98). Such problems can be expected to be occupancy related. 
Psychological capacity may be critical for an individual in a 
fire event. There will be implications for the ability to 
perceive [21,23,25,27,29], plan and implement plans for escape 
(63). In some cases it may also play a contributory part to the 
start or development of an incident (151). Re-awakening and the 
effects of the event stress may also be debilitating 
(134,155,156) [35,34]. 
Archea and Margulis (140) refer to the need for recognition of 
the problems associated with cognitive and physical defects, and 
notes that few models or regulations take this into account. 
Bickman et al. (96) include personal determinants in their model 
of human behaviour in fire emergencies. A number of sub-factors 
are identified; personality characteristics, mood, demographic 
characteristics, familiarity with environment [47,64], ongoing 
behaviour, and past experience with fires (see also (71)). Some 
are more transitory than others. See diagram C65 [247,250,252]. 
Psychological capacity is subject also to extremes between and 
within individuals, and fires are not restricted to the waking 
hours (see (96)). Fire occurrence patterns may vary between 
occupancies. Physiological capability may be subject to similar 
variations, and together with physical capability may be affected 
by the environmental degradation in a fire causing injury and/or 
death. These factors are plainly critical to Life Safety in 
Fires. 	See diagram C66 [31-37,21,23,25,27,29,38,45.53,64,47]. 
The effects of psychological will to survive or expectation will 
have implications for Life Safety (Abe (117)). The importance of 
stress during the event is discussed by Marchant (97) [247]. The 
nature of stress will be variable, and related to expectations 
and experiences, during the event. See diagram C67. It is 
likely that the response and adaptive ability of the individual 
in a fire will be related to their general composure. Highly 
stressed people may react less favourably to sudden increased 
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stress levels. A variety of effects on the psychological state 
may occur (Innes (1975)(157)). Marchant (63) and Nelson and 
Levin (54) note that in some occupancies (e.g., psychiatric 
hospitals) there is a likelihood of subnormal reactions to the 
stress of a fire event [35]. Time to detection or perception by 
individuals and the extent and nature of actions taken will be 
widely variable. Fire safety measures and staff training will be 
required to compensate for this. For small board and care homes, 
Nelson and Levin suggest staff appraisal of patients prior to 
events to help plan for this. The concepts of panic were 
discussed earlier. 
As expectation of death is confronted, so the will to go on and 
personal morale decreases (Abe (117)). On the other hand a 
seemingly hopeless situation, retrieved, or any definite 
improvement in expectation of safety can give increased resolve 
for escape (see also diagram C67). 
There are potential consequences for the whole Life Safety System 
of any individual's behaviour at any stage of the event. The 
psychological performance of an individual is evidently critical. 
Panzhauser (1985)(58) notes that as soon as people are included 
in a fire (as threatened or exposed persons , as staff members or 
as rescue personnel), the decisions of persons to act or not can 
or will lead to radical changes in the advance of the fire event. 
Lerup has noted this also (64). 
Stahl includes aspects of people behaviour and its effects into 
the BFires (computerised) models for emergency egress behaviour 
(1979/8O)(31,158,32). Specifically, the dynamic nature of 
response to the environment and the building layout is modelled 
[64,47]. Bfires is derived from an "information processing" model 
of human behaviour (1978)(122). Occupants make movement choices 
based on available current information [31], knowledge built up 
during the event activities [36], and the existing knowledge from 
training [33]. A particular movement path results from a chain 
of movement decisions over time. Updating of information and 
replanning is a recognised activity [53]. The later version of 
the model (Brires II) included smoke spread and toxicity, and 
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the provision of assistance. 	Diagrams C68 and C69 deal with 
modelling the movement of people and some of the criteria 
affecting movement [323,250,255,256,297,256]. BFires is 
applicable to a variety of general egress situations, described 
by user supplied parameters for the building, fire threat, and 
occupants. Known (or desired) spatial dimensions and known (or 
anticipated) temporal duration are specified (making it 
applicable to proposed/existing buildings). 
Physical Capability. 
Physical Capability may be both absolute and contextual. 	It is 
defined as (Delphi):- 
"The capability to move oneself and perform the physical 
activities required for escape." 
Bickman et a]. (96) identify physical and physiological state at 
the time of fire as very important determinants of behaviour, 
grouping psychological capacity as defined for this model in with 
their terms. They identify a number of sub factors affecting the 
level of alertness (sleep/wake, and drugs) and the physical 
condition (mobility and strength) [34,38]. 
The relationship between physical capability and obstructions is 
relative [81]; for example door opening resistance (Marchant 
(97). The potential of this occurrence is also considered by 
Butcher and Parnell (1979)(144), in relation to limits on smoke 
control over-pressures across doorways. Contextual aspects of 
physical capability relate to the inter-relationship between 
person and environment. See diagram C70 [38-
41,22,24,26,28,30,34,81]. 
A person who can travel horizontally but cannot use stairs will 
only be mobile in horizontal scenarios. The physical capability 
required for mobility is insufficient in itself for safety in a 
fire, although inability may be sufficient to allow death or 
injury to occur. It has been shown to be a critical determinant 
of time for evacuation (135,159, and diagram C71). Note that the 
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relative importance of factors may actually vary from the 
potential in actual scenarios. 
Physical capability is a widely variable factor in Life Safety 
scenarios (63). It is a common area of required assistance, and 
may include the totally dependent (54,55) and the very young or 
very old (Marchant (1976)(63), also Schwalm (1980)(160)). Its 
criticality is emphasised when occupants are alone. 
Physiological Capability. 
Physiological Capability is defined as (Delphi):- 
"The term is concerned with the functioning of the body, and 
importantly its continuing function throughout the event." 
The physiological ability and resistance of occupants to injury 
is potentially significant. There is an inter-relationship with 
the fire and its by-products [42,43,44]. Toxicological 
interference with physiological and physical capability may 
incapacitate (Marchant (97), possibly before waking in room of 
fire origin scenarios (Purser (161)); 
Common causes of physiological injury and death are inhalation 
of hot gases (Cox (1986)(162), and asphyxiants such as CO, HCN, 
Carbon Dioxide, and low Oxygen. Purser has identified a 
relationship between uptake and effect of carbon monoxide and 
workrate (161). See diagram C72 [44]. Hypoxia can occur with low 
oxygen levels, and/or crowding pressures (97). 
Synergistic effects have been shown to occur (Hartzell et al.; CO 
and HCN (1984)(163,164); Bowes et al.; CO and HCL (1976)(165)), 
although there is some dispute over the relative contributions of 
individual toxic gases (141). 	Purser (161) recommends further 
work. 	Bowes (1975)(166) reports a large increase in fatal and 
non-fatal casualties 'overcome by gas or smoke' over an eighteen 
year study period between 1955 and 1972 - a factor of three 
overall. He suggests the widespread introduction of plastics 
into buildings maybe contributory. 
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(:psychological Capacity may also be affected [35], and irritation 
of the upper respiratory tract and eyes probably impairs escape 
(Purser (161)) [391). 
Physiological capability may limit mobility to the extent that 
the occupant is immobile without assistance [249], or has 
critical travel limitations [46,105]. Marchant (63) has discussed 
physiological capability and the factors affecting it. Stress-
induced physiological changes may prepare the individual for 
"fight or flight", or cause injury through shock [39]. Those 
using drugs to modify their bodily functions may be particularly 
liable to dysfunctional responses. 
Abrupt arousal from sleep may be associated with temporary 
physical [39], physiological, and psychological [35] performance 
deficiency. 
See diagram C73 for summary of interactions [42-46,35,39]. 
Communication. 
The behaviour of individuals or groups in fires may vary, but is 
fundamentally dependent on knowledge about the event. This may 
be made available to them directly or indirectly from a variety 
of sources. The potential value will vary accordingly. 
Communication [296] relies on the existence and perception of 
information [237-246]. Rubin and Glass (167): 
"Effective communications assumes not only the capability to 
transmit a complex set of messages but a high degree of assurance 
that the appropriate messages are received and understood by 
those who are directly threatened by the fire." 
A functional distinction is made between the existence and 
perception of information (168,96). See diagram C74 [237-246]. 
Communication is defined as (Delphi):- 
'The term communication encompasses the transferral of 
information to or from (1) an individual at any stage of the 
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event. Communication of information may be important for varying 
reasons throughout the event - in making the threat apparent (2) 
in assessing options for escape, and the (continuing) execution 
of escape plans. (3) There can be no certainty that the 
communicated information will be directly relevant to the fire 
event, or that it will be correct (4) and complete. 
Notes. 
Information transferral from an individual:- in group 
environments leadership formation or discussion of problem 
definition (the threat from the fire/ smoke, etc.) and solution 
(escape plan), the to/from nature of communication is likely to 
be important. 
Making the threat apparent in a timely fashion may be 
affected significantly by the time wasted ignoring or 
-misinterpreting ambiguous cues - do not confuse mis-
interpretation with a low value of communication. They are 
distinct and can occur for different reasons. Misinterpretation, 
as the phrase implies, is concerned with the misinterpretation of 
information - this occurs after the communication has taken 
place. The actual value of communication need not the stumbling 
block. 	However, the quality' of the information may be 
contributory to its ease of interpretation. 	Perceptibility, 
directionality, coding, clarity, logic, credibility, and coverage 
may all affect 'quality'. 
The strategy of Life Safety will remain, the tactics (escape 
plans) may be updated or drastically altered in the light of new 
information. 
Incorrect conclusions may result from misinterpretation (see 
note (2)) or incorrect information., eg; public address systems 
giving incorrect facts about the event. 	The weak link in each 
case will be different." 
The communication of information makes a potentially important 
contribution to Life Safety throughout a fire event. Initially, 
it provides the ambiguous cues required for detection [57]. 
Canter et al. (1980)(85): 
"..fire is experienced as a complex, rapidly changing event, 
which, in its early stages at least, is usually highly ambiguous, 
providing little positive information to act upon." 
Characteristically a delay in action associated with the 
ambiguity, or sometimes a search, may lead to confirmatory or 
complementary information (28). This is termed reinforcement and 
may lead to perception of the fire event. 
Additionally, information to base plans for action on, or a 
continuing feedback about progression to safety during the 
potentially 'active' stages of a person's involvement in the fire 
event may be available [57]. 
Communication is inter-related with a number of factors involved 
in decision making processes. Individuals will base decisions for 
escape on knowledge gained from communication [57], training 
[164], and the building. Their training may affect the value of 
communication (e.g., understanding coded messages [64]), and vice 
versa [60,63]. In addition, effective communication could reduce 
the problems of obstructions [80] (149). See diagram C75 
[164,31,57,60,63,70,77,80]. 
Features of the building include provision for the identification 
of location and escape routes [70,77], and are discussed under 
the section Ease of Use. The components of trained knowledge are 
discussed shortly. 
Available information on events is inter-related with the 
building [e.g., 268,271,2731, environment [eg; 270,274] and 
people. Diagrams C76,C77 (125). The content and relevance will 
be variable throughout the fire event. Further, variation will 
occur between different occupancy scenarios. For example Breaux, 
Sime and Canter (85) distinguish between the ambiguous cues in 
domestic and multiple occupancy events. Refer diagram C47. 
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Safe design and usage of buildings must address function. 	The 
perception of information by occupants must be analysed and 
detection measures designed to cater for individuals needs and 
nature of use (149). The requirements will vary with occupancy 
type, and throughout the event. The term Ability to Perceive is 
defined as (Delphi):- 
"Perception of Aural! Visual! Tactile! Gustatory! Olfactory 
information - separate from the existence of sound sight, etc. 
is the perception of it. The ability to perceive does not imply 
meaningfulness, but rather the reception of it only; ie, it is 
acceptable (in terms of the model) for the sound of a fire bell 
to exist, and to be perceived as existing, but if the person does 
not have the general fire safety knowledge of what the bell 
means, the communication of the information in the sound does not 
occur. This term deals with the ability to perceive the existing 
sound, or sight, etc." 
The existence of information is distinguished from its perception 
on the basis of the psychological perception model (Radford and 
Govier (1982)(168)). A stimulus does not exist for an individual 
unless it is perceived. This is also supported by Bickman et al. 
(1977)(96). 
There will be different requirements for the provision of 
information at different stages in the event. The nature of 
communication will depend on the availability of information 
[237,238,239,240,241], and the perceptive ability of the 
individual [242,243,244,245,246], which will be related to their 
psychological capacity (63) [21,23,25,27,29]. 
Marchant (1976)(63) discusses the problems associated with 
- sensory deficiency [22,24,26,28,30], and the means for its 
compensation. Deficiency in the perception of audible [22], 
visual [24], and olfactory [30] cues will be most significant for 
detecting common cues. 	Visual deficiency is likely to be the 
most significant deficiency for escape. 	In cases of known 
sensory deficiency compensation using alternative techniques for 
warning may be practical. 	It may not always be practical for 
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every occupant to receive and interpret alarm signals, however, 
it should be ensured that all those who are expected to take 
independent action are reached (1979)( 149). Signals should be 
simple and preferably standardised. The type of medium used will 
affect the nature of communication. The information must be made 
available in such a manner that perception and interpretation can 
be done rapidly and effectively. 
Diagram C55 is a reproduction of two matrices derived by a panel 
studying alarm systems for the handicapped (1979)(149). The 
first matrix indicates the state of product availability for the 
initial notification of building occupants for a variety of 
disabilities [237,238]. 	Note the development requirements 
identified in the area of hearing [237]. 	The second matrix is 
conceptually similar, but covers product availability to provide 
the supplementary information required for continued escape. 
In instances involving large occupancies, communication is 
particularly critical. Pre-planning and scheduling of 
information may be necessary (63). 
The delay between the ignition and the detection of a fire is 
wasted escape time. See diagram C78. In all scenarios, early 
detection is vital to allow the usable portion of the total 
available time for escape to be maximised. The use of 
'intelligent' detection and alarm systems may cut down on delay, 
false alarms and uncertainty of maintenance. Reliability is an 
important aspect of alarms; frequent or recent faults in alarms 
may reduce their credibility (127,128). 
Detection 	of a fire occurs as a result of perception of 
information, usually in the form of ambiguous cues [295]. 	The 
first cue may differ with different occupancy. In addition there 
is evidence that the pre-fire activity influences cue reception 
and response (28). Olfactory or auditory early cues are frequent 
in domestic events [241,237], a high incidence of auditory cues 
characterise multiple occupancy fires (Canter (28)). Generally 
proximity to the fire is likely to be less in the multiple 
occupancies: Bryan has identified location and proximity of 
occupants to the lire as an important determining variable of 
direct detection (71) [2,5,13,16,19]. Cues for direct detection 
include smoke and heat [4,6,8,10,15,17,18,20], and the sight or 
sound of the fire. Air circulation systems [1,3,12] or poor 
compartmentation [2,5,13,16,19] may allow smoke or fire threats 
to move about in a manner as to give direct cues and threat to 
locations remote from the fire (Taylor (1975)(169)). 
Interpretation of cues is an important aspect of the 
understanding of communicated information [247]. Some cues, 
particularly direct cues are less ambiguous than others, and will 
require less reinforcement for a fire threat to be perceived 
(e.g., smoke). 
There will also be some variability in people's reactions, 
depending on their attitudes and experience. Consequently 
interpretations of the situation, and reactions will vary. Aural 
information is the most ambiguous (28). 
The nature of the information source may mean that some specific 
fire safety knowledge is needed for comprehension [33,51]. 	- 
Breaux et al. (1976)(104) warn against categorising detection 
through either visual, auditory or olfactory cues, since this may 
mask the fact that in fire situation a combination of cues may be 
responsible for detection. 
Ambiguous cues may reach the occupants directly from the fire or 
indirectly via a secondary source. The term secondary source 
applies to any noises not directly attributable to the fire and 
involves some intermediatory step(s). 
Examples of secondary sources include alarm bells, activated by 
remote detection, or noises associated with activity. Failure or 
changes to air conditioning [1,3] or lighting may be indicative. 
Kahn (1984)(152) suggests noises caused by other people and/or 
verbal warning sounds may be significant. He notes that despite 
the extensive use of smoke and fire detectors, post fire surveys 
indicate that most fires are detected by other fire-related 
stimuli. Reports on case studies by Horiuchi et al. (170), 
diagram C79, and Okishio and Handa (125), diagram C44 support 
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this. See also analysis of the Victoria Nurse's Home fire (see 
applications abstract and appendix 3). 
The link between the detection of the ambiguous cues and the 
secondary cue source may be manual or automatic. Manual links 
have been known to result in unnecessary delay and flow of 
information problems (e.g., Summerland (1973)(116), Beverley 
Hills Supper Club (1976)). The occurrence of this is discussed 
by Quarantelli (94), and the need for training highlighted by 
Rubin and Glass (167). 
The information to allow people to detect a fire remote from the 
location of the fire requires to have sufficient impact to 
attract attention (167). The provision of information for the 
detection of a fire by occupants may be made using any of the 
five senses. It is common to rely on auditory cues [237], which 
may be supplemented by visual information [238] (e.g., 
Informative Fire Warning Systems (171). Traditionally sounders 
have been used for auditory information, although there is a 
recent increase in the application of public address systems. 
Studies of the effectiveness of these have been made (Loftus and 
Keating (172), Shavit (173)). 
Canter and Tong (1984)(171) identified three distinct problems 
associated with conventional auditory alarms (and people): 
"1) A failure of people to differentiate fire alarms from other 
types of alarm. 
A failure of people to regard fire alarms as authentic 
warnings of a genuine fire. 
A failure of fire alarms to present information which will 
assist fire victims in their attempts to cope with the fire." 
These problems restrict the potential contribution of alarms to 
Life Safety in Fires. 
Canter notes that the early awareness is usually by smells or 
noises rather than by direct contact (28). 	Bryan and Milke 
(1981)( 123), studying healthcare facilities, note that within 
'7' 
close proximity of fires the incidence of direct detection is 
high. The likelihood of this will depend on the layout and use 
of the building [2,5,13,16,19], the nature of the occupants, and 
the fire. It is generally not possible to guarantee early manual 
detection, and automatic means of detection are installed. 
Some information sources will be of greater value than others. 
This may depend on the type of occupancy and the amount and 
quality of the information contained in the messages they give 
(28). Additionally the location is important (hence regulatory 
minimum sound levels). 
Ambiguous cues may be correctly interpreted, misinterpreted, 
ignored, or missed completely. - 
Stimuli below certain levels will not evoke any response (Govier 
(174)). This is termed the absolute threshold and varies between 
individuals [22,24,26,28,30] and in different circumstances with 
the same individual [21,23,25,27,29]. 	The same applies for 
difference thresholds. 	The relationship of existence of 
information and perception is evident. Diagram C74. 	Canter and 
Matthews (83) suggested further research in this area. 
The type of situation and role may have an influence on the 
treatment of cues: Domestic (M or F role), work station, staff 
or guest in hotel, patient or nurse in hospital, staff or member 
of total institution (Haber (1978/80)(105,175), Canter (1985) 
(28)). 
Canter (28) states that early stages of fires are characterised 
by awareness of something ambiguous. This may be ignored, but if 
the cues persist the tendency is to investigate. (cf.; Victoria 
Nurses Home - see appendix 3). In these circumstances perception 
of the fire is common. 
Investigation is a common act in fires to eliminate uncertainty 
(Bryan (71), Canter (28), Canter et al. (85)), and initiate 
planning stages. See diagram C46. Perception of fire events and 
the provision of information to people are all features of the 
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time stages in an event prior to action for escape. 	It is 
obviously critical to minimise this time. 
Deficiency in ability to perceive will reduce the effectiveness 
of the communication. Where the occupancy has identifiable 
problems in information reception this must be tackled. 
Compensations for deficiency in some of the senses are practical 
- eg; hearing and sight, using touch. The concepts of smell may 
be practical in some circumstances, and is a common source of 
detection by individuals of fires, particularly in 
compartmentalised areas (96). The ability to perceive is 
critically dependent on psychological status and physical 
capability [21,23,25,27,29,22,24,26,28,30]. See diagram C80. 
Dependent on the status and receptivity of each individual, 
information may be received or interpreted differently, and given 
different meaning and/ or importance. Members of the population 
of any single space may interpret the same situation differently. 
Aspects of crowd behaviour may be significant to the number of 
people and their relationships will be important (63). Refer 
diagram C38. 
Groups and individuals may treat situations differently (63, 
Stahl (1978)(122)). 	Darley and Latane (1968)(111) tested the 
reactions of individuals and individuals in group settings to a 
smoke filling room. 	Reporting of smoke was most likely with 
individuals. 	In the •presence of passive others, the report 
incidence was much lower. 	This group inhibition of bystander 
intervention was thought to arise because of the passive 
behaviour of others. Lack of leadership may also have played a 
part. Canter (28) suggests that activities with an expected 
sequence of events may produce delays in response. 
Also group inactivity may arise because of fear of 'losing face' 
- this may be a reason for poor responses to training drills 
(28). 
In another set of behavioural tests (1968)(112), Darley and 
Latane created a simulated injury. Groups again gave a reduced 
intervention response compared with individuals. 	This was 
73 
interpreted as the bystander's response to other observers rather 
than indifference to the victim. Canter also notes a low 
incidence of reporting of fires by strangers compared with people 
linked to the event (28). 
It is unlikely that all members of a group will investigate 
ambiguous cues, and members may be chosen (implicitly or 
explicitly) or volunteer (implicitly or explicitly) to 
investigate as an agent. Canter reports that situations where 
expected authoritative leadership is lacking may produce 
dangerous delays (1980)(28). By implication this is also 
supported by the behavioural study by Kobayashi and Horiuchi 
(129). 
The following section deals with the existence of information, 
either directly or by provision, and the salient features at 
different time stages in the event. 
Aural [237] 
The definition of the term 'Existence of Aural Information " used 
for the development of the model includes a caveat on the nature 
of communication (Delphi):- 
"Aural Existence - This describes the existence of any aural 
information about the fire event in total. This is broad enough 
to include ordinary sounds, since they may mask the untoward 
noises made by the fire. As the event progresses and information 
of different types may exist, eg; sounds of flames, glass 
cracking, fire alarm sounders, people talking (or not talking), 
shouting, running, the ambient noise level changing, etc. Rapid 
change is most likely to be received, but there is no statement 
in this factor of communication of the information. 
Communication only occurs when perception occurs. Note, any alarm 
related noises only occur after T(detection)' and that ambiguous 
cues are relevant in the T(i gn ition) to T(perception)  stages." 
Kahn (1984)(152) identifies a number of factors affecting 
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detection, including the intensity and salience of cues, and the 
individual's focus of attention. Human awakening experiments 
showed a higher likelihood of awakening by alarm sounds than heat 
or odour, and a dependency on cue intensity for awakening (see 
also (174)). 
Bells give limited information (84), but are the most common fire 
warning system (63). Marchant emphasises the importance of 
design of audible alarms so that adequate sound levels are 
assured, depending on the building and occupant characteristics 
(63). Pezoldt and Van Cott (154) have considered required sound 
levels for awakening. 
A panel on alarm systems for the handicapped identified a number 
of problems areas detracting from the value of alarms 
(1979)(149): 
"1) The steady non-coded signal inhibits communication between 
building occupants. 
Any audible system may disorient the blind who depend on 
normal building noises for navigation. 
Current audible alarms are non-directional. 
There may be a need for both audible and visual signals 
above exits. 
Present directional signs are intended for the sighted and 
English-reading. 
The existence of obstructions to safe egress is not 
communicated to -the visually-impaired and the blind by 
present systems." 
Voice alarm systems are being considered for a number of reasons 
(diagram C81)(172). Pre-recorded message applications (manual or 
linked to an 'intelligent' system (Pauers (1979)(176)) have been 
considered for their practicality by some researchers (e.g.; 
Loftus and Keating (1974)(172), also (167)). The motivation for 
this arises from problems of muddled messages, the nature of 
messages being stressful (e.g., Summerland) and delays associated 
with the human link. 
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With both types of information source a suitable sound level at 
all locations of the building is necessary. Occupants with 
hearing difficulties [22], or in occupancies where awakening will 
be necessary require special attention (98) [21]. Shavit notes 
the importance of keeping such messages brief, simple, and direct 
(1978)(173). Rubin and Glass identify the need for careful 
thought about the implications of using such systems (167) (see 
also Pauls (1975)(15). 
Visual [238] 
The term "Existence of Visual Information" is defined as 
(Delphi):- 
"Visual Existence - Similar to Aural - covers provision of 
adequate light, changes in lighting level, seeing peoples 
actions, smoke, signs, flashing lights, etc." 
Provision of light is very important for escape (Shields and 
Silcock (1987)(118)). 
The degradation of the environment by smoke is a common cause of 
difficulty in escape. Smoke obscuration is a significant factor 
affecting visibility and thus escape (Heselden and Baldwin 
(1978)(82)). Wagstaff and Rees (1981)(139) note the limitations 
of traditional lighting:- 
"Escape route lighting is traditionally mounted at high level - 
even with smoke extraction this high level lighting is quickly 
obscured. The luminaries require mounting at much lower levels if 
they are going to be effective." 
The feasibility of floor mounted lighting is being considered for 
aircraft (141). The same approach may be suitable for siting of 
lighting and active signs in buildings, using fibre optics 
(97,149). 
Problems with identification of back-lit signs through smoke have 
been experimentally tackled by Jin (1972)(177: in Japanese). 
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Emergency lighting provision is a potentially valuable backup for 
the continued usability of the building - the levels of light 
required will depend on the scenario (97) (e.g., immediately 
after waking or in a crowded room) and acceptability of light 
levels should be considered in context (compare a disco/ theatre 
to an office). Recommendations on the maximum delay from failure 
of primary light source to secondary commencement are generally 
in the realm of 10 seconds. 
In addition to considering auditory alarms, Pezoldt and Van Cott 
(1978)(154) also refer to arousal using other (non-auditory) 




"Tactile Existence - This is the existence of tactile information 
- temperature and, particularly change in temperature, and the 
building shape and surface texture are important for movement and 
location information. Also, the movement of other people will be 
included." 
Direct tactile information will occur in the spaces affected by 
fire. 	Indirect information has been considered by Pezoldt and 
Van Cott (154). 	Examples include tactile alarms (electrical, 
thermal stimuli), and olfactory stimuli. 	Use of wrist or bed 
vibrators has been tried (see also (149,178). 
Gustatory/Olfactory [240,1 241] 
These two senses are closely related and generally considered in 
the context of olfactory sensing only. There is a relatively 
high incidence of olfactory sensing of fires by people (12528). 
The definition is (Delphi): 
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"Gustatory/Olfactory - The combined smell/taste. 	At tertiary 
level considerations it is difficult to separate these factors; 
the existence of information would be detected as smell/taste, 
such as smoke." 
False Alarms 
False alarms are an aspect of detection and warning that require 
addressing - since there is a tendency for a 'cry wolf' effect to 
occur (Rubin (1974)(113), Wishart (1984)(127)). The problems of 
false alarms can result in alarm systems being switched off (1983 
Zaou Skiing Ground Hotel (125)), or not being considered as cues 
(96). A significant reduction in potential contribution can 
result. 
Training 
The term training covers the information used as background for 
the development of tactical plans for action and escape. The 
scope of this term is deliberately broad and in addition 
traditional training relating to drills and fire fighting [253], 
includes the general or specific procedures and self-taught 
knowledge necessary for escape [252]. Diagram C82 [251-253]. The 
latter includes familiarity with the building layout [250], and 
the current knowledge of the event as perceived by the individual 
and updated throughout the event [251], termed building knowledge 
and event knowledge respectively. Training is defined as 
(Delphi): 
"The term training is concerned with knowledge. Knowledge about 
the building, the fire event and fire safety. This knowledge may 
be, in terms of the event relatively static or relatively 
dynamic. Obviously knowledge of the event will be dynamic; nil 
at first, increasing throughout the event. Knowledge of the 
building is pre-existent and the potential contribution constant, 
knowledge of escape routes is a combination of (1) Building 
knowledge, a cognitive map of the whereabouts and relationship of 
the route(s) to the building spaces, and (2) Specific fire safety 
knowledge; knowing that the designated routes are escape routes." 
Sime (1980)(102) suggests that people act on the basis of 
knowledge - such knowledge may be built up during or prior to the 
event. Training and experience are potentially influential in a 
fire event (28). 
The importance of training is considered by Stahl (1978)(87) 
[298]. He notes little systematic investigation has been carried 
out on the influence of training or drill performance. That pre-
emergency training is valuable in actual cases is disputed (see 
also (97)), and treatment of the subject is not generally 
available (71). Innes (1975)(157) considers that the variability 
in fire situations may make some training ineffective. Support 
for training as a necessary part of a comprehensive approach to 
fire safety comes from Schwalm (116). 
Herz et al. (1978)(179) reported studies into the impact of 
training on knowledge of appropriate behaviour. They found after 
setting questionnaires for a group of nursing home staff, half of 
whom had been given a lecture on fire safety, that lecture 
methods of training appeared to be adequate for conveying 
straightforward, factual information that is easily memorised. 
It was felt that nursing home staff would have positive attitudes 
towards fire safety training. However they also noted that 
erroneous beliefs formed most of the factual information not 
learned in the lecture, and suggested that rigorous training. 
methods would be required to counteract these inaccurate 
assumptions. 
The Hackney hospital evacuation studies did not find any evidence 
for staff training improving evacuation times and further study 
in this area was recommended (135). 
Wood (1980)(89) noted that training was a variable leading to 
increased evacuation in fire events. Summarising the main. 
findings of his research, he noted (generally) that the scale of 
smoke spread influenced the extent to which trained people would 
move through smoke. - - - 
-it 
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Training for actions in emergencies should be given to transient 
residential populations (149). 	Bryan (1977)(71) noted an 
influence-af training on first actions. Diagram C83 indicates 
the influence of training on second actions [298] _. -  
There is an influence of training on communication [164]. Diagram 
C84. There is a wide interactivity of the training sub factors 
with use of routes, and this is supported from studies by 
Horiuchi et al. (170), Canter (28) [66,71,87,67,72,88,68,73,89]. 
Building Knowledge [250] 
The importance of familiarity with a building (Building 
Knowledge) [250], and the influence this may have on route choice 
was identified by Canter and Matthews (1976)(83) as a suitable 
area for research. Horiuchi et al. (170) also note familiarity 
with a building as an important factor in the choice of 
evacuation route, and the primary determinant of speed and ease 
of all phases of the evacuation process. It is defined as 
(Delphi): 
"The knowledge of the arrangement of the building spaces relative 
to the occupants location. A cognitive map of the building." 
In some cases of building layout, knowledge may not be complete 
for the whole building (e.g., Haber on prisons (1978)(105)) 
cites an example of a mixed prison fire event in which the male 
guards (responsible 'for the fire related duties) were not 
familiar with the femal'es' area of the prison, with consequent 
problems. She, also notes that new staff, or buildings with 
floating staff populations, and non-total institutional buildings 
(e.g., night-clubs) will mean that the occupants may have a low 
level of building knowledge. 
Work has been carried out into the way people remember the layout 
of buildings and cities (Stea (1974)(180), Downs and Stea 
(1977)(181)). It has been conceptualised that people form and 
store cognitive maps to describe building layouts. These may be 
used in a fire event for the planning and implementation of 
movement plans. The cognitive map comprises the key facets of the 
layout as perceived by the individual. These will depend on the 
nature and frequency of use of routes within the building, which 
may be related to design or usage. Sime notes that routes 
designed or used only in emergencies will be unfamiliar to the 
occupants (1985)(182) [49]. Overemphasis of those features that 
are familiar, and under-emphasis of those that are less familiar, 
may distort the map (Flarchant (1980)(26)). Transient or recent 
occupants of a building are likely to have an incomplete map. 
In addition to forming cognitive maps to store building 
knowledge, it is postulated (Passini (1984)(183)) that occupants 
create hierarchical decision plans to implement cognitive maps 
and other knowledge during wayfinding [47,32]. This agrees with 
the assumptions in-built into Stahl's Fires model of egress 
behaviour (31,32). 
Canter has suggested that people tend to use the most familiar 
routes in emergencies (also Sime) [61], and this appears to 
correlate with the concept of building knowledge and wayfinding. 
Horiuchi et al. conclude from a case study of an office block 
fire that the choice of evacuation route will often be a 
regularly used route if the evacuee is familiar with the building 
(also Sime (1985)(182). 
Other factors that will be useful are the identification of 
location [48] and route choices [9074]. Horiuchi et al. also 
found that people familiar with a building have little difficulty 
finding exits even in heavy smoke. 
Limited mobility will influence the formation and use of a 
cognitive map for the building layout [50]. See diagram C85. 
Stahl suggests a link between the effectiveness of training and 
the complexity or simplicity of layout of the building 
(1978)(87). He suggests research be carried out into this, 
particularly to distinguish between the value of specific and 
generalised training with complex and simple buildings [59,61]. 
Note interactions identified in diagram C85 [47-50.32,59,51]. 
Additionally, he suggests another suitable area of research may 
be the analysis of the link between factors route recognition 
[48,49], training, and psychological capacity [47,32]. 
Event Knowledge is defined as (Delphi): 
"The knowledge built up during the event about the event, aspects 
of knowledge about fire location, blocked routes, paths taken, 
acts performed, etc., all forms this knowledge. Knowledge may be 
incorrect." 
Event knowledge is an important co-ordinating feature in events 
for relating communicated information [57], decisions made [53] 
and actions carried out with the information picked up about the 
building layout [54,55,56], and fire safety knowledge [51,52]. 
Stahl has recognised and modelled these types of interaction 
(31,32). This is reflected by potential interactions with a 
number of factors. Investigation may occur (Canter et al. (85)), 
depending on mobility [58]. See diagram C86 [51-58,33,66,71,87]. 
General and Specific Fire Safety Knowledge 
General and Specific Fire Safety Knowledge are of a personal 
nature. Stahl (1978)(87) differentiates between pre-emergency 
training of a 'general' [252] or 'building specific' nature 
[253]. The criticality of these factors makes their separation 
necessary. Bickman et al. (96) have also identified these as the 
behavioural determinants education and preparation. Their sub 
factors show a strong correlation; knowledge of fire safety 
plans/communication [60], awareness of hazards [52], knowledge of 
use of suppression equipment [214,215], and amount/quality of 
training [252,253]. 
The factors are defined as (Delphi): 
General Fire Safety Knowledge: 
"Awareness of general procedure in a fire. 	How to use an 
extinguisher, the meaning of signs. 
Canter and Matthews (1976)(83) note that the regulations assume a 
minimum level of knowledge about fire, and suggest research to 
establish what information which sections of the population have. 
Following studies of human behaviour in fire, Canter (28) 
suggests that people, and especially staff should be trained to 
use extinguishers. 
See diagram C87 [59,60,52,62,67,72,88,214]. 
Specific Fire Safety Knowledge: 
"The term covers that knowledge which the ordinary person would 
not be expected to have. Knowledge of routes, muster points, 
extinguisher location, coded information, procedures." [68,73,89, 
63] 
Stahl, discussing research designs for study of human response to 
fire, includes under 'building specific' training the variables 
of 'recognition of adaptive emergency egress routes' [73,89] and 
'safety related features and objects in the environment'. 	The 
formation of cognitive maps is encouraged and tested [61]. 
Canter (28) discusses a number of implications for training 
arising from case studies. 	He notes the importance of staff 
roles in fires, and training for effective communication [164]. 
He states that "special staff training for specific situations or 
contexts is essential." [253] 
Sime (1983)(93) notes that the route knowledge of staff can lead 
to different route usage patterns in fires between types of 
occupant (e.g., Summerland) [73,89,68,67,72,88]. 
Bryan (71) notes an effect on behaviour in fires of the 
experience of alarms in events [62]. Additionally, effects of 
training on first actions emerged by comparing the actions of 
participants in fires with or without previous training. He 
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found a greater number of those with training 'notifying others', 
'searching for fire, and 'obtaining extinguishers' [214,215]. 
There was a greater self and family orientation by those without 
training. See diagram 088. Canter (1985)(28) warns that staff 
should be trained to identify when use of an extinguisher is 
inappropriate [214,215], and also that warning others and 
notifying the fire brigade is important. 
See diagram 089 [61-63,33,51,68,73,89,215]. 
M Escape Route Layout 
Introduction 
Movement within buildings is governed by the arrangement of 
workspaces and circulation paths. Functional elements in the 
design of layouts include entrances, corridors, stairs, waiting 
spaces, and directional signs. An effective design will be 
systemically coherent (Fruin (1971)(143)). 
In an emergency, building layout may be acutely important. 
Recognition of this has led to the regulatory mandate of 
satisfactory means of escape in event of fire * (The Building 
Regulations 1985)(10); The Fire Precautions Act 1971 (184) 
requirements for Designated buildings include means of escape 
(see also (185,186). The principal objective of means of escape 
is to maintain the occupants' Life Safety. 
* A Local Authority may agree to relax this in some 
circumstances. 
Conventionally, escape is by egress from the building. 	The 
egress from any point within a building can be analysed 
qualitatively into stages for escape, and this is generally done 
in codes for the acceptable facility for egress. The number of 
stages varies. 	Typically, the escape route layout [323] is 
divided into three stages. 	A distinction is made between 
workspaces and paths used for ordinary movement and those 
designated also for escape; termed "protected routes". Occupants 
travel from initial location through partially protected or 
unprotected zones and into fully protected zones such as 
corridors or staircases (184,187). Conventionally travel to the 
protected route may be considered asthe first stage (the 'travel 
distance'). . The intermediate stage is vertical travel in a 
protected staircase, and finally horizontal travel in open air. 
Comparison of the two variations on a concept are shown in 
diagram C26. 
For the purposes of the general model, a distinction is made 
between travel in semi- or unprotected routes (stage T( action) -  
T(relative safety)) and in protected routes (stage T( relative 
safe ty )_T( safety ) Y Generally, the use of lifts and escalators 
is not encouraged. Marchant (1976)(62) suggests that selective 
use of lifts in protected areas of the building may be acceptable 
(see also diagram C90). 
If every occupant of a large multi-storey building is to be 
evacuated simultaneously, the stairs will have to be 
uneconomically wide, or some delays will certainly occur [258]. 
Extra stairs may be required to serve the lower floors. 
Kagawa et al. (188) conclude from studies on a high-rise building 
(53 stories + 5 basement stories) evacuation exercise that 
simultaneous total evacuation seems impractical in high-rise 
buildings. The width of stairways [258] was criticised by users 
- and with only one fifth of the potential population 
participating, problems of stagnation occurred due to 
insufficient stair capacity [300]. They suggest that reasonable 
procedures for selective evacuation need to be developed. 
Pauls and Jones (1980)(84) identified the main controls over the 
effectiveness of this type of evacuation as being exit geometry, 
building population and movement behaviour of evacuees (92). The 
same problem of capacity may apply to parts of the exit route 
from a large single story building. An alternative technique is 
to initially evacuate only those occupants in immediate danger, 
such as those on the fire floor and the floor above. If the risk 
persists, the area to be evacuated may be extended. In this 
manner, the evacuation of the whole building could be phased 
(90,189). This evacuation method requires centralised decision 
making; effective communication [296] (92); protection of the 
stairs from environmental degradation; and a structure of 
adequate fire resistance (144). Pre-planning and training will 
also be necessary. 
In some buildings, such as hospitals, the occupancy may be of 
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limited mobility (21) [169]. 	To compensate for this it may be 
necessary to provide for escape by alternative means (Pauls 
(1977)(90) [166]. Studies by Marchant and Finucane (80) have 
indicated a wide range of mobilities between hospital patients (a 
scale of 1-33). See diagram C53. This is supported by Malhotra 
(1985)( 120), who notes differential effects of human factors on 
escape in a variety of occupancy types [169,101,105]. Other 
studies (e.g.; Archea (1979)( 140)) have indicated a variety of 
requirements for assistance in escape, and also in effective 
number of people in crowds, based on relative mobility factors 
(63). See diagram C40. 
The need to design and evaluate building provisions in the 
context of the population characteristics is evident 
[166,167,168]. Pauls supports a case for selective or phased 
evacuations in high rise applications. Studying high rise 
buildings he estimates that (1977)(90):- 
"about 3% of those usually present in high rise office buildings 
cannot or should not attempt to evacuate by means of crowded exit 
stairs. In addition to those with obvious physical disabilities, 
this minority includes people with heart disorders and 
convalescents from recent illness, surgery, or accident." 
In cases of limited practicality of escape, movement to refuges 
may be considered as a design option (190). Protection in place 
is a further technique of protecting the occupants against the 
fire for an adequate amount of time. 
The maximum restrictions on travel for escape should relate to 
the time required to travel the distance to reach safety or a 
protected zone. Marchant (1982)(191) points out the inter 
relationship between escape provisions and the mobility of the 
population [166,167,169]. Caravaty and Winslow (1970)(81) have 
studied the relationship of mobility and escape from high 
buildings. Diagram C32, adapted from Marchant (178)(after (81)), 
shows that with increase of building height, incapacitation, or 
both, there is a trend to move from escape by egress to 
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protection in place (minimal disruption) as the suitable Life 
Safety policy. Note that the provision of refuges (refer diagram) 
in buildings with seven or more storeys above ground corresponds 
to the practical height limit for rescue by ladder. 
Malhotra notes that the criticality of escape routes has been 
highlighted by some tragic incidents (e.g., Sao Paulo * (1974)) 
(also (144)). Interference with exits has been a significant 
factor in a number on incidents (e.g.; Saint Laurent-du-Pont * 
(1970) ) (120) [92]. Narrowing of routes may also be a problem 
[168,82]. 
Escape is defined as the avoidance of the threat imposed by the 
fire and its effects. This is a deliberately broad concept, to 
allow for the range of techniques for achieving safety in 
practice. See diagram 091 [254-259,299,300,323]. Diagram C92 is 
an early concept of the factors determining escape route layout. 
The term Escape Route Layout [323] relates to building provisions 
for safety, and is defined as (Delphi):- 
"the layout of, and inter-relationship between the building 
spaces. Any building space, whether a designed escape route or 
otherwise, may be used as a part of an escape route; e.g.; 
movement from initial location in a building to the protected 
escape route or a refuge. The design covers factors affecting 
ease of use (note that a blockage occurring during, as opposed to 
before the event will be a modification of the "optimal" escape 
route layout, not a factor of it).' 
Malhotra (1985)(1 20); 
"While the essential factors for escape route design are known, a 
rational approach to optimise the design is not available." 
The coherence of the design will determine its value in emergency 
use (143). Identification of the aspects of escape route 
provision is necessary if design and evaluation is to be 
realistic. Pauls (1984)(192) recommends a number of factors be 
For further details:: 	 - - 	- 
San Laurent du Pont Dance Hall Fire. 1st November 1970. 
Fire Prevention Jnl. n90 Apr 1971 pp36-41. 
Sao Paulo Joelma Fire. 1st February 1974. 
FPA Special Review, reprint from Fire Prevention Journal n104. 
considered in the design of means of egress. 	The first four 
items he states are of especial importance and represent factors 
for which current knowledge is weak. 
- Normal building use, including circulation. 
- Population characteristics [169]. 
- Evacuation procedure. 
- Orientation and path-finding [254,255]. 
- Route redundancy [257]. 
- Movement safety. 
- Security. 
- Economics. 
- Control of fire hazards. 
Analysis of egress system failures (Sime (69), Malhotra (120), 
Roux (22,9)) suggests that commonly failings are attributable in 
some way to the routes. This may be a physical aspect of the 
route itself [300], or some aspect of its use [299]. Both should 
be related to the escapees ability. 
Failure may be the result of physical provision of routes, for 
instance inadequate provision for the size of occupancy. This 
may relate to design assumptions, misuse of the building, or 
both. The capacity of the routes will be an important factor 
[300], and will partly determine the usefulness to occupants 
[167]. Physical space requirements are determined by the size of 
the users and any additional space requirements for baggage and 
prosthetic equipment (70,134,138) [101]. Work has been done on 
the effective population size (Marchant (63)). Additionally, the 
closeness of the packing of people will affect the number that 
can be contained in a protected zone, and also the ease of its 
use [170] and speed of clearing (Fruin (1971)(143); See diagram 
C93; Pauls (1979)(90); Pauls and Jones (1980)(92); Predtechenskii 
and Millinski (1978)(29)). 
Ease of use [299] is related to identification of routes [255] 
and options provided [257], identification of the initial 
location [254], and the effects of any physical obstructions. 
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Obstructions may arise from the occupants themselves [256,81]. 
Each, or a combination, may lead to an escape problem in a fire. 
For instance, Summerland, (1973) (Route Choice Identification 
[255,91] and Choice of Alternative Routes [257,791)(Sime) (116); 
similar problems arose with Kirkcaldy Nurses' Home (1981)('see 
appendix 3) (also heat as an obstruction [84]). 
Routes are sometimes marked for emergency use only, or as private 
staff routes (cf.; Summerland) [77]. In other circumstances 
routes may be hidden (by the design, or for aesthetic reasons) 
[75]. An adequate number of signS should compensate for this, 
but should not be required for this purpose (Fruin (1971)(143). 
In other circumstances the routes are unsuited for the occupants 
- slipperiness, steepness, stairways, resistance of doors, and a 
route suitable for an "average" person fails to adequately serve 
a large proportion of the population [92,195,83,99,103]. 	This 
may or may not produce a problem. 	In other circumstances the 
routes may be blocked off (Dublin, San Laurent-du-Pont, Bradford) 
[92]. Security and safety may compromise each other. 
Escape in clear air is potentially optimal. Smoke logging of 
routes is a potential problem and design should accommodate this. 
The risk of smoke problems on non-protected sections is real [92] 
and it is necessary that all occupants can be accommodated in a 
protected zone and within a suitable time. 
The unpredictable nature of fires is the crux of the problem of 
Fire Safety Engineering - and assumptions of reasonable time 
requirements for entry to protected zones are made. In the U.K. 
this is 2.5 minutes. The hazard and likely fire type will differ 
between building uses - this should be considered. 
Marchant (1976) has identified a number of factors affecting 
escape route systems, and produced a table ((62) and see diagram 
C24). There are a number of factors included that are considered 
as sub-factors in other domains of the Life Safety System. Note 




A sprawling inter-relationship with the rest of the system is 
suggested, and this augers well with accepted conventions of 
escape from fires. Routes are fundamentally important to Life 
Safety (see diagram C24) [323]. Usage of routes is strongly 
dependent on occupant aspects - mobility, density, familiarity 
with, and interpretation of routes. The potential contribution 
may not be realised if these factors are significantly deficient 
(questions of significance are discussed elsewhere). 
Heat [225] and smoke [223] may degrade the routes and measures 
should be taken to protect the enclosures - compartmentation, 
smoke control [224], self closers to openings, and control of 
contents to provide fuel or act as an obstruction. See diagram 
C94 [222-225,217,227,230,233]. Note, however, that the potential 
contribution of routes is limited to when they are required. 
This is only in the latter stages of an event. Hence, any 
interactions involving escape route layout and its sub-factors 
will also be limited. An 'optimal" route layout is of no 
consequence to a population ignorant of an impending threat 
Malhotra (120) has identified a number of important factors in 
the design of escape routes. He states that the most important 
considerations in the design of escape routes are adequacy of 
facility and tenability. Failure to escape is statistically 
shown to be due to one or more of the following (1982)( 120): 
- delayed awareness of the fire 
- escape route untenable due to smoke logging [256,92] 
- occupants not aware of alternative routes [255] 
- escape routes inadequate in number, size or design [257,300] 
- exits locked or barred or blocked [256] 
The design requires attention toa number of aspects:- planning, 
recognition, and protection of routes are important. Malhotra 
(120) also identifies warning and alarm systems. 
I' 
The general inclusion of escape route provisions in Building 
Standards indicates a general acceptance of its importance to 
Life Safety. Diagram C91 indicates the factors identified as 
being important [323,299,300,254,255,256,257,258,259]. 
Exit Route Capacity [300] 
The study and evaluation of people movement for evacuation has 
been largely in relation to the assumed requirements for escape 
route provision. Escape routes are critical to partial or total 
evacuation. They should be designed to allow timely evacuation 
of all occupants to open air or to a refuge. Evacuee mobility 
will be potentially important. The regulatory requirements vary 
between countries, and Kendik (119) has analysed several 
producing a comparative graph. This is reproduced as diagram 
C95. Based on a datum of 1 minute for escape from a floor, the 
national time limits of acceptability are compared. The extreme 
is 5 minutes. Pauls (1979)(g0):- 
"Although evacuation has been a major concern of building codes 
for over half a century, the scientific and technological basis 
for exits is poorly developed and often contains errors that have 
gone unrecognised. Recent research.. .has pointed out, for 
example, errors in current code rules governing the width of exit 
stairs and riser tread geometry." 
A number of modelling techniques have been developed to design 
and/ or evaluate escape routes. A number of factors affecting 
performance have been identified and included in models: capacity 
of routes [300]; travel distances [259]; occupant load; total 
size of occupancy; travel speeds; floor area; and dead ends. It 
is clear also that route effectiveness is related to the evacuee 
characteristics (41), Marchant (191) [101,105]. Evaluation of 
Exit Route Capacity must be based on these aspects. 
It is natural that evaluative techniques for escape routes are 
concerned with the time required to evacuate occupants to safe 
locations. However, the time required to reach safety depends on 
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a number of successful steps. 	Evacuation is one of the later 
aspects (see earlier). 	This is an important assumption for an 
evaluation model. Diagram C96 illustrates the time stages during 
which Escape Route Layout may make a potential contribution to 
Life Safety. - 
The time required to use a route is affected by its capacity 
[300], and this is a traditional evaluation criterion. See 
diagram Dl. Exit Route Capacity is defined as (Delphi):- 
"Exit Route Capacity - This applies to the aspects of route 
suitability for evacuation population. The term capacity relates 
to the dynamic flow capability of the route - the number of 
people entering or leaving per time interval. This is relevant 
for people in the T(relative safety)-T(safety) stage of escape by 
egress, more relevant for those in the T( action)_T(relative 
safety) stage, who may require to queue to enter the relative 
safety of the protected route (or indeed, a refuge)." 
The capacity of routes is important in static and dynamic terms. 
This governs the number of people that may be contained in a 
route (or refuge), and the rate at which they may be cleared to 
safety. It is very important how long it takes for the last 
occupant to enter the protected route. Queuing delays in semi-
or unprotected areas (T( action)_T(relative safety)) must be 
minimised. See diagram C96. The discharge rate at the exit 
from a route may be a significant factor in the delay for entry 
to the protected route, and it should not be obstructed. It is 
important to minimise the time routes require to remain tenable 
for. Factors affecting both the static and dynamic capacity will 
be the width [258] and length [259] of the route sections. See 
diagram C97. 
The majority of models developed recently relate to the physical 
aspects of usage. Stahl et al. (1982)(67) reviewing the state of 
knowledge on egress, note that an increased understanding of the 
time required for travel through routes is not matched in the 
behavioural area. Models for human interpretation of signs 	and 
layouts are also required. 	Aspects directly affecting travel 
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(such as obstructions [2561) will affect potential contribution 
to Life Safety and require consideration also. 
Flow models 
Models for route clearing capacity and flow rates have been the 
backbone of egress knowledge and regulatory assumptions for a 
number of years (Roach (1982)(193), Pauls (90)). They are noted 
and discussed by Kendik (1985) (119); 
Evaluation of clearing capacity requires assumptions about the 
spatial width [258] and length [259] requirements of escaping 
people and the speed at which they can travel. See diagram C97. 
These factors are defined as (Delphi):- 
"Width of Route - The effective width of the route or part of a 
route or building space for people movement. Criteria for 
effective width cover edges of corridors, use of stair width, 
etc." 
"Length of Route - The effective length of the route in terms of 
dynamic capacity for evaluation." 
In the U.K., the number of exits required for escape provision is 
based on the calculated total width requirement for assumed 
occupancy sizes, and a concept of "unit of width" [258]. The 
total width requirement may be met by either one large exit or a 
number of smaller ones; exits in new buildings (BINC, 1935) must 
not be " ..less than two units of width (44 inch). Exits should be 
as remote from each other as possible." 
Kendik (119) notes calculation methods for total width 
requirements from a number of sources, each relying (implicitly 
or explicitly) on a unit width concept (e.g.; (194)). A unit of 
width is based on the recommendations of the BINC 1945 report 
(195), and Post War Building Study No. 29 Fire Grading of 
Buildings Part III, Personal Safety (1952) (194). Roach (193) 
states that it is the minimum width through which the biggest 
person can pass in comfort, and is assumed to be able to clear 40 
persons per minute (also (119)) [101]. It was initially taken as 
being 22 inches (560mm), although BINC 1945 recommended 21 inches 
(530mm) (which was adopted in Scotland). Post War Building Study 
No. 29 (194) adopted this latter value generally. 
Based on 2.5 minutes as an acceptable regulation discharge time 
for egress or escape to a protected zone, the units of width 
required are calculated from estimated occupant load. See 
diagram C98 [258,257]. Starkey (1982)(196):- 
"Double the width and you can double the rate of exit. Above a 
two unit width you can begin to make an allowance for each 
increase of 6 inches or 152mm by adding an extra 30 persons per 
2.5 minutes." 
See also diagram C99 [258], based on a 535mm unit of width. 
A factor for differences in stair usage is used (Roach 
(1982)(193)). 	Fruin (1971) compared several studies of width 
requirements (143). 	Values include 20.7 inches (525mm) for the 
99th percentile of civilian men with a recommended addition of 
1.5 inches for heavy clothing (22.2 inches! 563mm); 22.8 inches 
(579mm) for the 95th percentile of fully clothed labourers; and a 
requirement of 24 inches (609mm) for the average male human body 
(New York City Subway Cars Study and U. S. Army Human Factors 
Design Manual). See diagram C100 [2581. Fruin states a 
preference for the latter, allowing for personal articles, body 
buffer zones and sway requirements. This exceeds regulatory 
assumptions. The regulatory value has been disputed by others; 
Kendik (1985)(119); Read (197); and particularly Pauls, in 
relation also to how people use route width (91,192). 
The International situation is unclear. 	People do escape from 
fires through routes designed using National Standards based on 
unit of width concepts. 	Evidently routes designed on this 
principle cannot be totally defective. 	However, some 
rationalisation is necessary. 
Travel distance is another aspect considered in design and 
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acceptability of route provision [259]. Occupants should be able 
to reach safety before a fire produces untenable conditions. The 
hazard and fire properties of a space will depend on the building 
use. Additionally there will be different occupant mobilities 
[105]. Based on assumptions of time to untenability and occupant 
travel speed a maximum travel distance may be calculated. This 
applies to the occupant furthest away from the open air or a 
protected zone. The clearing capacity of doorways (see earlier) 
may also be important [258]. Marchant (1976) (62) notes that the 
range of time allowed is from 20 seconds to more than 5 minutes. 
Marchant (21) discusses the effect of relative mobility on the 
appropriateness of the travel distance [105]. 
Roach (1982) (193) discusses the historic incorporation of travel 
distances into regulations. BINC 1935 set three categories of 
hazard building, and set down maximum allowable travel distances. 
High hazard buildings had a maximum of 75 feet, medium hazard was 
125 feet and a low hazard building had an acceptable travel 
distance of 175 feet. These values related to construction also. 
BINC 1945 (195) recommended reasonable travel times for building 
classifications ranging from 3 minutes to 2 minutes. Acceptable 
travel distances were reduced (55 - 150 feet range) [259]. 
These values were further amended by Post War Building Study No. 
29 (194). Escape time was standardised at 2.5 minutes and travel 
distances altered again (60 - 150 ft.). This was covered, with 
some modifications by BS CP3 Chapter IV (shops), now  superseded 
by BS 5588 Pt. 2 1985. 
Calculations of the effective size of people are based on 
ellipses. Fruin (see diagram C100) suggests 18 inches (457mm) as 
an average body depth (143). See later for crowd density. 
For calculation purposes, the occupancy size is needed. Where 
this cannot be predicted accurately, estimates may be made. 
These are based on experience. Marchant has demonstrated (63) 
that in some occupancies, e.g.; shops, assumptions of crowd 
density (and homogeneity) may be unsuitable. 	See diagrams 
C101,C40. (see also Malhotra (120)). 
The speed of travel has been shown to decrease with age. It may 
also be affected by disability (134) [165]. Individual fast and 
slow speeds may be found in all age groups (143,70). 
Step length will be related to linear density; 	(Roytman 
(1975)(70) 	See diagram C102. 	In considering step length, a 
distinction may be made between single and double steps. The 
length 'of step depends on the length of the lower limb, the 
bending angle at the joints and the length of free path 
available. (It is believed that the bending angle of the legs at 
the pelvis joint of a short adult is somewhat larger than that 
of intermediate or tall persons. Consequently, length of step is 
practically the same for all). 
Length of stride (step length) is maintained in large streams of 
people, as an individual can put his foot down between those who 
are ahead of him. When linear density is 0.8 m /person it is 
assumed that an average step length of 0.7 m is retained. If 
density is less than 0.8 m /person, length of step is calculated 
as in diagram C102 (70) [165]. 
Fruin (143) discusses the relationship between crowd density and 
speed of travel based on empirical studies. 	He proposes six 
"service level" categories associated with this. 	These are 
labelled A - F for the range of free movement (low density) to 
extreme restriction (high density) respectively [165]. 	See 
diagrams (C103 queuing level of service D, C93). 	These differ 
for horizontal and inclined travel. See also diagram C104). The 
level of service will vary with building type, occupancy load, 
and evacuation stage. The flow rate of people moving in crowds 
of different densities has been studied by Predtechenskii and 
Millinski (29). See diagram CbS. 
The regulation of 2.5 minutes relates to travel distance to a 
protected route which will depend on walking speed. Walking 
speed is related to density. Up to a density of about 25 sq. feet 
per- person, the walking speeds are about 'normal' (this 
corresponds to level of service C) (143). After this point the 
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walking speed declines rapidly as the available clear area for 
locomotion decreases. Movement is restricted below about 7 sq. 
feet per person. This is level of service E and would occur 
naturally with a bulk arrival that immediately exceeds available 
capacity. e.g.; sports stadia and some simultaneous evacuation 
scenarios. At an occupant density of slightly less than about 3 
sq. ft. per person the walking speed approaches zero, 
representative of a crowded, immobile queue (level of service F). 
The relationship of flow density and speed of movement is 
confirmed by Roytman (70) and Predtechenskii and Millinski (29). 
See diagram C106. In cases where there is insufficient flow 
capacity, queues may develop. Kendik notes that measured maximum 
flow rates vary considerably with occupancy type and the route 
geometry. Studies have shown that occupant density assumptions 
may not always be representative 2 Marchant (1976) (63). Some 
occupancies are susceptible to seasonal and daily fluctuations 
(Marchant (1976)(63). The nature of route usage should also be 
reflected (191). To design or evaluate escape routes a model for 
flow characteristics of the occupants will be needed to establish 
required evacuation time. A mass flow model tests the boundary 
condition for escape and may be suitable for some types of 
occupancy/ building only (such as theatres, tall buildings). 
Further, these models apply to the portions of egress systems 
carrying large numbers of people. 
A number of techniques have been developed to model the 
effectiveness of portions of routes to carry crowds for escape. 
The calculation techniques employed tend to be based on width and 
length of route and assumptions of flow characteristics. These 
may be horizontal (corridors) or inclined (stairs); (cf. 
regulatory stages). The concept that route capacity [300] is 
fundamentally dependent on geometrical width [258] and length 
[259] is assumed for the model described in this thesis. See 
diagram C97. 
People movement 	in crowds has been modelled 	as 	a 
hydraulic/gaseous flow in pipes (119); as particles in a 
potential field (147); and as ball bearing equivalents (Peschl 
iJTj 
(1971)(30)). 	Generally there is little recognition in these 
models of the potential influence of individual behaviour on 
escape, and a uniformity of evacuees is assumed. These are 
questionable assumptions (Sime (1985)(45)). 
K.Togawa (1955)(198) is noted as being the first researcher 
having attempted to model mathematically the movement of people 
through doorways, passageways, along ramps, and on stairs (119). 
Actual velocity was related to a function of free velocity and 
crowd density (see also Fruin, 1971 (143). This will depend on 
individual mobility [297,101,105]. 
Melinek and Booth (1975)(199) have also studied movement on 
stairs in department stores and note a relationship of clearing 
capacity to width [2583 (based on Togawa and The London Transport 
Board underground studies 1958 (200), aankin and Wright (201)). 
Predtechenskii and Millinski (29) have developed a deterministic 
model from a large number of measurements. This relates flow 
velocity and density for horizontal or inclined movement, mainly 
in relation to auditoriums and halls (after (119)). They found a 
wide variation in flow velocity with density (particularly low 
densities) (see diagram C105). An equation was developed 
relating the individual projected areas of all the persons summed 
with the available floor area (see length and width factors in 
model). An assumption of homogeneity of flow is implicit, and 
there is no width allowance for boundaries (handrails, rough 
surfaces etc.) [82]. Pauls disagrees with these assumptions 
(91, 192). 
The importance of maintenance of flow is recognised. 
0btructions [256] (see later) are modelled as differential flow 
rates. There is shown to be relationship of speed of movement 
along horizontal paths as a function of flow density for normal, 
emergency, and comfortable conditions. This is similar to 
Fruin's model of people movement involving levels of service 
based on density (143)(refer diagrams C93, C104). Nomograms were 
produced for foot traffic parameters - along horizontal paths, 
through doors, up and down stairs. Empirical studies on high 
rise and large buildings by Seeger and John (1978)(202) support 
the model. They suggest a suitable reaction time be included in 
modelling time for evacuation. 
Kendik (1985)(119) has developed a model (after Predtechenskii 
and Millinski) for the evaluation of multi-storey buildings via 
staircases. For all the floors, similarity of route geometry and 
a homogeneous population distribution are assumed, as is 
simultaneous usage of the stairs. The corridors feeding the 
stairs are assumed to be full, giving a constant entry rate into 
the stairs. Results of the model confirm the criticality of 
stairs to egress and also the need for a balance of evacuation 
time for different stages. A relationship between escape route 
layout and occupant load is •defined. Variations in flow density, 
and hence congestion on sections of the route, can be modelled. 
The model is reported to have been computerised. 
Study of movement on components of egress systems has also been 
carried out by the following researchers... 
Roytman (1975)(70) discusses the mathematical modelling of 
egress, on the basis of the work developed by Predtechenskii and 
Millinski. 
Roytman uses physical models of movement to estimate the 
duration of different stages of escape. Clearing capacity of 
exits [300] is defined as a function of width [258] and the 
number of persons passing through an exit one metre in width per 
minute. (no boundary allowance). Diagram C107 indicates it is 
non-linear. He (70) suggests that a distinction should be made 
between speed of motion along a horizontal path, along an 
incline, in passageways, and through openings. Movement may be 
upward or downward along inclined paths. The speed of motion 
decreases as the density of the stream increases confirming a 
relationship between crowding and speed of travel also (Fruin 
(143)). See diagram C106. 
Speed in an upward direction was found to be equal or slightly 
greater than speed down stairs. The differenceis greatest at low 
density, and is generally approximately 10%. 	There is a much 
greater effect on speed if constrictions occur at maximum stream 
densities. In this case traffic clearing capacities of the doors 
and stairs govern the speed (203). 
In addition to simple flpw on horizontal or inclined routes, 
changes in width [82], or direction are important. Contra-flow 
and merging of flows may further affect escape route dynamics 
[171]. Merging at the foot of stairs may be particularly 
problematic. The effect of width restrictions on flow rate was 
recognised by Predtechenskii and Millinski (29) 
Peschl (1971) analysed the problems of flow capacity of door 
openings (30). His model applies to high density flow, such as 
may occur at the first 'sets of exit doors from a theatre. In 
such circumstances, people have little or no freedom of movement. 
On the basis of this Peschl uses a particle analogy: 
"When escaping in a panic.people are behaving like a granular 
mass flowing out of a bunker" (for bunker read hopper). 
A single exit for a flow of people is modelled as a vessel open 
at the top and with a hole at the bottom sufficiently large to 
emit one ball bearing only at a time (single unit of width). 
Ball bearings are poured in at the top, and under the force of 
gravity fall to the bottom of the vessel. If the entry rate is 
faster than balls can leave the hole, packing occurs (this is 
analogous to the increase in density as a backlog occurs), and 
the outward flow decreases. If increased pressure is applied 
(crowd pushing) then the critical density is achieved, and there 
is no movement. Peschl reports an arch formation in these cases 
(see also Togawa (198), and Panzhauser (58)). 
Arch formation is also noted by Roytman. 	See diagram C108. 
Pulsating flow causes formation and dissolution of arches. 
Obstruction is temporary [256,99], and the flow follows a 
sawtooth pattern. See diagram ClOY. He concludes that exit rate 
is a positive linear function of doorway width [258] (cf.: 
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Regulatory assumptions (193); Pauls (92). The arch is considered 
less stable as door width increases, confirming the criticality 
of adequate width for movement [258]. 
On the basis of his findings, Peschl recommends exit doors be as 
wide as possible and open outwards to minimise potential 
obstructions. The concept may be applicable to the ad hoc 
testing of doors. Bryan is reported as not having been able to 
recreate the arching effects in similar experiments (204). 
On discussing the feature of obstructions on flow, Melinek and 
Booth (199) note the effect of bends on flow rates. Inside bends 
the flow is slower, outside it is faster. This is related to 
density and the net difference for a route assumed to be nil. 
"Small scale" projections were reported to have little effect on 
flow rate, but the effect of inclination is recognised (after 
Togawa (198)). 
A formula for the number of people who can use staircases is 
derived. There is no recognition of a boundary effect. See 
diagram CilO for comparison of others' findings. 
A similar graph for number of floors and minimum evacuation time 
is derived. See diagram Clii. Note increasing problems of 
congestion with number of floors. 
Melinek and Booth (199) conclude from studies on crowd 'movement 
and evacuation that the normal capacity per unit width for 
corridors and stairs is approximately 1.5 persons rn-is-1. and 
1.1 persons m.-is.-I respectively. Assuming im is approximately 2 
units, then that is higher than unit of width assumption for 
corridors (90 compared with assumed 80 per minute). 
Traffic density produces effects on the average speed. 	For 
example, the agile pedestrian becomes handicapped and unable to 
by-pass the disabled person, and this reduces the total average 
speed. of the group, and acts as an obstruction (see later) 
[256,165]. Consideration of the way in which people move in 
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relatively free travel shows that people tend to overtake slower 
travellers. 
A physical movement mod ?l has been developed that considers 
differential flow speeds and contra-flows (1984) (146). People 
are considered as moving in lanes in a similar manner to road 
usage, with differential lane speeds. A person overtakes a 
slower one by using the appropriate lane to overtake and then 
returning to the original lane. 
0' Leary (1980) (205) uses a similar approach (cf. (146)) for 
analysing traffic movement on a road network. This has been 
developed for fire evacuation procedures (without overtaking) by 
W Leary and Gratz (1982) (206). The movements of people are 
modelled as transactions. Merging of flows (a feature of (146) 
is competitive; blockages and congestion (obstructions) can be 
modelled [256,82,99]. An input of initial locations for 
occupants and exit goals, routes available [257,92] and available 
capacity [300] is manipulated. The output of the model relates 
to the people evacuated and those remaining. 
Stair climbing and descent are quite different from ordinary 
horizontal movement. Fitch et al (1974) (142) report a reliance 
on rule of thumb for stair design. Experimental studies of stair 
usage with a variable piece of apparatus have determined a range 
of acceptable geometries. The effort required for movement up 
and down stairs at different configurations of pitch and 
riser/going dimension was compared. Significant increases in 
pulse rate and blood pressure were noted with steep stair angles. 
Physiologically weak evacuees may be susceptible. Safety will 
vary within the acceptable range of stair geometries, and with 
restraints imposed by the design configuration. 
Frequency of missed steps was also analysed. They identified a 
criticality of riser height and this is reinforced by Fruin 
(143). Some stair configurations found to be acceptable are 
out side the preferred architectural range (for instance 26.5 
degree pitch, 6 inch riser, 12 inch tread). 
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Other aspects include the shape of the nosing to the stair and 
position of handrails [99]. See diagram C112. 
Pauls has carried out empirical studies on evacuation from tall 
office buildings (91). In particular, he has studied the 
relationship between the width of stairs [258] and the flow rates 
of evacuees. He states that regulatory flow assumptions derived 
under test conditions (200) are unrepresentative of evacuation. 
A concept of "effective width" is put forward, based on 
regression analysis and film recordings of stair use. 	This 
includes a boundary width allowance of 300mm (total) on stairways 
to take account of the tendency for people to avoid stationary 
objects and walls (see also Fruin (143)) [99]. 	In some 
circumstances this allowance may be increased; Pauls suggests 
precarious-looking open wells, or rough textured walls (an 
average mean evacuation flow 7% lower than smooth walled stairs) 
C 
[82,99]. 
He has noted also that not all parts of stairs are equally used. 
There is a trend for travel in lanes, preferring the sides of 
stairs where there is a handrail. In three or four unit width 
stairs (66/88 inch) there is little tendency to form third or 
fourth lanes. See diagrams C113,C114. This has will have a 
significant effect on actual carrying capacity [258]. 
Diagram C115 illustrates Pauls' findings on effective stair width 
and mean flow in total evacuation of office buildings. For 
instance, his empirical studies have shown that a two unit of 
width stair (44 inch) would pass 60 people per minute (25% less 
than the regulatory assumption)(cf. (196)). 
Pauls notes the caution required if use of fluid flow models is 
to be valid. The generalisation of people and their usage of 
routes to that of fluid flow may tend to restrict realism and 
underestimate required time. The required time becomes 
management dependent in some occupancies particularly with phased 
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evacuations (Pauls and Jones) (92). 	(over estimation of 
provision effectiveness at design compared with 'in-use' 
performance). 
Some models are macroscopic. 	AIR-Q (Laing and Gentles (1975) 
(207,208)) is a time-based simulation model. 	It was originally 
intended for modelling the flow of large numbers of people 
through building networks, such as at airports. Ordinary 
movement is modelled using probabilistic transition matrices. 
(See also Stahl (31,32)). The model has been applied to 
analysing escape from fire (209,210). Escape is modelled through 
a restricted network. Evacuation time was derived using 
regulatory travel assumptions [258,300]: Queuing at bottlenecks 
may be analysed [82,99]. 
Henderson, (1971) (211), has modelled crowd movement on a 
(Maxwell Boltzmann) gas analogy. The density of flow is compared 
to gas and liquid phases and a number of crowd measurements are 
reported to support the model. Changes in speed at obstructions 
are modelled as phase transformations. The testing of the model 
was done using a number of homogeneous crowds under normal (free 
flow) movement. Henderson attributed flow deviations to 
differences between the sexes. The concept that people tend to 
move in groups was noted, but excluded from the model workings (a 
feature considered important by Sime (1983)(93)). 
The tests in some cases involved contra-flow interference. This 
may occur in scenarios with re-supply of assistance or confusion 
(cf. excluded by Archea (1979)( 140)) [165]. 
See also (146) for modelling this. Additionally, where there was 
confinement of travel this was by 'soft' boundaries, rather than 
'hard' boundaries associated with travel in buildings. See Pauls 
(92) [82,99]. 
Nakamura and Yoshioka (1975)(147) have analysed, and developed a 
mathematical model for, individuals walking in pedestrianised 
areas. Direction and speed are determined by the physical 
environment; others' movements; and "the individual's peculiar 
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conditions". A table of identified sub-properties is reproduced 
in diagram C116. 
In both cases (211,147) the tests were not made in relation to 
emergency movement and applicability to emergency movement 
analysis in building confines is limited. 
A model for crowd dynamics is discussed by Fruin (1984) (133). 
He identifies four interacting elements in any crowd situation:- 
Time - Arrival rate. 	In situations of peak arrival rates the 
capacity of the route may become overloaded and queuing occurs at 
bottlenecks. There are two basic types of pedestrian arrival 
process that should be taken into account, bulk arrival such as 
experienced at sporting events, or air terminals (208); and 
intermittent. 
Space - Critical Density (average area per person), related to 
architectural capacity, e.g.; stair or corridor width 
insufficient, number of exits, guardrail heights [82,99,165]. 
Information - Crowd compliance will depend on availability and 
quality of information. 
Energy - Crowds at Critical Density can produce immense forces. 
Fruin notes that asphyxia is a more common cause of crowd deaths 
than trampling. 
Computerised networking models may be used to simulate building 
layout and allow evaluation of Escape Route Layout [323] 
(Macgregor Smith (1982)(212), Kisko and Francis, (1983)(49). 
This will require assumptions about travel in routes. This may 
be based on flow capacity knowledge (49) [300]. Typical output 
is time for evacuation and identification of bottlenecks (see 
also (207,208)) [258,82]. 
Evacnet+ is an analytical model developed to calculate the 
minimum time required to evacuate a building; Chalmet et al. 
(1982)(47), Kisko and Francis (1982/83) (48,49,46), and Kisko 
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(1984)(50,51). 	In principal it appears to be an adaptation of 	a 
cost minimisation tool. 
The building is described as a static network of nodes and arcs 
(cf. AIR-Q (208). See diagram C117. Nodes represent building 
spaces such as rooms, halls, stairways. These are linked by arcs 
representing passageways between the spaces, to form a network. 
Travel across links (termed movement arcs) and staying in a space 
fe? a time period (termed a holdover arc) are assigned notional 
costs. Assumptions of physical movement on escape routes are 
unclear, however arc capacities are assumed not to depend on arc 
flows (50) (cf.; Fruin (143)). The total cost sum is converted 
to the time required for evacuation. Hence the model calculates 
the minimum time for all occupants to leave the. building. It is 
capable of dealing with large numbers of people and complex 
building layouts (213). 
The output does not specify route combinations used by 
individuals, but the occurrence of queuing is modelled [256]. 
Reiterations of the model with a variety of layouts would allow 
optimisation of indicated minimum evacuation time. It is 
possible that the least time solution(s) does not correspond to 
the anticipated usage of the escape route network. A proposed 
node priority facility extension may help reduce this problem 
(50). 
A possible extension to Evacnet+ is to allow for network 
modification during an event. This would be programmed prior to 
running and may represent smoke logged or fire infiltrated routes 
(51) [256,92]. 
Chalmet et al. (47) note the restrictions of behavioural 
modelling in network flow models, and suggest they are 
complementary approaches [299,300,170,171]. 
Macgregor-Smith (1982)(212,214) has also developed an analytical 
model for optimal egress based on a queuing network. The 
stochastic nature of the model allows the potential problems of 
merging of streams and environmental degradation to be simulated. 
Alvord (1983/85)(41) has developed a suite of two models for the 
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simulation of general fire emergency evacuations. 
Escape and Rescue Model for Board and Care Houses (ERM) 
(42,43) 
Fire Emergency Evacuation Simulation for Multifamily 
Buildings (FEES/MB). 
Both models are based on discrete event deterministic simulation 
methods using a network of nodes and links to describe the escape 
route layout. Egress is modelled using input assumptions for 
speed of travel. 
The simulation of exit route blockages [92] require changing the 
network. The Escape and Rescue model simulates movement for 
escape and/or rescue involving people with varying degrees of 
physical or mental disabilities [217,222]. Preparation times for 
daytime or night-time evacuation is included in the Escape and 
Rescue Model. A delay in becoming aware of the threat may be 
included in the multifamily model. The program produces a time 
to safety for each occupant and route used, and a total time to 
clear the building. It is intended to incorporate fire spread 
into the models. 
Some models relate threat and building usage, and this is a more 
potentially realistic representation of the interdependence of 
the whole safety system. Workplace variability is recognised by 
Stahl (Brires model) (31,32). 	Berlin (1982) (60) has also made 
use of networks for modelling. He has produced a simulation 
model relating fire intensity, smoke spread, and occupant 
evacuation [222,223,225]. This is discussed later. 
People Factors 
People interrelate with routes. 	Some of the traditional 
assumptions regarding people travelling on routes have been 
challenged (Pauls (1980)(91)). 
Shoulder width is assumed to be the main consideration in 
enabling people to exit through a restricted space (195,194). 
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There appears to be a range of values for people size assumptions 
(143,91,195). 
Fruin (143) discusses body sway. 	As the body travels, so it 
sways from side to side, (about 40mm). This is termed lateral 
sway. The width required for travel will be affected by this 
[101]. 	The amount of sway is pronounced at low speeds (143). 
Body sway may also be observed while standing. 	Although 
generally considered a static activity, this and foot shifting 
are required to aid in return of blood to the brain and the 
resting of leg muscles. 
Most building codes have assumed working widths of stairs based 
only on multiples of human shoulder dimensions, without allowance 
for this swaying factor (143) [101,258]. 
Additionally, body buffer zones may be important. 	Fruin also 
discusses the mental requirement of space in movement, referring 
to this as a buffer zone (143); There are a number various 
assumptions on the requirements for buffer zone size under 
various stages and qualities of travel. Fruin suggests that in 
some circumstances, such as emergency evacuation, there may be 
reductions in this requirement. Fruin divides the required space 
into two zones - a pacing zone and a sensory zone. 
The length of the pacing zone is dependent on the age, sex and 
physical condition of the individual. This is also noted by 
Roytman (70). 
Sensory zones are concerned with the requirement of the 
individual for information about the surroundings for movement. 
Visually handicapped pedestrians may move more slowly than 
'normal' and negotiate stairs more carefully. They may often stop 
to get their bearings. 
The assumption that people move side by side and do not overlap 
shoulders (196) is disputed on the basis of empirical studies 
(Pauls)(91). See diagram C113. 
Aspects of the way in which people actually queue and walk will 
affect the potential capacity of the routes. 	An observed 
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boundary effect in corridors (143) and stairs (91) has been 
discussed [82]. Pauls identifies handrail spacing and height as 
particularly important for emergency usage of stairs. See 
diagram C112. 
It has been suggested that stairs emptying into lobbies may have 
a greater flow rate (91.). (Lobby areas are likely - areas for 
getting information in events). 
Melinek and Booth (1975)(199) note the importance to total time 
of alertness and response. The possibility of panic is noted and 
not a feature of the evacuations considered (ordinary 
evacuation). 	Mobility is also acknowledged as being a 
potentially significant occupancy related variable [297]. 	The 
potential effect of environmental degradation (particularly to 
mobility) to reduced rates of travel is noted, but excluded from 
the model. 
Upper limits for evacuation times in cold weather may be longer 
where there may be delays in entering stairs and lower flows of 
descent because evacuees may retrieve and wear or carry bulkier 
outdoor clothing. Marchant (63) notes that people's projected 
area may increase by 33% in Winter. See also Roytman (70). 
Design of building layouts should take into account the disabled 
(Goldsmith (134)) [169,166]. Disability may be of a physical 
nature and limit the potential for movement [2481. The use of 
prosthetics, such as wheelchairs will affect width requirements 
[101]. In addition to these permanently physically handicapped, 
there may be people with a variety of minor deficiencies such as 
sight or locomotive related impairment. Fruin (143) notes that 
the poorly sighted tend to travel more slowly [81]. Added to 
these are the aged whose motor capabilities may have slowed down; 
persons temporarily limited due to accidents (this is permanent 
in terms of the event duration); and persons who may also be 
encumbered with babies or carriages. The length of route may be 
critical for them [83]. In addition to the space requirements 
(diagram C103) [101] and speed of travel of assisting people may 
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have to be considered (41,140). 	The natural ability of the 
individual may differ with age. This has been discussed by 
Marchant (63) who suggests that the space requirements of a 
disabled person may be up to four times that of a 'normal' 
person. This type of data could be translated into values for 
reduced density for a fixed number of people. In turn this could 
be used to provide estimates of relative travel time 
requirements. The disabled may also provide problems for other 
route users (146) [169]. Pauls also notes the possibility of 
injury during an event and cites an incident during an experiment 
(1952 report on Fire Gradings of Buildings) (92). 
The Hackney Hospital Evacuation Exercise (135) allowed the 
ranking of difficulty of evacuation of a hospital ward (using 
assistance and evaluated with volunteers). See diagram C71 
(159). 
Vertical evacuation of the patients was identified as being 
inadequate to maintain safety. There was a significant time 
requirement for preparation [81]. 
In addition there are a number of important aspects relating to 
the way people interpret and use routes. These factors determine 
the Ease of Use of Escape Route Layouts [299]. There is also an 
important inter-relationship with peoples capability to escape 
[217]. The behavioural aspects of route usage have been explored 
less than time for egress aspects Stahl et al.(67). 
A number of factors affecting Exit Route Capacity directly and by 
interaction have been identified. 	See diagrams C118 
[171,l72,167169], dig [98-102,168,82,149,138][103 -107, 46 , 83 . 
139]. It is evident that the effective capacity of routes [300] 
is strongly dependent on their geometrical nature and the ease of 
use [299]. This must be designed to serve the occupants. A 
degree of redundancy of provision is required (196) (see diagram 
C98). The effective Width [258] and Length of routes [259] is 
related to the shape of the building layout 
[98,100,102,104,106,107]. The performance of these factors will 
be critical for the users. 
The representativeness and applicability of models will depend on 
the context in which they are developed and the (related) 
designed application (e.g.; Henderson (211)). In most 
circumstances the information on people movement is derived in 
laboratory conditions and the stress and urgency of the real 
situation is not adequately created. 
Models based on empirical studies (e.g.; Henderson (free 
flow)(211), Pauls (tall office buildings)(91), Melinek and Booth 
(stores)(199)) are restricted in application to those areas. The 
more fundamental models on the general physics of movement may 
allow application to any specific scenario and can be powerful by 
reason of their flexibility. They may be applicable to the 
analysis of proposed or existing buildings. However, the nature 
of the relationship of both with realism, requires recognition. 
It is appropriate also to consider the models of people behaviour 
in fires and indicate the links between this and the physical 
provisions of routes [222,217]. This people-orientated approach 
has been gathering pace, e.g.; Stahl (1979/80)(31,32), Sime 
(1983/85)(45,93). A number of models (e.g.; Baer (1974)(215) are 
related closely to the use of routes and are discussed in more 
detail in the following section. 
Ease of Use 
The performance of an Escape Route Layout [323] depends also on 
aspects of Ease of Use (Maclennan (1984)(216)) [299]. There is a 
degree of interaction identified between Ease of Use and the Exit 
Route Capacity (and its sub-factors) [170,171], and capability of 
the population [169,166] (Marchant (1976)(62,63)). See diagram 
C120 [169,170,166 r171]. Relationships between route provision 
and people behaviour have been observed to differentiate 
performance on paper and in use (Roux (1974)(9)). 
Evaluation of route layout performance is a traditionally 
important method of 'evaluating' safety - people activities may 
often be ignored. Fundamental to any predictive or analytical 
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model for route effectiveness is an understanding of how routes 
and aspects of routes are used [299]. 
A useful Escape Route Layout will be simple to interpret and easy 
to negotiate at all times. Any escape route options should be 
easy to identify [255]. Fruin (1971)(143):- 
"Building configuration should be logical, containing simple, 
direct architectural statements that visually convey direction, 
orientation, and purpose to the user." 
See diagram C121 [254,255]. 
The belief that buildings are elementary determinants of the 
behavioural responses of occupants is concluded by Kendik 
(1985)(119), noting the need for performance-orientated 
calculation methods. Marchant (1976)(63) has reviewed a series 
of aspects of escape route design and performance. He notes 
particularly people behaviour, mass flow on routes, and 
interpretation of routes. 
There are a number of Ease of Use aspects in buildings that 
determine behaviour, and the effectiveness of the building for 
escape. These are Location Identification [254], Route Choice 
Identification [255], Choice of Alternative Routes [257], and any 
Obstructions to use [256]. Refer diagram C12. 
Ease of Use [299] is defined as (Delphi): 
"The ease of use or otherwise with which all building spaces may 
be used for escape. Use of a route requires that it may be so 
identified, and the relationship with other building spaces 
ascertained. Further, the degree of obstruction to movement 
because of the design, usage by other escapees, or as a direct 
result of the threat will alter the ease of use. Where design is 
achieved without movement or by use of refuge facilities the 
contribution of the ease of use of the spaces will be 
correspondingly restricted." 
In ordinary circumstances Ease of Use of the building will aid 
travel. In emergencies it is a critical factor. 
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Ease of use is complementary to capacity of routes (Quality and 
Quantity) [170,171]. Refer diagram C91. A deficiency in either 
of these main sub-factors of Escape Route Layout will mean that 
it is unlikely that the escape route layout will perform 
adequately (for egress, refuge, or protection in place). The 
characteristics of a route that may affect its performance relate 
to the ease of interpretation and the facility it offers. This 
has been recognised by a some researchers and a variety of models 
have been produced which relate to Ease of Use and Exit Route 
Capacity to simulate usage of escape route layouts in events, or 
the manner in which it relates to the rest of the Life Safety 
System. 
Watts (1986)(217) reports on a number of such modelling 
techniques for the analysis of evacuation from building fires 
including; BFires (Stahl)(31,32), FEES/MB (Alvord)(41), ERM 
(Alvord)(42,43), Building Fire Simulation Model (BSFM) 
(Fahy)(218), Evaluation Methodology for Building Evacuation and 
Review (EMBER) (Berlin)(60), Evacnet+,(Chalmet, Francis, 
Kisko)(46-51), and Q2 (Watts)(217) adapted from Macgregor-Smith 
(212,214) and Evacnet+). He focuses on the need to link or 
combining existing models to give further information. 
Ease of Use may be split down into the following determinant sub-
factors: -  
- Location Identification [254] 
- Route Choice Identification [255] 
- Choice of Alternative Routes [257] 
- Obstructions to use of routes [256] 
Providing those unfamiliar with the building with adequate safety 
requires information/instructions for escape that are easy to 
interpret. Route design and signage are important aspects 
[70,77] in addition to dynamic communication [296]. Negotiation 
of the building will tend to be in successive stages (T( action) - 
T(relative safety)'  T(relative safety) - T(safety) and Regulatory 
assumptions on stages of travel (187,120)). 	Confirmation of 
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action/direction for safety and new instructions between stages 
will be necessary. The user may be unable to distinguish between 
protected and unprotected zones, and confirmation of relative 
safety may be required. 
It is important that occupants can interpret the way the building 
is laid out, and the directions to take for escape, even if they 
are totally unfamiliar with the building. Most people will have 
the benefit of a cognitive map for some parts of the building. 
This may be distorted- commonly used routes appearing 
predominant. People will tend to use ordinary main routes in an 
event and these should be designed as protected routes. 
Essential prerequisites to route usage 	are Location 
Identification [254] and Route Choice Identification [255,74]. 
Both these factors may be served by signage, and contribute to 
Life Safety in a similar manner. They are considered jointly. 
Location Identification Route Choice Identification [254,255] 
Location Identification is defined as (Delphi):- 
'The ease with which a person can identify their location in a 
building relative to exits/ refuges.' 
Route Choice Identification is defined as (Delphi):- 
"The ease with which a person at any particular location in a 
building can identify where the nearest escape route(s) or 
protected refuge is, and also identify that they are still on 
a protected route when using it." 
Negotiating a building system is very much like a learning 
process [48,49] (Fruin (1971)(143). 	The frequent user will 
comprehend route configuration after a few trials [65]. 	Also, 
the identification of location, or landmarks such as routes [49] 
is an important prerequisite for the use of building knowledge 
for escape [48]. Infrequent or first-time users will find 
difficulty if the visual components of the space are incoherent. 
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The ability of the individual and awareness of the event will be 
significant [64,66,71]. 
Fruin (143) suggests emphasis on architectural design [78], e.g.; 
avoidance of circuitous 'dogleg' routes [259,83], centralised 
exits, obscured doorways [91] and ambiguous paths where possible. 
These aspects relate to the factors Route Choice Identification 
[255] and Obstructions [256,75] (refer diagram C121). 
Signage should be seen as 'a supplementary aid which confirms the 
architectural statement rather than deciphers it (143). A logical 
route layout helps with interpretation, and should increase 
information reception under stressful conditions [78]. Fruin 
proposes a concept of a range of perception for goal direction, 
based on the visual field (cf. Fires, Stahl (1979/80)(31,32)). 
BFires models the perceptual and behavioural response of 
individuals, occupant location [254] and exit arrangement 
[255,257], and so simulates the decision process for use of 
escape routes (210). Blires II (32) uses a probability 
transition matrix to model choice of direction of people in 
routes. This differentiates it from most of the networking 
models which assume occupants use pre-planned route (not always an 
unreasonable assumption). 
The importance of visual field and proximity of route choices 
[257] have also been recognised by Horiuchi (1978)(219). 	See 
diagram C122. 	Location of routes may help with this problem 
(refer diagram C121) [78]. 
Regulatory requirements for spaces include provision of 
information in a recognisable format and within easy view to 
allow the person to identify a • route for escape [255,91]. The 
provision of information in the form of safety notices and 
information signs has been studied by Collins (1982)(220). She 
identified the nature of signs and the provision of unambiguous 
information as particularly important for the person who is 
searching for information [54,55]. Placing of signs is also 
significant. Signs at head height may quickly become obscured by 
smoke [69,76], but before routes become impassable (Rees and 
Wagstaff) (139). 
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Sime (115) suggests that in fires people investigate and/or move 
towards the familiar. Signage is a continuing communication tool 
for establishing the location [254] and direction towards 
increased safety [255]. 
Interpretation of signs is critical. Signs must convey 
information easily, accurately, and unambiguously. Problems may 
arise with multi-cultural societies because of mixed social and 
language backgrounds. Effective signage will transcend these 
problems and be easily interpretable by all the general public 
 
There are a number of important aspects that make symbols 
advantageous over words (Collins and Lerner (1980)(221)): 
- they can be perceived more rapidly 
- they can be interpreted at a greater distance 
- more accurate interpretation. 
Collins and Lerner suggest that reaction time to symbols may be 
shorter, even with visual degradation. Symbols can also be more 
easily and accurately remembered. 	Studies of pictorial signs 
(glyphs), to eliminate possible ambiguity, caused by 
uncoordinated development or poor design, have been carried out 
(Collins and Pierinan (1978)(222)). They report problems of 
applications of signs in use for other purposes (e.g.; 'no entry' 
signs), and with directional signs requiring specific knowledge 
Some designs were found to be critically ambiguous. 
Diagram C123 shows a sign depicting 'blind alley - no exit'. 
This was interpreted by some people as a refuge. 
Aspects of signs, such as colours, backlighting (tested by Jin 
(1972)(177)), and height have also been identified as important. 
The influence of colour on the speed of detection and accuracy of 
identification has been studied (Reynolds et al. (1972)(223)). 
Additionally, interactions between stimulus colour, background 
colour, and amount of ambient illumination were identified and 
assessed. Detection and identification of stimuli lights against 
backgrounds are more difficult under bright ambient illumination. 
Speed of response was related to colour. Red and green, the 
u-i 
common fire safety signage colours, were identified quickest. 
In most circumstances signage is visual [7]. 	This may be 
inappropriate for fractions of the population, and information 
for the identification of location and use of routes may be 
provided using other sensory media [70,77]. Refer diagram C92. 
An example of this approach is the use of directional tactile 
strips along the walls of routes. 
Location Identification is essential for the manual use of smoke 
control systems [150]. Diagrams C124,C125 [71-78,7,49,55,91] 
indicate the potential interactions of the factors Location and 
Route Choice Identification. 
Other aspects to consider in signage of routes include the use of 
Staff Only, or Fire Exit Only signs, which discourage normal use, 
and may lead to the routes being overlooked in an event. 
Additionally, problems may be caused by fire exits remote from 
normal routes (an obstruction to identification [75]). Haber 
(1978)(105) recommends that exits are plentiful [257], well 
marked [255], and never locked [92]. Doors must open outwards 
[256]. 
Training will be required to help interpretation of route choices 
[72,73], alternatives [88,89], and locations [67,68] (210). 
General fire safety knowledge may be more useful than specific 
knowledge. See diagram C125. 
Choice of Alternative Routes 
Butcher and Parnell (203) note that where occupants do not have 
immediate access to a place of safety they should be provided 
with alternative routes to reduce the chance of being trapped 
(also noted earlier by Van Bogaert (1978)(24)) 	The absence of 
routes provides an obstruction to escape [79]. 	In most 
circumstances, accessible choice of alternative routes is 
mandatory. 	Continued identification of location and routes is 
important [90,91], also the constructional performance of the 
(I? 
building [85,86,95] and the presence of any temporary or 
permanent obstructions [92]. 
Choice of Alternative Routes is defined as (Delphi):-. 
"The ease with which alternative protected routes may be 
identified, and the provision of such routes." 
Berlin (1978)(226) has used a network approach for three 
dimensional building description (EMBER)(see also 	(46- 
51,217,212,214)). 	The inter-relationships between fire growth, 
smoke spread and occupant evacuation are included in the 
(computerised) simulation model. 
He identified the spaces in a building as nodes, linked by the 
possible travel paths. 	See diagram C126 (000 represents the 
exterior of the building) [257]. 	The total number of routes 
available in normal conditions determines the exit route capacity 
[172], and gives a measure of the escape potential [257]. 	The 
criticality of spaces may be assessed on the basis of available 
routes affected if the space is affected by a fire. This is an 
important interactive link between the degradation of the 
environment and provision of escape facilities [92,94,93,96]. 
The work has been developed (Berlin (1980)(224) for analysis of 
residential rehabilitation. This reflects aspects of remoteness 
of exits, travel distance and the problems of dead ends (also 
tackled by Stahl (32,210). 	Also modelled is crowding and the 
effect this may have on step retracing. Time delays are used to 
model travel difficulty [92] (Berlin (1980). 
Diagram C127 represents the potential interactions of the factor 
Choice of Alternative Routes [85-97,79,172]. 
Obstructions [256] 
Obstructions is a general factor related the .usability of the 
spaces within the building. At tertiary level the scope of the 
factor is broad, and aspects of route use included are; geometry 
and its influence on mobility [165], slipperiness, permanent or 
temporary obstructions caused by the building [82,83,79], people 
[81], or the environment [84]. At the 4th and lower tiers of the 
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hierarchy it could be expected that the further division of the 
factor would allow a more specific set of performance related 
parameters to be identified. 
A number of examples of inadequate escape route performance 
related to obstructions have been identified by Malhotra 
(1985)(120), discussed earlier. 
Any form of restriction on the identification of routes (e.g.; 
Summerland, hidden exits from Marquee Showbar [75] (115)(also Abe 
(1976)(117), Haber (1978)(105), route alternatives [92], or 
continued use of escape routes (e.g.; Summerland, open stairways 
affected by fire [84] (115)) are examples of obstructions. The 
factor Obstructions is defined as (Delphi):- 
"This term covers any temporary or permanent obstruction to 
movement, within the time frame of the event. Examples of 
obstructions include locked doors, blocked routes, queues, narrow 
sections of routes." 
A permanent obstruction is any form of obstruction that obstructs 
the routes for the duration of the available escape time. This 
may be routes blocked by smoke or heat [84] or locked doors 
(Haber (105) and appendix 3) [223,225]. A heavily sprung door or 
a long route [83] may effectively be an obstruction to a weak or 
disabled person, unless aided [81]. 
The obstruction need not be complete, but may only slow movement 
down (e.g.; columns restricting flow width and thus crowd 
movement [82] (Fruin (1971)(143)). Other examples of temporary 
obstructions include; queuing or slow movement caused by 
restricted physical capability [81] or movement on stairways or 
around obstacles [82], contra-flow (e.g.; re-supply of rescuers 
(1979)(1 40)), disruption to flow because of doors (in free or 
emergency use) opening (Kagawa et al. observational studies 
(188)) or the same heavily sprung door to a stronger individual. 
Aspects of entrances and exits to buildings channel people into 
lanes of travel of controlled (door) width. In addition to 
restricting lateral spacing in the traffic •stream, such entrance 
or exitways may require the pedestrian to undertake some other 
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time-consuming act, such as opening a door (e.g.; Victoria 
Nurses Home (1981)(appendix 3)), or passing through a turnstile 
(Saint Laurent-du-Pont (1970)). The complexity of manoeuvres 
required to negotiate the route may be particularly significant 
for the disabled [165]. 
Wagstaff and Rees (1981)(139) note from patient evacuation 
exercises the significance of floor surface (particularly the 
direction of carpet weave). 
A choice of alternative routes will strongly influence the 
significance of a blocked route (refer diagram C126 and compare 
local and remote paths). Additionally, advance information about 
obstructions (an increase in event knowledge [56]) may reduce the 
impact of an obstruction [80]. 
The wide potential interactivity of obstructions with the Life 
Safety System is indicated in diagram C128 [79-84165,56,92,75, 
gg,1o3]. 
Examples of inclusion of Obstructions into models include ASET; 
which uses the depth and temperature of the upper (smoke) layer 
[84] as criteria for safe available time for escape. 
Considerations of how people react to the smoke obscuration of 
routes and the influence this has on travel has been studied 
experimentally by Jin (177) and is the subject of studies by Sime 
(69). Canter suggests this is a'suitable topic for further work 
(1985)(28). The importance of this has also been recognised by 
Berlin (60,225). 
Generally 
The function of ease of use factors should be to ensure that the 
target population has the opportunity to work at their Optimum 
level if this is required. This will be related to,environmeiital 
degradation and the size of the population. 
Th e _Tè6 n trib ution of ease of use factors will be particularly 
important in the stage of the event associated with planning 
(T(perception) - T(action))s and activities during-this stage may 
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include information seeking in the immediate vicinity for 
location [254] and route choice identification [255]. 
Experiments on this have been carried out (Horiuchi (1978)(219)). 
See diagram C129. These indicate an importance of orientation in 
evaluating the situation and establishing the options available. 
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Id Smoke Release 
Introduction. 
Smoke may be defined as consisting of the airborne solid and 
liquid particulates and gases evolved when a material undergoes 
pyrolysis or combustion (ASTM) - In general, the release of smoke 
is the source of the predominate threat for occupants of a 
building on fire [324]. Particularly, the rate of smoke 
production (and temperature increase) is extremely important in 
relation to escape from building fires (Woolley et al 
(1978)(227), Marchant (97)) [140]. Smoke Release is determined 
by the size and type of the fire [226,301], and the fuels that 
are combusting in the fire [302](Butcher and Parnell 
(1979) (144)). 
Smoke Release is defined as (Delphi):- 
"The term smoke release covers the release of products of 
combustion as a fuel, or combination of fuels, burns. The 
products of combustion will not only be smoke particles but also 
toxic gases." 
Smoke release depends on a number of sub-factors. There are shown 
in diagram C130 [260-266,301,302]. Diagram C131 is an early 
concept of the factors determining smoke release. 
The precursor to a 'normal' fire is the presence of an ignition 
source [262]. Diagram C132 is a table of sources of ignition in 
buildings (based on 1972 statistics)(after (228)). The intensity 
and duration of ignition sources will vary greatly (229)* [108]. 
The significance of an ignition source will depend on the 
material(s) the source impinges upon [114]. The nature of the 
relationship, and potential contribution to Life Safety will vary 
between scenarios (1982)(230). 
* Explosions are excluded from this model: the non-general time 
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stages and growth patterns of an explosion, together with the 
structural problems are not included in the model. 
Smoke Release 
The release of smoke and toxic gases may affect people 
physiologically and physically by either disturbing the quality 
of the visual field and/ or causing direct harm by the toxic, 
irritant nature of the products (Woolley and Raftery (1975)(231)) 
[208]. See diagram C133 [42-44,40,41]. Interaction with 
physiological [44] or physical deficiencies may occur (Birky 
(1975)(232)). Other problems include hypoxia in fire area 
(161,228,233,133) [3281, and the temperature of the gases (see 
also (97), and refer appendix 3 and (38)) (Cox (1986)(162) 
[84,40,42]. Disturbance of the visual field may slow down 
escapers or lead to their retreat from escape routes (234) 
[6,96]. The effect of smoke is made more problematic because of 
its ability to spread. Diagram C134 [226,218,228,231,234]. 
Heselden and Baldwin (1976)(235):- 
'A fire in a building generates 'smoke, that is, combustion 
gases containing irritant, noxious and toxic constituents and 
carrying smoke particles. The effects of smoke and irritant and 
toxic gases occur together but roughly speaking the smoke 
particles obscure the escape routes and trap people who may then 
be killed by the toxic products." 
The smoke release quantity and rate will depend on the rate of 
burning of the fire [301] and the smoke yield qualities of the 
fuels combusting [302]. Refer diagram C130. 
Relatively recent advances in the understanding of physical 
structure of materials have made it possible to create materials 
to meet functional needs. The application of such materials with 
relatively new fire properties has consequences for the nature of 
the environmental degradation associated with fires (see (236)). 
For example, an increased usage of plastic materials (Butcher and 
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Parnell (144)) may be a contributory factor in the increased 
statistical proportion of smoke as a serious threat in fires 
(also Woolley and Raftery (1975)(233), Bowes (1974/5)(237,166)) 
[266]. See diagrams C135,C136 (after (144)). 
Robertson (1975)(238) has suggested that in the absence of 
specific techniques for analysing the relative hazards of 
combustion products, smoke production may be used as a partial 
indicator [302]. The complexity of defining a standard smoke and 
its analysis make this an impractical_solution. 
The quantity and nature of smoke produced by the combustion of 
materials will vary [266]. See diagram C137 [265,266]. Some 
studies of smoke release give a relative order of magnitude of 
components, that allows a statement - "this is better or worse 
than that." 
The relative smoke producing potential of materials has been 
discussed by Butcher and Parnell (144). Smoke filling and the 
reduction of visibility to im with different materials is 
discussed:- 
0.5kg of wood 
0.007kg of expanded Polystyrene 
0.1kg of Foam Rubber 
0.5kg of Polyurethane Foam 
0.31 of Kerosene 
All are equivalent [266]. 
Rasbash (1967)(132) notes a relative production of products 
between plastics and wood: " ...many  of the plastics produce 10-
250 times as much smoke as wood..." 
Rasbash and Phillips (1978)(234) have carried out comparative 
tests on smoke production potential with the aim of quantifying 
it, based on obscuration by standard samples. There is a growing 
demand for the identification of materials with a high tendency 
to produce smoke (Drysdale (1976/82) (228,239,240) [302]. The 
creation of a relative index would assist with the assessment of 
smoke load (see also Robertson (238)). Drysdale notes the 
difficulty in devising a suitable test for the 'smoke-generating 
capacity' of materials because of the influence of environmental 
conditions (228,240,239) [226,265]. 
Toxicity 
Products of combustion are a threat to Life Safety in Fires [44]. 
The amount of exposure required will vary with the products (132) 
[266] and the individual (161), and may be lethal (144). In some 
cases a short exposure (seconds) to a small concentration may be 
sufficient. There is a tendency for deaths to be attributed to 
carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning, since it is always present in 
fires (144,239,132,141), generally in greater concentrations 
than other products. Studies have shown a relationship of time 
to incapacitation by CO and activity level (Purser (1972)(161)). 
See diagram C72. 
A number of other potentially hazardous products have been 
identified, including hydrogen chloride (HC1) and hydrogen 
cyanide (HCN), given off when some plastics burn (144). --
A synergistic effect of toxicity has been discussed by some 
researchers, including Rasbash (132): 
.very often a mixture of dangerous compounds may be produced 
and the combined toxic effect could be greater than merely 
additive." 
Bowes et al (1976)(165) studied toxicity of PVC pyrolysis 
products with animals, and summarise that there could be a 
marginal increase in fatality if HCl was present in lethal 
concentrations in fire gases containing lethal concentrations of 
carbon monoxide; but that it is probable that the most important 
effects of the presence of HC1 may be related to the highly 
irritant nature of the gas, which may result in (more) people 
being prevented from using the escape routes in the early stages 
of an event by otherwise relatively harmless concentrations of 
fire gas [96]. 
Lynch reports experimentally demonstrating non-existence of 
synergism between HCN and CO (1975)(241). 
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Other studies have been done by Hartzell et al (1984)(163,164). 
See also physiological capability section. Clearly, any 
synergistic relationships will be potentially significant. 
The requirement to define fire atmospheres is noted by Woolley 
and Fardell (1982)(242). Rasbash (1967)(132) states that "smoke 
may also incapacitate people physiologically by the irritating 
effect caused by many of the combustion products ... On the other 
hand, irritants can give early warning of the presence of smoke." 
[6,20,17,44]. See diagram C134. 
An approach towards the development of a toxicity index is 
introduced by Martin and McKee (1978)(243). Experimental studies 
on toxicological effects are reported to have led to a reasonable 
understanding and some quantification of the effects of fire 
products (on non-human primates and humans) (Hartzell et al 
(1985)(244)) [44,328]. Relative toxicity is also discussed by 
Butcher and Parnell (144). See diagram C138 [44]. 
Visibility 
Rasbash suggests (1967)(132) that "Probably the main hazard of 
smoke is that it makes escape difficult by reducing visibility." 
[6] (see also Hagglund (1983)(245). 
Rasbash and Phillips (1978)(234) introduce a concept for 
measuring the smoke (obscuration) potential (also Rasbash 
(1966)(246). Referring to this, Woolley et al (1978)(227) state: 
"In considering escape from fire, visibility through the smoke is 
usually important and this has been directly related to measured 
opacity of smoke in terms of optical density through a measured 
distance, usually one metre. The amount of smoke produced, and 
the rate at which it is evolved, measured as a quantity of known 
opacity can be of value in calculating likely contamination 
levels when smoke is dispersed into compartments of known 
volume." [302,140,6] 
See diagram C139 (after (132)(1967)). This is also supported by 
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Rasbash and Phillips (1978)(234). Diagram C137 is derived from 
Table 1 (source (234)). 	They have produced a model of smoke 
release and visibility. A unit to express smokiness, _termed_the 
Obscura (ob), was proposed. 	This was defined as 1db light 
attenuation per metre of light path. Diagram C140 indicates the 
relationship of volume of smoke produced [302,140], volume of 
compartment, and visibility [6] derived from experimental studies 
by Woolley et al (1978)(247). 	The smoke producing potential 
('Do' in diagram C137) is compared. 	Plastics are particularly 
problematic (Woolley et al. (1978)(227), Drysdale (1976)(228)) 
[256]. 
Determinant Factors of Smoke Release 
A number of factors determine smoke release (diagrams C130,C131). 
A distinction may be made between the contribution of the 
materials and the fire [302,301]. 
Malhotra notes the relevance of a large number of independent and 
inter-dependent factors to fires (1981)(248):- 
"The nature and amount of combustible materials, the manner in 
which they are distributed, the nature of the initial energy 
source responsible for the initiation of combustion, the 
availability of oxygen, the size of the room or compartment 
involved, the thermal characteristics of boundaries; these are 
some of the important factors." [266,261,113,262,264,158] 
Work on the nature of fires has identified and confirmed three 
essential requirements for a fire to exist and continue. These 
are fuel [261,113], heat [262,260] and oxygen [264]. 	This is 
often represented in the simplistic form of a triangle. Absence 
of any any of these will prevent or extinguish a fire [112,115]. 
The nature of combination will determine the type of fire. For 
instance, low heat and certain types of fuel (Drysdale 
(1980)(249)), low oxygen availability may create a smouldering 
fire [119,121,264,120]. 
The toxic 'nature of smoke is dependent on a number of factors. 
Martin and McKee (1978)(243):- 
"Smoke toxicity is not an intrinsic property of a material, 
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rather it is a fire-related extrinsic property. 	Both the 
quantity and quality of the smoke depend on the history and 
condition of a fire exposure (ie; situation variables) as well as 
on the chemical and physical make up of the material or end-use 
product." [265,256] 
Martin and McKee identify oxygen concentration and heat load as 
main factors affecting smoke toxicity [264,260]. 
They relate smoke compositions and hence toxic potential to the 
'fire triangle'. See diagram C141. They suggest that different 
locations within the triangle (e.g., x,y, or z) represent 
different smoke compositions and hence toxic potential. 
This is a poor model, with particularly little meaning at the 
boundaries of the triangle (334). 	However, it emphasises the 
importance 	of the following factors included in the smoke 
release section of the model described in this thesis:- 
Ignition Source [262] 
Rate of Heat Release [260] 
Oxygen Supply [264] 
Type of Material [266] 
Bulk Density [263) 
Fuel Geometry and Orientation [261] 
Work by other researchers has identified a relationship between 
the type of fire and the nature of combustion products from 
burning materials (Rasbash (1967)(132), Drysdale (228) [266]. 
Some materials give a marked difference in products when 
burning under- different conditions (e.g., rigid polyurethane 
foam (234)) [265]. 
Two principle factors determine Smoke Release. See diagram C131. 
These are Rate of Burning [301] and Smoke Yield [302]. 
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Rate of Burning [301] 
The Rate of Burning of a fire is defined as (Delphi):- 
"The rate of weight loss of fuel or combination of fuels under 
combustion. "  
This is inter-related to a number of other factors - see diagram 
C142 [173,123,193,174,157]. Mode of burning is influenced by the 
rate of burning [123]. The rate of burning will influence the 
volume and energy of smoke released [174,193] (144,228). 
Different materials will have different rates of burning, eg; 
Polyurethane foam burns extremely rapidly, wood relatively slowly 
(240) [173,157]. The amount of time available for escape will be 
significantly affected. 
The Rate of Burning depends on the temperature of the material 
(228) [260]. Other factors determining the Rate of Burning are 
Ignition Source [262], Fuel Geometry and Orientation [261], Bulk 
Density [263], and Oxygen Supply [264]. 
Rate of Heat Release [260] 
Defined as (Delphi):- 
"The rate at which heat is given out by the fire for the release 
of volatiles and pre-heating of fuel, also to the plume." * 
This factor impacts onto the Rate of Burning (228) [260]. The 
pre-heating effect of a fire on the fuel is a significant aspect 
in the growth of that fire [119]. 	It allows for 	an easier 
continued growth 	and contributes to the contribution of the 
flame spread characteristics (228) [152]. There is also a 
potential interaction onto contribution of fuel supply and 
distribution [203]. See diagram C143 [108-
112,8,42,84,93,119,128,141,152,203,158]. The rate of heat release 
of fires and the temperature of smoke are important hazardous 




Footnote: Some heat is also radiated (to the fuel). That which 
goes to the hemisphere above the fire is lost to the 
plume and fire. 
The proximity of fuels is a significant factor in fire spread. 
2 If heat released by combustion (acting as an ignition source for 
second item ignited, etc.) is sufficient to cause ignition then 
the fire can potentially spread [203]. 
Rate of Heat Release influences the mode of burning [ 119]. 
There are a number of ther  factors which rate of heat release 
interacts with. Heat released by a fire may provide information 
about the fire threat. The tenability of spaces or routes 
affected by the fire will be adversely affected. Refer diagram 
C143.  
Fuel Geometry and Orientation [261] 
"The way in which the fuel is arranged to allow the development 
of the fire." (Delphi) 
The term Fuel Geometry and Orientation refers to the positioning 
of the available fuel in the context of how it might affect the 
Rate [261] and Mode of Burning [121]. Fuel surfaces which are 
vertical burn easiest (228), the lower surface of a horizontal 
plane has the least propensity to burn. 
The Supply and Distribution of Fuel will influence the Rate of 
Burning [114] (228,250), and so to the Life Safety 	of the 
scenario. 	Also the Rate of Burning will influence the 
performance of Fuel Distribution (e.g., ease of fire growth in 
racked structures) [204]. Diagram C144 [113,121,204]. 
Ignition Source. [262] 
This factor relates to the scale and type of source provided for 
ignition. There is a variability in potential intensity and 
duration (229). 
Ignition source is defined as (Delphi):- 
"This term covers the provision of some type of ignition source 
for starting combustion. The effectiveness of the ignition source 
to start combustion will vary with the ease of ignition of the 
Ft.' 
fuel." [114] 
The importance of an ignition source lies in the definition of 
its application (Drysdale (1976)(228)). Ignition requires the 
raising of the temperature of a combustible material to a level 
where there is a sufficient rate of gasification to allow a 
combustible mix to form above the surface. The nature of 
combustion will depend on the rate of heat release of volatiles 	v i 
(249,228)[1 24 , 120].  
There was discussion in the Delphi group of the time stages and 
concepts of ignition source. Ignition sources of a low intensity 
may require to be of a long duration (e.g., hot electric cables) 
to start a fire. Other sources are high power, perhaps only of a 
short duration will be needed [108]. 
The relationship of the ignition source and the materials to the 
ease of ignition is recognised by interactions of ignition source 
and Flame Spread Characteristics (a material which spreads flame 
well may be easier to ignite). [114], and the Rate of Heat Release 
(this applies mostly to ignition of further items) [108]. 	See 
diagram C145 [114,108]. 	Woolley and Raftery (1975 ) (233) note 
that materials treated with flame-retardant additives may be more 
difficult to ignite E1141, but tend to generate increased amounts 
of smoke and toxic gas if involved in a fire. Incombustible 
materials are obviously preferable [266,154]. 
Bulk Density [263] 
"The density of material/ fuel as may affect its rate of 
burning." (Delphi) 
Thomas and Theobald (1977)(251) identify an inverse relationship 
between Rate of Burning and Bulk Density, confirming a dependence 
of Rate of Burning on Bulk Density [263]. This supports Thomas 
(1975)(236), who also identified an influence of bulk density on 
mode of burning. See diagram C146 [109,120]. 
In instances of deep-seated smouldering, the bulk density of a 
fuel may influence the rate of burning. [120] by limiting the 
availability of oxygen into the fuel. With a porous material of 
low bulk density, smouldering is possible (334). Whether the 
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rate of heat release can be influenced by the mode of burning 
[109] is debatable (334). This interaction, and the potential 
influence of type of material on rate of burning [111] are 
included in  the model described in this thesis. - 
Oxygen Supply [264] 
This factor is defined as (Delphi):- 
"The availability of plentiful or otherwise supply of oxygen to 
support the combustion process and influence characteristics of 
smoke released." 
It is included in the model in the context of smoke release 
through fire development. In a large or well ventilated space 
[116,117,118] there may be an (effectively) unlimited air supply. 
In this circumstance the rate of burning depends primarily on the 
fuel supply(Drysdale (1979)(252)). The characteristics of its 
nature, area [261], and type [266] will be important. 
In a small space with limited ventilation, the supply of air (and 
oxygen) controls the growth of the fire (252,250) [116,117,118]. 
This is termed a ventilation-controlled fire. 
The growth of fires in large, well ventilated spaces may be fuel-
controlled. This is discussed more fully in the fire spread 
section (page 194). After flashover, a fire will ventilation-
controlled. 
Limited oxygen availability may affect occupants (directly or in 
combination with toxic gases) [328]. 
The interactions modelling the relationships between oxygen 
supply and other factors in the system are indicated in diagram 
C147 [115-118,328-330]. 
Smoke Yield [302] 
Drysdale (1976)(228):- 
"The yield of smoke and toxic gas from a fire depends not only on 
the nature of the materials involved, but also on the conditions 
of burning." [265,266] 
See diagram C148. 	Smoke yield potentially interacts with a 
number of factors [6,20,17,44,96,140]. 	These relationships are 
illustrated in diagram C149. Smoke yield may affect the ability 
of individuals to escape (Purser (161), Marchant (97)) [44], and 
the tenability of escape routes (Heselden and Baldwin (235), 
Rasbash (132)) [96]. 
Mode of Burning [265] 
Defined as (Delphi).:- "Flaming or non-flaming combustion." 
The mode of burning is important for the smoke yield [265]. 
Drysdale (1980)(249): 
.the smoke from a smouldering fire is totally different from 
that produced in flaming combustion..." 
Refer diagram C137. 	Drysdale (1980)(249) notes that only 
materials which form a solid carbonaceous char on heating can 
smoulder. He identifies factors affecting mode of burning as 
temperature [119,123], Fuel Geometry and Orientation [121], 
Surface Characteristics [122,124], and Density [120] (249). 
Smouldering is generally less of a threat to safety because the 
rate of smoke production is low [265](253).  The transition from 
smouldering to flaming combustion is dependent on the flow rate 
of volatiles [153]. This may be related to an increase in 
temperature [110] caused by the geometry of the fuel (249). 
The potential contribution of this factor will be influenced by a 
number of other factors relating to the material properties 
[120,122,124], the Fuel Geometry and Orientation [121], and the 
nature of the fire [119,123]. See diagram C150 [119- 
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124,110,1531. 
Type of Material [266] 
Defined as (Delphi):- 
"Aspects of the fuel as may affect the smoke yield properties." 
The yield of smoke depends on the type of material burning 
(228,132) [266]. The type of material will determine the density 
and toxicity of the smoke. Additionally, the nature of the fuel 
[154] will affect the quantity of smoke released by affecting the 
nature of the fire (144) [111]. See diagram C151 [111,154]. 
Models 
The discussion of smoke release related models overlaps 
significantly enough with fire growth that the two are discussed 
together, following the section on fire spread. See later. 
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(4). Smoke Movement 
Introduction. 
The spread of smoke and toxic gases is a significant potential 
threat to escape from fires (144) [325]. In a structurally sound 
building the Life Safety of people near to and remote from the 
fire can be affected by smoke or toxic gases. 
In large buildings the threat of smoke may be more widespread 
than the threat of the fire itself (234), and can affect more 
people (169,33). 	Escape is concerned with distancing oneself 
from the threat (in real or effective terms). 	Escape from a 
distributed threat is jotentially more problematic. 	It is 
generally the major killer in fire situations (Klote and 
Fothergill (1983)(145), Rasbash and Phillips (1978)(234)). 
The effects of smoke movement may lead to injury or death 
directly [219], or indirectly following blockage of escape routes 
[223]. The potential threat of smoke depends on its proximity to 
people and their immersion in it. 
The threat may be divided into three aspects; the toxicity, the 
reduction in visibility (254,245,255), and the temperature of the 
smoke [228]. Rasbash (1967)(132) notes the difficulty in 
distinguishing between the hazards of smoke and toxic gases 
because of coincidence. 
The threat becomes significant when the smoke in the building, 
which tends to occupy the upper parts of the space(s) whilst it 
is hot enough to displace the ambient air [304], either cools or 
becomes so relatively voluminous that it approaches head height 
level of the escapee(s) (Cooper (256,38,40,257,258), see also 
Hagglund (1983)(245)) [142]. This may be rapid, and will depend 
on the size of the space [275]. See diagram C152 [304,270,271]. 
Safety will be influenced directly (toxicity! heat [41,43] - 
(245)) and indirectly (visibility). Rasbash (132) identifies the 
hazard of smoke is in cutting off escape [223], which may lead to 
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retreat (Rasbash and Phillips (234)).This may occur when smoke 
meets barriers (Herzberg (259), Butcher and Parnell (144)) [144]. 
The possibility of doubling back of smoke at a lower level from 
the extremities of the building is a potential problem (see 
appendix 4). This creates a problem of effective height of the 
space [181,348]. 
A similar potential problem can occur if there is a low level 
mixing caused by in-flowing cold air. 
Additionally, turbulence caused by use of the building can 
disrupt the two-layer effect (141,259) [144]. 
The significance of smoke movement, and the frequency of its 
occurrence in fires is statistically borne out (144,84). 
There is a real need to be able to predict how the smoke from a 
fire spreads to any location in a building (260). There is a 
requirement for inclusion in a model of Life Safety in Fires. If 
control over the movement of smoke is to be practical, the 
factors determining 	smoke movement must be understood (145). 
Diagram C153 is an early concept of smoke movement sub-factors. 
Factors affecting Smoke Movement. 
Smoke and air both move as a result of pressure differentials. 
The energy of smoke close to the fire produces a buoyancy through 
reduced density (97) [304,194,175]. Locally, and particularly in 
the room of origin, this may be a major motivating factor 
(144,145): The increased pressure of hot smoke will be dominant, 
but not independent of air movements [303,305,306]. 
In instances where the fire is small, or the smoke becomes remote 
from the fire and will have mixed with sufficient air to have 
cooled, it will move in a similar manner to the air movements 
(33). To understand this latter type of smoke movement it is 
necessary and generally sufficient to understand air movement 
(144,33). 
A number of researchers (e.g., Sander and Tamura (1973)(261); 
Shavit (1974)(255); Evers and Waterhouse (1978)(39); Butcher and 
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Parnell (1979)(144); (Marchant (1979)(254)); Klote and Fothergill 
(1983)(145)) have identified four mechanisms affecting Smoke 
Movement: 
Ambient Stack [303] 
Fire Stack [304] 
Mechanically Induced Flow [305] 
Wind Induced Flow [306] 
The synthesis of these four mechanisms (see diagram C154 [303-
306]) will give a resultant air/ smoke movement profile within 
the building (145,254), and it is this which is fundamental to 
the potential manifestation of a smoke threat in locations other 
than the fire zone. Of particular importance to the emergence of 
a threat remote from the seat of a fire are leakages [273274], 
differential pressures [272], and the nature of the building 
spaces [275,227] - in conjunction they provide the mechanism for 
smoke movement. 
Hopkinson (1984) has identified three factors for smoke spread 
and confirms the distinction between smoke movement close to the 




He lists a number of leakage-related factors [273,274] observed 
to be related to smoke spread:- 
Around doors 	 Open doors 
Closed doors Along corridors 
Up staircases 	 Around party walls 
Within voids Through floors and ceilings. 
The inclusion of these building-related factors is shown in 
diagram CiSS. Smoke movement is defined as (Delphi):- 
'The spreading of products of combustion within and between 
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building spaces. 	The way in which products will move will be 
influenced by airflow mechanisms:- 
natural (wind induced flow) 
ambient stack (temperature induced flow) 
fire stack (fire induced flow) 
mechanical' 
Smoke movement may be in both horizontal and vertical directions. 
The rate of spread of smoke threat may be faster than accepted 
reasonable travel speed (Cox (1986)(162)). 	Diagram C156 (cf; 
- 	Marchant (137), Pearson and Joost (138)). The factors affecting 
I- 	 movement (Butcher and Parnell (1979)(144)) are shown in diagram 
C157 [303,30405,306]. 
Ambient stack [303] 
Ambient stack is defined as (Delphi):- 
"This is the normal stack effect in a building - the pressure 
differential due to the internal temperature being different to 
the external air temperature. If the internal temperature is 
greater than the external temperature there will be a tendency 
for the air to move upwards. 
Inverse stack can also occur. 	This normal air movement has 
nothing to do with the fire, but may carry smoke around the 
building. The height across which the pressure differential 
works will be contributory factor." [267,268,269] 
Ambient stack (also' known as chimney effect) is a normal air 
movement within a building. It is discrete. See diagram C158. 
The motivating force behind the air flow depends on the 
difference between the internal and external temperatures 
[267,268], and the height of the building [269](39).  See diagram 
C159 [269]. The overall pressure-potential is independent of 
design, the internal distribution of pressure differentials is 
not (Barrett and Locklin)(1970)(33)) [227]. 
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The relative impact of stack effect will depend on the overall 
height of the building [269], also the magnitude of the 
temperature differential between the internal and external air 
[267,268,125]. 	Extreme weather conditions may produce large 
stack forces (Heselden and Baldwin (1976)(235). 	Stack effects 
are most significant in tall buildings [269], although stack may 
exist in one storey buildings (145). Diagram C160. 
The importance of stack (and inverse stack) [303] is supported by 
Klote and Fothergill (145), who state that: 
"Smoke movement from a building fire can be dominated by stack 
effect.. .as evidenced in the following descriptions of different 
types of smoke movement resulting from normal and reverse stack 
effect. In a building with normal stack effect, the existing air 
currents ... can move smoke considerable distances from the fire 
origin. If the fire is below the neutral pressure plane, smoke 
moves with the building air and up the shafts. This upward smoke 
flow is enhanced by any buoyancy forces on the smoke existing due 
to its temperature. Once above the neutral pressure plane, the 
smoke flows out of the shafts into the upper floors of the 
building. Smoke from a fire located above the neutral pressure 
plane is carried by the building airflow to the outside through 
openings in the exterior of the building. If the leakage between 
floors is negligible, the floors below the neutral pressure 
plane, except the fire floor, will be smoke free. When the 
leakage between floors is considerable, there is an upward smoke 
movement to the floor above the fire floor." [133,134,135,136] 
The importance of stack effect on overall smoke movement is also 
supported by Barrett and Locklin (33) (see also Taylor 
(1978)(263). Shavit (255) suggests ambient stack is the dominant 
force in early stages of a fire [303]. This may not always be so 
(see appendix 3). . 
An inverse stack effect occurs in buildings when the air 
temperature inside is cooler than outside [267,268,125]. 	The 
occurrence of this in air-conditioned buildings is potentially 
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frequent [126,127]. 	The result of this effect is to create a 
downward flow of air in the building. As a consequence there is 
a tendency for smoke/ toxic gas laden air to be carried downwards 
in the building [303]. This is the direction people must move in 
to conventionally escape from a fire in a multi-storey building 
(unless refuges employed). The potential relevance of reverse 
stack to smoke movement (diagram C159 again) is also noted by 
Mote and Fothergill (145). They indicate the significance of 
the buoyancy of smoke is fire-size [270,142] and proximity 
related:- 
"The air currents caused by reverse stack effect ... tend to 
affect the movement of relatively cool smoke in the reverse of 
normal stack effect. In the case of hot smoke, buoyancy forces 
may be so great that smoke can flow upward even during reverse 
stack effect conditions." [304] - 
Consider the factors identified as determining ambient stack 
[303]; internal temperature [267], external temperature [268], 
and height [269] (diagram C160). 
Internal temperature is defined as (Delphi): 
"Ambient temperature for the space concerned." 
The internal temperature of the air in a building will vary 
throughout it to some extent. Differences in internal 
temperature may influence internal flows [135], affecting smoke 
movement (e.g., temperature controlled computhr rooms [126], 
refrigerated spaces (97)). Assumption of uniform temperature 
distribution is convenient for modelling purposes but may be 
unrepresentative (Evers and Waterhouse (1978)(33)). The 
significance of this factor is contextual [125]. 
The current single-space approach (see conceptual introduction) 
includes the potential for modelling internal temperature 
variations. Internal temperature distributions influence 
internal flows (Kandola (1980)(264)),\via internal leakage [135]. 
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The assumption of a uniform temperature in the single space may 
be modified for multi-spatial modelling to reflect temperature 
differentials and the effects this may have in conjunction with 
internal leakages. 
The potential contribution of the internal temperature is 
affected by the external temperature [1251. See diagram C161 
[125-127,9,135,132]. The two factors will be dynamically 
related. Determinants will be the difference at any given time 
(itself a variable relationship (97) [125], the nature of the 
building (thermal inertia (265)) [1271 and its usage [126]. 
In some buildings the value of the internal temperature may be 
controlled by the air conditioning system [126]. This is most 
popular in occupancies such as offices or public gathering 
places. Space heating may significantly affect air movement 
within spaces (162) [127]. See diagram C162. 
Other 'air conditioning' modifications of the internal air 
include windows opened for ventilation and temperature or 
humidity control(s) [126]. Heat gain of space is a further 
potential influence on internal conditions [127]. Rapid 
fluctuations may occur. Characteristics of spaces may tend to 
affect the actual significance of heat gain of space. For 
instance large expanses of curtain walling over glass roofed 
domes may cause high heat gain in sunny conditions (green house 
effect) and high rate of heat loss in winter (265). People 
inside the building may also make a significant contribution to 
the internal temperature. 
The inter-relationships determining the potential contribution of 
internal temperature to Life Safety are shown in diagram C161 
[125,126,127,9,135,132]. 
In addition to the internal temperature, the ambient stack effect 
depends on the external temperature [268] and the height across 
which the pressure differential acts [269]. See diagram C160. 
External temperature has been defined as (Delphi):- 
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"The external temperature of the air as concerned for stack 
effects." 
The external temperature influences the contributions of the 
internal temperature (the 'stack balance') [125] and also the 
internal and external leakages [133,136] (as does internal 
temperature (145) [132,135]). See diagram C163 [125,133,136]. 
The factors internal and external temperature were not considered 
as being individually critical, since the actual contribution of 
each is dependent on relative values. 	However in combination 
they may may be critical (particularly with extremes of either). 
The other factor contributing to ambient stack is height (diagram 
C160) [269]. It is defined, for the purposes of the model, as 
(Delphi):- 
"The internal height of the space concerned with for internal 
temperature." 
Height is a static factor in the model. It is discrete (diagram 
C164). The actual contribution of height to smoke movement will 
depend on the fire location and the position of the neutral 
pressure plan. This is not modelled as an interaction, since the 
determination of pressure difference for ambient stack relates 
each of the ambient stack sub-factors (Klote and Fothergill 
(145)). Extension to multi-spatial modelling must reflect 
potentially different contributions of height to Life Safety of 
different spaces (e.g., above and below the neutral pressure 
plane). 
Fire Stack [304] 
In addition to the ambient stack in a building, Butcher and 
Parnell (144) noted other determinants of air movement. Fire 
Stack [304], the movement caused by the relative buoyancy of the 
smoke (Heselden and Baldwin (1976)(235)), is differentiated from 
the other factors affecting smoke movement in that it is always 
relevant in the event. It is defined as (Delphi):- 
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"This is a measure of the smokes own buoyancy relative to the 
surroundings and will depend on the difference in temperature of 
the fire producing the buoyant plume and the ambient 
temperature." 
The relative importance of the fire stack depends on the scale of 
the fire [128,270] and proximity (effective scale). Butcher and 
Parnell (144) note that in general it may be expected that close 
to the fire the smoke's own mobility will dominate. See diagram 
C165 (also (235)). Shavit (255) suggests that the fire stack 
reinforces the (normal) ambient stack. The fire plume carries 
the combustion products diluted in entrained air upwards and away 
from the fire source [175,194] (Hagglund (1983)(245)). See 
diagram C166. This forms a layer at the ceiling by displacement 
(Cox (162), Cooper (40)). Diagram C167. Thickening of the smoke 
layering is accompanied by an increase in temperature (Hagglund 
et al. (1985)(266)) [194,175]. 
Some (convective) heat transfer to the ceiling will occur (Cooper 
(1981)(267)) [235]. Also, as the distance from the fire 
increases the smoke mixes with the cooler surrounding air, 
becoming more voluminous, and cooler. As this occurs, the other 
air movement factors will become relatively more important. 
Pressure due to buoyancy depends on the height above the neutral 
pressure plane in the fire compartment (144). 
Kiote and Fothergill confirm this relationship, after comparing 
measured pressure differentials developed above the neutral 
pressure plane, in fire compartments of different height. 
The relationship of height (above neutral pressure plane) 'and 
fire stack should be modelled as an interaction of height onto 
the factor fire stack. Its omission is a limitation of the 
model. See diagrams C168,C164. 
Fire stack is coincident with fire events. The other mechanisms 
are not exclusive to fire events. 	Early smoke movement relies 
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on, and is the result of, pre-existent air flows (due to pressure 
distribution and leakages) within the building prior to the fire. 
After T(ignition)'  people behaviours and movements may alter the 
air flows, for example by door usage [273,274] (262,268,269). 
Opening or breakage of windows, and alterations to air 
conditioning (planned or unplanned) will affect the smoke 
movement [306,305]. Mote and Fothergill (145) note that the 
effects of a window breaking will depend on the wind direction, 
but may either vent the smoke (leeward) or encourage its spread 
(windward). The fire will be affected also. 
In conjunction with this, the smoke/ toxic gases produced by the 
fire and intrinsic buoyancy effects disturb the air and create a 
dynamic smoke movement profile for the building [304]. Further, 
the dynamic nature of the fire will result in a changing fire 
stack. This will be particularly significant in the initial 
stages of a fire (39). 
Fire stack is related to the convective energy of the smoke 
[175,1941 and depends on the ambient air temperature [271]. This 
dependence is modelled by th& factors fire temperature [270] and 
ambient temperature [271]. See diagram C169. 
The buoyancy of smoke is dependent on the differential 
temperatures of the smoky layer and the surrounding air and 
boundary layers at surfaces (Cooper (1982)(256), Hagglund 
(1983)(245)). This creates differential densities and so allows 
the (hotter and less dense) smoke to rise (256).  Included in the 
aspects of smoke movement at the tertiary level must be a 
recognition of the importance of the building on the buoyancy of 
the smoke. The movement of smoke around obstacles, such as 
balconies, will affect the buoyancy, as air is entrained 
[144,143]. The volume of smoke will increase (145). See diagram 
C170. 
* 
Fire temperature [270] is defined as (Delphi):- 
"The rate of heat given out by the fire and generating the 
plume." 
The typical range of fire sizes assumed for dpsign purposes to 
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* 
Erratum: In the context of its use, the term identified as Fire 
Temperature should be referred to as Fire Size, and should be 
considered accordingly. 
occur in fire events is between 1 and 5 MW. The significance of 
a fire of a particular size will depend on the circumstances, 
including the size of the room (March ant) (254). A large fire, 
with a high rate of heat release generating the plume may be 
acceptable in a large space. 
A fire controlled by sprinklers may be as large as 3m x 3m with a 
rate of heat release of 5MW (cf. [112])(Morgan (270)). 
The likelihood that any given size of fire is achieved depends on 
what fuel is available and the way in which it is burning (cf. 
[111,110]). A stochastic modelling approach to fire realms has 
been considered by Beard (1981-83)(34,35,36). Diagram C171. (See 
also Lerup et al (1976)(64) - diagram C34). 
There is a strong link between the factors rate of heat release 
and fire temperature [128]. See diagram C172. 
The heat released by the fire motivates the plume, and determines 
the'.initial nature of the smoke [142] (Cooper ,(40)). Relatively 
buoyant smoke will be produced by a large fire, smoke from a 
small fire will be less buoyant. In either case thepressures 
developed are relatively small (144). 
People may be affected directly by -the heat released from the 
fire, or by hot gases (Cox (186)(162)) [10,41,43]. Refer 
appendix 3 for an example. 
If fire stack is a function of relative densities the ambient 
temperature must also be important [271]. 	This has been defined 
earlier - see common factor internal temperature [267]. 	The 
potential contribution of the fire temperature is greater than 
the ambient temperature, hence smoke rises. 
In the case of a single opening such as a door the smoke will 
flow out at the top. If the smoke is flowing out (higher 
pressure than outside) and the cold air is drawn into the space 
at the floor level to feed the plume, there will be a plane where 
the difference between pressures inside and outside is nil. This 
is termed the neutral pressure plane. In situations where the 
door is closed there will be leakages associated with the cracks 
(269). Refer Diagram C165. 
'It' 
Klote and Fothergill (145), discussing smoke control, note that 
water spray from sprinklers cools smoke and reduces its buoyancy. 
This view is endorsed by Herzberg (1984)(259). Bullen reports 
that buoyant, deep (approx. lm) smoke layers can withstand 
sprinkler sprays, but thin smoke layers may be affected by high 
pressure sprinklers, or those activated at low temperatures 
(304). 
A significant amount of smoke may be released from the fire 
before the sprinkler heads are  activated. 
Mechanical and Wind Induced Flows [305,306] 
Movement of air (and potentially smoke) may also be affected by 
any ventilation forces set up and existing in the building 
(144,145) [305,306]. Such pressures are distinguished from those 
related to smoke control. 
These ventilation profiles may be the result of natural or forced 
means, and will depend on the magnitude of the force [272], the 
leakage paths it operates across [273,274], and the volume and 
design of the space concerned [275]. Diagram C173 [272-
275,305,306] shows the factors included in the model. 
Wind Induced Flow [306] 
The more direct aspects of normal air (and potential smoke) 
movement are the result of either wind or some mechanical - 
mechanism modifying the stack effect (Evers and Waterhouse 
(333)). The wind is an obvious external factor, and can be 
potentially very significant in affecting the spread of fire and 
smoke (145,271)(see appendix 3). Definition (Delphi):- 
"This is any air, and thus smoke, movement caused by the wind 
induced pressure (acting through leakage areas). It is distinct 
from smoke control by natural pressure for the same reasons as 
mechanically induced flow." 
The wind effect on smoke movement (and control) is due to the 
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inter-relationship of air movements and buildings (97). 
The wind is slowed down by objects in its path [278]. Buildings 
will be individually affected. The nature of the wind (speed 
[279] and characteristics of flow) will be determined by the wind 
pressures, modified by the topographiy (272,273) [278]. - I 
Wind impinging on any bluff body, such as a building, creates a 
(relative) build up of pressure on the windward side [185]. See 
diagram 0174. On the leeward and other sides of the building 
there is a complex spilling of air and consequent pressure 
differentials (Marchant (97)) [185]. Pressure coefficents will 
vary across the surfaces [281] and will be affected by the shape 
of the building (Marchant (97), Tamura and Shaw (1977)(274)). 
Diagram C175 shows the effects on internal pressures for a 
notional building with leakages on the windward or leeward sides 
only [137,133]. Also the surface roughness, aspect ratio (also 
Lawson (1980)(27s))and the building orientation [280] will be 
important. 
The air pressure differentials developed over the faces of the 
building create flow potential through the building (Kandola 
(1978)(271))[185]. A typical pressure differential induced by a 
20 mph (9m/s) wind velocity is approximately 50 Pa (97). 
Dependent on and in conjunction with leakage paths 273,2741, 
airflow through the building will occur (262,271). This can 
carry smoke laden air with it [306], any may upset smoke control 
[347]. The layout of the building spaces and the leakages 
between the spaces will affect the flow. See diagram 0173. Tamura 
and Shaw (1977)(274) discussing pressures imposed by wind (and 
temperature difference) forces:- 
.for a given outside condition, the patterns or pressure 
difference and air leakage depend on the flow resistances of all 
the separations.' [273,274] 
Flow resistance may change during an event, as people using the 
building open and close doors (262,269), or elements fail (a long 
term effect of limited relevance to Life Safety generally) 
[273,274]. 
Pressure differences across external leakages [131] affect spaces 
immediately adjacent to the outside (ie; ones with a direct 
barrier between them and the outside environment); internal 
leakages affect the wholly internal spaces [137] (ie; the 
barriers separate them from other building spaces). The effect 
is to create a buffer tendency for these internal spaces. The 
effect of simple pressure differentials across the building 
section will be diffused by the internal structure and affect the 
air movement within differently [132]. 
The context of the significance of the wind is discussed in the 
definition of wind used for the model (Delphi):- 
"Any wind induced pressure at points on the faces of the 
buildings, depending on wind speed and direction, building 
height, and surrounding height. This pressure is available to 
act across leakage areas." [279,280,281] 
Mechanically Induced Flow [305] 
The internal effect of mechanical (forced) ventilation is similar 
in nature to that produced by the wind. Pressure differentials 
caused by mechanical force give rise to air movement (its 
ordinary function) [272], and this will frequently carry smoke 
around with it whilst it operates (145) [305]. Uncontrolled, 
HVAC (Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning) systems may 
spread smoke to all areas served [305]. 
Mechanically induced flow, for the purposes of the model is 
assumed to be air handling equipment not designed, or intended, 
for use in its current or normal mode for controlling smoke 
movement. Any contribution of the mechanical forces is a 
potential contributory threat to smoke movement [305]. Use of a 
(variable) system to control smoke (and act as a potential 
contributor to safety) is discussed in the next section. 
Conventionally such systems were shut down on detection of fires 
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(145,276). This prevents supply of air to the fire, but without 
dampers does not prevent smoke movement through ductwork (262) 
[137]. 
Generally, mechanised smoke control uses a variable HVAC system 
or a dedicated system in isolation. Continued interference of 
independent mechanically induced flow may disrupt effectiveness 
of the smoke control [344,345,346] (also modelled by an 
interaction of smoke movement sub-factors onto smoke control sub-
factors). 
In each of the mechanisms of flow inducement, the volume of the 
space is important (Boyle's law) [275]. 
The influence of such aspects have been modelled at scale in wind 
tunnels by Marchant and Morgan (1975)(277). This model 
represents both natural [306] and mechanical techniques [305], 
and the partial contributions of each factor are represented for 
each. 
The internal and external leakages [273,274] and the volume of 
the space and design [275] factors contribute to the wind induced 
flow contribution - and the mechanically induced flow. 
Leakage [273,274] 
Leakage is important to fire safety (Kandola (1978)(271). 
Barrett and Locklin (33) discuss the importance of external 
leakage coefficients (walls and windows) [273], and particularly 
the need for in-situ values (see also Sander and Tamura 
(1973)(261). The influence of internal [274] and external 
barriers [273] on flow is supported also by Marchant (254). 
Kandola (1978)(271) emphasises the importance of leakage on smoke 
movement within bu'ildings:- 
"The internal pressures.. .are highly dependent on the leakage 
characteristics as well as the direction of the approaching 
wind." 
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Klote and Fothergill (145) note that passive limitation of smoke 
movement due to the forces discussed earlier is dependent on 
leakage within the building, and number of open doors at any time 
[274] (also lire stopping [211,210]). Work by Kiote and Bódart 
(1983)(278) on the (computerised) analysis of pressurised 
stairwells noted flow through cracks in partitions, floors, 
exterior walls, and roofs (see also (235,262)). Shannon 
(1975)(289) recognised the criticality of workmanship. The 
resulting complexity has been noted by Heselden and Baldwin 
(1976)(235) in the development of a modelling technique for smoke 
movement (and control). 
Calculation techniques for effective flow resistance through 
buildings (equivalent orifice areas) is generally based on an 
electrical resistance analogue (145). See diagram C176. BS 5588 
Pt 4: 1978 (279) gives values for door and window leakages for 
the purposes of designing pressurisation systems, and guidance on 
the calculation of leakage areas. Marchant (254) notes that 
higher differential pressures will develop across barriers with 
lower leakage [131,137]. 
Problems of door leakage resistance against smoke pressure have 
been noted by Hopkinson (1984)(269,262). Den Ouden (1975)(268) 
recommends door closers (also (279)). Difficulty in opening doors 
has been noted by Barrett and Locklin (1970)(33) [165]. 
There will be an influence of leakage characteristics on the fire 
resistant integrity of barriers [210,211,159,160] (Marchant 
(1979)(254), also (280)). See diagrams C177 [176-178,210], C178 
[179,180,177,211]. Leakage does not have any influence on wind 
pressures (Kandola (271)). 
Modelling Smoke Movement 
A number of researchers have developed models for smoke movement. 
In some cases these have been developed as a sub-aspect of a 
model for the calculation or evaluation of smoke control measures 
(e.g., Klote and Fothergill (1983)(145)). Where appropriate, the 
smoke movement aspects of these models is discussed here. Models 
specifically oriented towards smoke control are discussed in the 
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following section. 
Analytical models allow the study of smoke movement without risk 
to life or property (33). These may be broken down on the basis 
of single or multi-space models (note mathematical analysis is 
not considered here, study is limited to input/ output 
characteristics and assumptions). 
ASET is a (computerised) model for estimating the time available 
for safe egress from a fire in an enclosure •(Cooper (1982)(256)). 
The single space assumptions are based on work by Zukowski 
(1978)(281), also used by Hagglund (245). The available safe 
egress time is the time between detection and hazardous 
conditions. 
The criteria on which detection and the hazard are assessed 
depend on the layer temperature and change in temperature with 
time. The identification and use of combustion product 
concentrations (CO and H20) with time as criteria for (detection 
and) untenability support the inclusion in the model of the 
interactions of rate of heat release and smoke yield onto 
physiological capability (cf, Victoria Nurses' Home (appendix 3)) 
[42,44]. Loss of life caused by hot gas ingestion has been 
recognised by Cox (1986)(162) and Heselden and Baldwin 
(1976)(235) as being a major cause of death in fires. 
The effect of mobility and smoke yield on space usage is 
supported by Heselden and Baldwin (235). 	Problems of toxicity 
may be compounded by visibility restricting travel. 	Cooper 
includes this in his model - a criterion of 0.91m from floor 
level for the lower level of the upper layer (ASET - 
(256,38,40,257,258)). 
The temperature 183 degrees C (corresponding to 0.25w!m 2 ) is 
included as a criterion also for the onset of hazardous 
conditions. Cooper recognises the balance between the required 
time for egress and introduces another formula for time 
requirements (RSET)(40). 
Input requirements to reflect the significant factors in a 
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scenario are fire elevation, energy, and product of combustion 
generation rates (see fire temperature [270], and smoke mass flow 
rates [276] for dilution default model) and also smoke yield 
[302]. 	Also the dimensions of the space (height [288], length 
[289], and breadth [290]) and internal temperature [267]. 	The 
fuel load must be characteristic of the occupancy and Cooper (40) 
recognises this in the development of the semi-universal fire 
curves. 
The model assumes a point source, with the fire modelled some 
distance above the floor level if required (to represent a fire 
on a bed for instance). Transition to flashover is not included 
in the model, since it is not relevant to continued life safety 
in a single space. Applicability to freely communicating multi-
room scenarios is noted. 
Cooper notes that "Fire growth models that are developed to 
provide fire protection practitioners with available egress time 
estimates are likely to represent compromises between accuracy in 
simulation and practicality in implementation." 
Limitation and assumptions of the model are noted and relate to:-
length to width aspect ratios greater than 10:1 or height to 
minimum horizontal dimension exceeding one; ASET may not be 
reliable. There is assumed to be sufficient oxygen supply for 
free burning prior to T(haz). Doors, windows, and other 
significant openings are assumed closed (usage for escape?). 
Leakage of air prior to layer reaching floor level (after T(haz)) 
is assumed to be at floor level and cool air leaks out. 
.One feature which is common to all single or multi-room zone-
type enclosure fire models; namely, a two layer description of 
the intra-room environmental conditions" (Cooper and Stroup 
(1982)(257,258)), is considered for validity of occurrence and 
modelled realism. In full-scale multi-room fire scenarios they 
report that in terms of visual observation, a two layer 
description of the environment was well substantiated throughout 
each room (cf. (141)). At least until the layer had descended to 
1c3 
0.5 to 0.667 of the total floor to ceiling height. (This relates 
to the factor nature of smoke [277]). 
The more rapid the growth (higher smoke mass flow rate) the 
sharper the interface (less ageing associated with nature of 
smoke]). The influence of sprinklers on smoke is included in the 
model under the interaction of fire suppression onto rate of heat 
release. 
In addition to the cooling caused by entrainment of cooler air in 
the plume and when encountering obstacles, the smoke will cool 
with time. As the temperature difference between the smoke and 
surrounding air decreases, there is a tendency for the smoke to 
'log out' and stratification (the separation of layers) will 
fail. This is important for the escapee. A clear layer of smoke 
above head height is a potential threat.. A logging out (or 
increasing depth of layer) is a real threat. 
Fire Stack is discussed and incorporated into models by several 
researchers, including Hagglund (245), Cooper (256), Emmons and 
Mitler (27). Some of the models are strictly mathematical 
modelling techniques for 3D movement, and are based on 
mathematical expressions representing dynamic equilibria. Such 
models are open to use and interpretation (by experts) in the 
context of either life safety or property protection. If the 
criteria for evaluating either are considered by the individual 
('butithis must, be done extra to the models). Cooper's model 
(ASET)(256 ,38,40,257,258) however relates the smoke movement 
from a deterministic (imagined combination of fire curves) to 
Life Safety for a single space (now extended to multi space (40)) 
based on criteria of visibility, smoke toxicity and temperature 
(cf; Beard (36), also Marchant (97)). See diagram C23. (See 
diagram C179). These reflect the characteristics of the threat to 
the individual, and although model assumptions eliminate 
interaction of the individual with the environment is concerned, 
it does recognise the way in which the movement of released smoke 
due to its own buoyancy affects tenability of a single (38)(or 
multi (40)) space scenario. 
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A version of ASET, usable on personal computers has been 
developed by Walton (1985)(282). 	It predicts the fire 
environment in a single room using the same equations as ASET 
(256,38,40,257,258) but using a simpler numerical technique. 
Input requirements are height and area of room, fire elevation 
above floor, heat loss factor, and a rate of heat release to 
define the fire. Output is a thickness and temperature of the 
smoke layer as a function of time (no gas concentrations). The 
ease of availability of this and other programs for personal 
computer usage suggests the need for a warning •a gainst 
presumptive usage.. 	 - 
Beard discusses the lack of interaction of the individual with 
the developing threat in ASET (1983)(36), and in view of the 
number of successful events (the fire self extinguishes or is 
actively put out) that go unreported the scope of scenarios and 
representation of reality may be limited to those fires that 
develop (1983)(36). Scenarios involving the immobile, the 
temporarily unattended, and those occupancies requiring some 
assistance for evacuation from the fire zone indicate the 
potential usefulness of Cooper's deterministic model (in terms of 
the fire growth curve) modelling approach (38,40). For very large 
spaces, with modification, it may allow for modelling of dilution 
scenarios (e.g., atria application). 
Mote and Fothergill (1983)(145) have developed a computer 
program to calculate the airflows and pressure differences 
throughout a building in which a smoke control system is 
operating. They report that some programs calculate steady state 
airflow and pressures throughout a building (e.g., Sander and 
Tamura (1973)(261)). 
The consequent limitation of this is a loss of smoke 
concentration modelling throughout the buildings. Other programs 
calculate these concentrations (Tamura and Shaw (1975-
81)(283,284,285); Butcher, Fardell and Jackmann (1969)(286); 
Barrett and Locklin (1970)(33); Evers and Waterhouse (178)(333); 
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Wakamatsu (1971)(287)). 
Mote and Fothergill's model is specifically intended for the 
analysis of smoke control, and was developed initially as a 
research tool to investigate the feasibility of specific smoke 
control systems and determine the interaction between these 
systems and the rest of the building (1983)(145). A feature of 
the design of the model is that data input requirements are 
minimised whilst maintaining a (usefully) high level of 
generality. Output consists of pressure differentials across all 
building shafts. A number of assumptions and limitations are 
noted. 
The building is modelled as a network of spaces or nodes, each at 
a specific pressure and temperature. Air for pressurisation may 
be entered at any point in the building. On the basis of this and 
driving forces such as the wind, the pressurisation, (HVAC is 
assumed switched off or to another mode), and inside-to-outside 
temperatures differences the pressures throughout the building 
and flow rates through all the flow paths are obtained and may be 
used to analyse pressurisation of any building (note flexibility 
of generality). In addition, any space may be exhausted. This 
could come under the definition of a removal system, but note 
that aspects of the technique of removal here are different from 
those discussed in the assumptions for removal in this model, 
specifically buoyant layer formation. The exhaustion of any space 
allows the modelling of zoned smoke control. 
The model considers pressurisation (containment) only - it does 
not handle the dilution or removal techniques included in the 
development of tIiis model as dilution or removal. The factors 
included relate closely to the secondary level factors identified 
in this model - see diagram C16. 
Volume and design of space is not specifically considered in 
Cote and Fothergill's model, but is covered in the assumptions 
of 
nodal representation of space 
that each space is considered to be at one specific pressure 
'9-' 
and temperature. 
It is implicit that the system contribution prior to activation 
will be of a passive nature only (145). 
Barrett and Locklin (1970)(33) developed a model for stack effect 
on smoke movement. The applicability of this will depend on the 
location of the fire. The wind effect (considered in this model 
as a separate but inter-related factor) is not included. The 
model makes the predictions on air flow quantities, spatial 
pressures and differential pressures across doors, walls, and 
infiltration/ exfiltration through exterior walls. 
The overall pressure potential caused by stack effect cannot be 
altered by design - The distribution of leakages and other flows 
may modify it. 
As Barrett and Locklin note (33), the requirement for advance 
knowledge of leakage values is necessary. Wall, window, and door 
leakage values as constructed are needed. This applies to many 
other models. 
F1JME(1978)(288) is a smoke movement model (Oscar Faber and 
Partners) (see also Shannon (1975)(289). The model uses typical 
leakages derived from measurements 'as constructed'. It also 
takes as input temperature assumptions, estimated Cp profiles, 
and direction/ speed data for the stack and wind effects 
respectively. The fire is assumed. Output is expressed 
graphically as time-based mass concentration and visibility 
(unclear how this is derived), also smoke spread throughout the 
building. 
A poorly fitting door with a relatively large pressure 
differential across it can result in a very rapid spread of 
smoke. The importance of closed fire doors is also noted 
(appendix 3). 
Jones and Quintiere (1984)(290) have done work on the prediction 
of corridor smoke filling by zone models. The applicability of 
this is to multi-compartment scenarios. 
Comparisons are made of predictive models for the growth and 
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spread of fires in compartments:- 
A single space model based on a leaky compartment (Cooper 
(1981)(38)). 
A model designed for a single space compartment (Mitler and 
Emmons 1981)(74). 
A two compartment model (Zukowski.and Kubota 1980)(291). 
They found that all (including single space models applied 
globally) did a creditable job of predicting smoke layer height, 
and should allow for reasonable estimates of filling time for 
other (experimental) conditions. They conclude that an 
understanding of the more complicated multi-compartment fire 
sources and connection of compartments is needed. 
Jones (1984)(260) has developed the model further. 	FAST is a 
model for the prediction of the evolution of a fire in a room 
and the subsequent transport of the smoke and toxic gases which 
evolve from it. 
It is noted by Jones and Quintiere (290) that the mixing that may 
occur in compartments used for containment will be contrary to 
the assumptions of the two layers (one hot, one cold) in most 
models (see also (141)). This model excludes from the containment 
technique the factors concerned with the status of the air in 
the compartment (other than pressure) that would be significant 
to the build up of dual layers associated with removal and 
dilution techniques. (refer also to Klote and Fothergill in 
relation to untenability of containment zones)(145). 
Shannon (1975)(289) discussing the 'FUME' smoke movement model 
(see also (288)) identified the requirements to model total 
safety from smoke. The input criteria, below, supdrT iThüiiibif 
of relationships included in the model described in this thesis 
[229,276 277,279 ,280,291,292,308,309, 310,323,316, 317 , 324, 326] 
"a) 	Building Description 




2. Detailed Description of each room. 
overall description of rooms 
data for supply terminals to room 
data for exhaust terminals to room 
data for air leakage paths: room to room 
data for air leakage paths: room to outside 
data for heat flow paths: room to room 
data for heat flow paths: room to outside 
data for determining opening forces of opening items 
in building 
3. Detailed description of Each Auxiliary Ventilation 
System 
header card for system size and node/ fittings cards 
inlet,/outlet of system 
data for fittings including sensing/ control devices 
data for ductwork runs 
4. Building Layout Description 
a) rooms on each floor 
These.areconstant data providing the wind DIRECTION does NOT 
change 	- 
b) Conditions for Analysis 
5. (-only if predetermined study/ actions to be initiated 
BEFORE! WITHOUT interactive intervention) 
rooms containing polluting sources 
nodes changed to control pollutant movement on 
building 
6. (-OPTIONAL close guess to 'mass-flow balanced' 
situation) 
room pressures, temperatures 
node no. and flow temperature 
7. Pollutant Characteristics 
temperature variation with time 
rate of volume production with time 
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c) physical characteristics of pollutant 
External Environment for study 
a) pressure, temperature, wind speed 
Study Periods 
a) steptime, summary period, period for study." 
He goes on to state (288):- 
"with the existing state of escape methodology and conflicting 
conclusions resulting from analysis of actual fires, it was felt 
that the optimum value would be obtained from manually combining 
the resultant analysis of smoke distribution with the combined 
skills and experience of Architects or Fire Officers" 
Support for the significance of leakage - particularly 
workmanship (see also Marchant (1979)(254) is provided by Shannon 
(1975)(289); 
"Because of the small pressures promoting building airflows, 
quite small excursions from the design point can totally alter 
building air flows. 
Shannon (289) has developed a (computerised) model for smoke 
movement in buildings. The factors included in Shannon's model 
for smoke movement relate closely to those included in this 
model. 
Evers and Waterhouse (1978)(333) reported that validation of the 
'SCICON' smoke movement model was necessary (and being 
undertaken). This and other models that consider smoke movement 
and control are valuable assets to understanding fragments of the 
: whole system, and in the right hands may be powerful aids to 
design thinking. 
Bengston and Hagglund (293) state that:- 
"In spite of the fact that there now exist analytical models to 
describe a fire and the threat from it, few attempts have been 
made to use them as an engineering tool." 
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The necessity to relate fires to real circumstances is echoed by 
Bengston and Hagglund (293). A simulation model for single 
enclosures similar to ASET but applicable also to ventilation of 
smoke has been developed by Hagglund (1983)(245). He concludes a 
functional relationship between the measured temperature use of 
the hot gases below the roof and fire size and distance below the 
roof. This supports the inclusion in the model of the factor 
nature of smoke (ageing in relation to heat) and the interactions 
onto it of rate of heat release/ fire temperature (related to 
fire size and reservoir size and design). 
Sander and Tamura (1973)(261) have developed a (computerised) 
model to simulate air movement in multi-storey buildings. The 
model assumes an open plan floor, and discusses air. movement 
caused by stack, wind and operation of air handling systems, 
taking account of external leakage. Input requirements include 
information ,about floors, leakages (external walls, floors), air 
temperature, height from floor to floor, and wind pressures 
(indirectly modelling wind direction). r,The model produces mass 
flow rates for air movement within, the building. The 
contribution of Fire Stack is excluded and use of the model to 
simulate smoke movement is limited to smoke at ambient 
temperatures. For areas remote from the fire; this is not an 
unreasonable assumption. 
Tamura and Shaw (1976)(283) also note from some field tests that 
stair-shafts are liable to smoke contamination in summer 
(possibility of inverse stack) when the stair door on the fire 
floor and the exit door of the same stairshaft are opened at the 
same time. This illustrates the potential importance of stack, 
and leakages. Refer diagram C159. Other aspects highlighted as 
being important are the outside temperature, and fire temperature 
- these relate to smoke movement aspects in the model. Excess 
pressure venting is also noted (Tamura and Shaw (1976)(283)). 
Testing in buildings and wind tunnels, using sulphur hexafluoride 
for example, 	are alternative techniques for evaluating smoke 
movement characteristics of buildings (e.g., Butcher and Parnell 
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(144), also Shavit (1974)(255). This may be used as some of the 
input to computer programs. 
For any reader not familiar with computer applications to 
modelling there is a useful paper by Walton (involved with the 
development of ASET B) see (294). 
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(i). Smoke Control 
Introduction. 
Even small fires can produce considerable amounts of smoke, 
threatening great numbers of occupants (33). Considering tall 
buildings, Barrett and Locklin (1970)(33) state:- 
.it is imperative that smoke movement be restricted. Control 
of smoke movement in tall buildings will substantially improve 
prospects for occupant survival and will also aid firemen in 
locating and fighting fires." 
Control of smoke spread is a relatively recent adaptation of the 
use of airflows and pressurisation to control the flow of 
undesired airborne matter. Laboratories, clean rooms, operating 
theatres are examples of existing usage (145). 
The main function of smoke control is to extend the available 
time for the occupants to escape [220]. This may be done by 
excluding the smoke from the zones they are occupying 
(containment) or controlling the threat imposed by it (dilution 
or removal) [229]. 
Egress paths need only be kept clear for long enough to allow 
escape (Marchant (97)) [230]. Alternatively, or in addition, 
building spaces (including stairwells) may be pressurised to act 
as refuges (Erdelyi (1976)(295), also Klote and Bodart 
(1983)(278)) [224]. 
Accessibility of the fire brigade to tall building scenarios will 
be limited (c. 6th or 7th floor (276)). Outside assistance to 
occupants above this level will be limited. Refuge provision in 
conjunction with smoke control is valuable in such instances 
(190) [224]. 
Additional functions of smoke control are to aid fire-fighting, 
by allowing unobstructed access to the fire [236], and to limit 
property damage (145). 
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A (containment) Smoke Control system can perform adequately even 
if a small amount of smoke infiltrates the protected area (Klote 
and Fothergill (145)). It is normal to design on the assumption 
of no smoke infiltration (similarly, the assignation of potential 
values in this model were made also on this assumption). The 
extent of infiltration required to cause failure is uncertain, 
and contextual. 
Approaching Smoke Control 
The variety of building layouts provides a number of types of 
space (compartmentation to open plan (e.g., appendix 4). High-
rise buildings pose exceptional Life Safety problems (276). 
Additionally, the anticipated type of fire (hazard related) and 
the consequences of smoke filling a space must be considered 
(254). A range of protective measures will be required. The 
capability of any occupants present, their distribution and 
requirements will dictate the nature of smoke control required. 
(145), and determine its effectiveness [220224]. Mote and 
Fothergill note other preliminary considerations for design. See 
diagram C180. 
Conventional egress will require protection to routes used in the 
final stage of travel (T(relative safety) - T(s afety )) at least 
[230]; the use of refuges and protection in place will require 
other specific areas of smoke exclusion. See diagram C26. 
Choice of smoke control system will depend on the building and 
the occupancy type. Webb (1976)(296) suggests that office 
buildings, characterised by high population, with large open 
areas and significant combustible loading should be provided with 
smoke control. 
Residential buildings are more amenable to protection by early 
detection and constructional or active stopping of both fire and 
smoke. Low use shopping malls could use sprinklering and/or 
natural venting (144,270,277). 
Atria could be served by natural venting. Dilution may be 
practical (297). Spatial arrangement is a determinant. 
Long, low buildings tend to be suitable for natural venting and 
short escape routes (e.g., single storey buildings). 	Tall 
buildings are suitable for mechanical smoke control and refuges 
(e.g., 145,190). There are relationships between smoke control, 
building type and escape route layout [230,220] - smoke control 
should give sufficient extra time to allow the best use of the 
available escape routes. See diagram 0181 [230-232,220,224,229, 
236]. 
Smoke control is defined as (Delphi):- 
"The control of the spread of the products of combustion. This 
may involve techniques of dispersing products of combustion in a 
large space, removal from, or containment within a space (or set 
of spaces)." 
Marchant (254) discusses the range of methods of controlling 
smoke, and-the available sources of energy (see also 253). 	See 
diagram 0182(a) and (b). 	Three smoke control techniques are 
identified:- 
(Smoke Control by) Dilution 
(Smoke Control by) Containment 
(Smoke Control by) Removal 
Diagram 0183 shows an early version of factors in the 
environmental degradation domain. Note the option of Diluting, 
Containing, or Removing smoke. 
The nature of the three techniques differs. The effectiveness of 
each will be dependent on different sets of determinant factors, 
acting in different combinations. Consequently, models to 
represent each will differ. See diagrams C184,C185,C186. 
There will be some overlap of determinant factors. For example, 
the secondary level factor 'Wind' [308] is a common factor. Wind 
may provide the energy source for natural Removal (Marchant 
(254)); disrupt Dilution (Klote and Fothergill (145)); aid or 
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inhibit mechanical Removal or Containment (refer diagram C182 
also). It becomes evident that factors common to each technique 
may have different potential relative contributions to the 
effectiveness of each technique. 
The implications of these differences are systemic. 	The Life 
Safety System describing any scenario is comprised of inter-
relationships. Diagram C181. Each smoke control technique will 
contribute to Life Safety differently, and will inter-relate 
within the system differently. 
To limit the complexity of the evaluation tool, it is assumed 
that only one smoke control technique is employed in any 
scenario. In th&absence of any specific smoke control system, a 
default of dilution is assumed. 
For evaluation purposes this effectively means that there are 
three parallel models. Evaluation is made using the appropriate 
systemic model. This is reflected in the derivation of relative 
values for the model - see developmental abstract and starting 
development section 5. 
Achieving Smoke Control 
The function of Smoke Control for Life Safety is to protect 
occupiable spaces. The alternative to the exclusion of smoke 
(containment) is to control the threat within the space. This may 
be achieved either by removing the smoke as it is produced, thus 
preventing it spreading in such a way as to provide a real 
threat; or if the space is suitable, allowing it to dilute. 
Marchant (254) lists five' headings of building factors 
influencing smoke control design:- 
Risk of ignition 
Smoke production potential [276]. 
Volume of Space [312,314]. 
Barrier performance [282,283]. 
Environmental influences [308]. 
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The design of smoke control (by pressurisation) hs been 
considered by Cote and Fothergill (1983)(145). They report 
insufficient test data to ensure validity of systems concepts or 
specific calculation procedure for all types of pressure usage, 
and omit the pressurisation of corridors, elevators, and smoke 
control of atria from their smoke control design guide. They 
define the design parameters necessary for smoke control systems 
as:- 
- The leakage areas of flow paths throughout the building 
[309,310] 
- The design weather data [308,278,279,280,281]. 
- Pressure differences across boundaries of smoke control 
systems [313]. 
- Airflows through openings in boundaries of smoke control 
systems [282,283]. 
- The number of doors likely to be open in the boundary of a 
smoke control system (see also den Ouden (1975)(268)) 
[309,310]. 
- An indication of the scale 
movement sub-factors [232]. 
of pressure induced by smoke 
A smoke control system must be seen as an integral part of the 
system for Life Safety and designed for accordingly (Fothergill 
(1978)(298)). The effectiveness of a smoke control system is 
dependent on the relationship with the whole system. Diagram 
C181. 	Inclusion at the conceptual stage of design is necessary 
(Marchant (1982)(137)). 	The inter-relationship of smoke and 
safety is identified by Shannon (1975)(289). 	Diagram C187 
[229,327,325]. 
Bostock (1986)(297) noted the relationship of smoke control and 
whole building design and particularly how changes to the brief 
require alteration to the means of providing a safe building, 
including means of providing for control of smoke. Shavit 
(1974)(255):- 
"Smoke control must be approached with caution and adapted to 
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meet the needs of a specific application. 	High rise buildings 
are constructed not only as offices but also as apartments, 
hospitals, hotels, etc." 
Wakamatsu (1971)(287) has produced a flow chart for smoke control 
systems considerations. See diagram C188 [267,268,279,280,282, 
283,260,286,287,323,254,255,247,324]. The design system 
recognises the interactivity of the whole system. Adjusting the 
performance of factors included in the central column may 
improve smoke control effectiveness. Note the similarity between 
factors considered as important and those included in this model 
(refer diagrams C184,C185,C186). Some factors in the central 
column influence smoke control effectiveness directly (e.g., wind 
direction and velocity (97)), others are considered for this 
model as indirect, interactions (e.g.; psychological factors in 
danger situations). 
A systems approach is favoured by Jenson also (1975)(299). 	He 
highlights the contextual nature of the performance of smoke 
control systems: - 
"Smoke movement or smoke control systems cannot be designed in 
isolation from all other systems in the building. More 
important, they cannot even be addressed properly unless one 
recognises that smoke movement is one element of a dynamic fire 
safety problem. I therefore suggest that it is necessary to 
redefine the problem of smoke control in relation to the degree 
of smoke movement that can be tolerated in a real building for a 
specific period of time." [232,229] 
Design for Fire Size. 
An important aspect in the choice of a smoke control system at 
the desigfl stage and the effectiveness of a smoke control system 
in actual usage is the fire size (144). Butcher and Parnell note 
the significance of the fire size on smoke control design (144). 
In the fire area, the size of fire may be estimated on the 
assumption that it will be controlled by sprinklers (say to 5Mw), 
that the available combustibles are limited (say by separation), 
or that the whole contents of the space will burn. In the latter 
case the duration of the smoke control system will be limited, 
but must be sufficient for escape. 
Where the space requires to remain usable for a long period of 
time, the fire size must be limited. Sprinklering is the most 
practical method of ensuring this. 
Smoke control for protected routes must be capable of excluding 
smoke under maximum possible fire sizes. 
The potential sizes of fires may vary significantly and depend on 
a variety of factors related to the scenario (including 
occupancy). 
The convective heat of the fire determines the buoyancy of the 
smoke layer (together with the condition and relative quantity of 
air entrained) [304]. 
The buoyancy of hot smoke derived from reduced density may tend 
to drive the smoke out of the original compartment (this may be 
countered by a pressurisation smoke control system (300)) [229]. 
This will depend on the fire temperature [142]. A large fire 
will produce smoke of high energy (270) [194,175]. 
In leaky spaces [282,283], smoke of a relatively high pressure 
escapes from openings, and air is drawn in at the base of the 
room through openings (providing the oxygen supply for the 
fire). Refer diagram C165. 
Automatic suppression systems limit the growth rate and the 
maximum size of a fire [112] but •do not necessarily reduce or 
eliminate the movement of smoke (145,270). Further, the 
effectiveness of gaseous suppression may be affected if used 
concurrently with a smoke control system. 
Smoke Control Techniques 
Any conventional HVAC system running during an event may help 
move smoke around the building [313,145,146]. 	It is important 
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that such systems cease HVAC functions, particularly those in 
multi-space buildings which would allow the smoke to affect areas 
remote from the fire. Before the development of smoke control, 
HVAC systems were shut down when fires were discovered (Schmidt 
(1976)(276)). In some cases the systems may now be a variable or 
multistage design, and suitable for smoke control. The 
effectiveness will depend on the quality of operating decisions. 
The distinction between the potential dual contribution of the 
mechanical systems for smoke movement and control is an •important 
aspect of the model. 
If a system ceases to move air (and smoke) around the building 
and is not to be used for a smoke control purpose it is 
important that the pathway provided by the ductwork is sealed 
[159,160, also 210,211]. The over-pressure of a fire can move 
smoke around ductwork, acting as a relatively direct leakage path 
to remote locations (145). Reliable duct-closers should be 
installed. Smoke detectors located inside ducts may be 
ineffective because of the cooling of smoke, and are difficult to 
maintain (145). 
Use of Mechanical Systems for Smoke Control fall into three 
categories:- 
Variable Systems are defined as:- a fully variable air-handling 
system, used both for normal environmental control purposes, and 
for fire emergencies. The system will be automatically 
overridden when alert is activated, and may have the facility for 
further manual overriding by the fire brigade. Refers to input 
and extract functions. 
The term Dedicated System refers to an input or extract function 
of an air-handling system (be it natural or mechanical), designed 
to • be used only in fire emergencies. Independent of any air-
handling units in normal usage. 
Dedicated! Variable Combination systems are normal usage variable 
air-handling units with an attached overriding dedicated function 
for specific use in fire emergencies. Applies to input and 
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extract functions of systems. 
The source of power for Removal may be natural or mechanical 
[291]. Containment (pressurisation) techniques are assumed to 
rely on mechanical means (145) [291]. The mode of usage will be 
important (particularly in multi storey applications) [292]. This 
is discussed later. 
If the space is large enough and of the right shape and scale it 
may be practicable to adopt a dilution technique of smoke 
control [312]. 
Other techniques of smoke control include cross ventilation 
applied to flats or maisonettes described by Wilkinson 
(1969)(301)). This requires holes on either side of the 
corridors to allow the clearance of smoke by the cross flow of 
wind. The scale of the openings required may be dysfunctional in 
terms of other building performance aspects. Further, the wind 
speed necessary may not always be available in the UK. 
Slit extraction of smoke is based on the extraction of smoke from 
ceiling slits or slits spanning openings into adjacent occupiable 
spaces (1978)(302). Slit extraction technique is not 
specifically included in the definition of the term removal of 
smoke. 
Smoke shafts have been discussed by Tamura and Shaw (1973)(303). 
They are vertical incombustible shafts With damped openings to 
each floor and to the outside at the top. Smoke is allowed to  
enter the shaft from the fire floor and is vented to the outside. 
Ambient stack plays an important part in the functioning [303]. 
Leakage [309,310] and fire temperature [270] have also been 
identified as important factors affecting performance. 
Cross ventilation, slit extraction, and smoke shafts are not 
included in this model. 
Dilution. 
1-7, 
Smoke Dilution is a passive smoke control technique (145) of 
limited effectiveness in small spaces (See Victoria Nurses Ftome,, 
appendix 3) [312]. Refer diagram C152. The underlying principle 
of smoke control by dilution is to lose smoke by dispersion in 
the air. This is practical in spaces that are sufficiently large 
that the smoke produced by a fire of 'acceptable size' can be 
diluted in the air in the space without resulting in any serious 
threat to the occupants from toxicity, visibility, or heat for 
the time required to escape [22]. The term 'acceptable size' 
relates to the provisions made available for controlling fire 
growth (discussed earlier). Generally, fire size can be limited 
to 5MW using sprinklers on a 3m x 3m grid (Morgan (270)) {112]. 
Marchant (254) discusses the relationship of fire size and volume 
of space. See diagram C189 [312]. 
Any passive enclosure will eventually fail as a smoke control 
technique either by filling and/or natural logging as the smoke 
cools [181,182,144]. The amount of extra time for escape 
provided by the system must be sufficient. 
Smoke control by Dilution is more easily overcome by stack 
effect, fire stack, and wind induced forces than smoke control by 
active means (145) [232]. 
In addition to those spaces included for smoke control for 
dilutibn; evaluation of any building space(s) without a removal 
or containment smoke control system can be made on the basis of 
performance criteria of the smoke control by dilution factors. 
Buildings designed for removal or containment smoke control 
systems are accordingly handled by the other models. 
The factors determining smoke control by dilution performance 
are shown in diagram C184. Smoke control effectiveness will 
depend on the volume and energy of the smoke [307], ambient 
temperature of the internal air [311], and the size of the 
dilution reservoir [312]. Wind induced flows [308] acting 
through leakages [309,310,179,176] (discussed in the smoke 
movement section) may drive smoke down or out of the intended 
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dilution reservoir. 
The problems associated with large scale use of sprinklers in 
such situations have been also considered (145). 	Bullen 
(1974)(304) 	suggests that the effects of sprinklers on smoke 
layers depend on the layer temperature and depth, and the 
sprinkler pressure. 
Volume and Energy of Smoke [307] 
Potential smoke behaviour requires assessing for a designed smoke 
control system. An important factor is the energy of the smoke 
[307], particularly so when smoke buoyancy is relied upon - e.g.: 
dilution, or to a removal reservoir to create the required 
buoyant layer. 
Volume and energy of smoke is defined as (Delphi):- 
"The energy of the smoke as a measure of its buoyancy. 	The 
difference in temperature compared with ambient temperature. The 
volume of smoke defines the amount of smoke that must be safely 
handled within the space." 
The volume and energy of the smoke will be related to the size of 
the fire (discussed earlier) and the history of the smoke 
[174,175]. The energy of smoke above a fire influences the 
pressure developed. There is also a dependence on the height of 
the column of hot gases (144). See diagrams C190,C191. Butcher 
and Parnell (1979)(144):- 
"In any fire, the quantity and rate of production of smoke will 
depend enormously on the size of the fire, and it may be 
necessary in the design of a smoke control system to assume a 
likely fire size." 
See also (145,270). The inter-relationship of designed fire size 
is significant and discrepancies between design and actual 
circumstances may be a problem - either too much smoke [182], or 
too cool a smoke (logging out) [183]. The factor volume and 
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energy of smoke may conveniently be split down into the factors 
Smoke Mass Flow Rate [276] and Nature of Smoke [277]. 
Smoke Mast Flow Rate [276] 
The Smoke Mass Flow Rate is defined as (Delphi):- 
"The rate of smoke/entrained air production requiring dilution by 
smoke control." 
The smoke mass flow rate has been described as the most important 
factor for which the smoke control system has to be designed. In 
practice, the smoke mass flow rate may be the main reason for the 
failure of a smoke control system (144, 145). ' Failure of the 
smoke control system may result from either an excessively large 
fire (compared with design estimates) or too small a fire. In 
the latter case there will be relatively less smoke produced and 
it may be of a lower energy also. The  smoke mass flow rate will 
be particularly important in the operation of a removal system, 
and in the duration of effectivness of a dilution system. 
Design of smoke control by containment systems is more concerned 
with the pressure requirements to counterbalance the smoke 
production of the fire, but the energy of the smoke and the flow 
rate are not unrelated [276]. 
The contribution of the smoke mass flow rate to life safety (or 
more specifically, the threat it imposes on life safety) is 
influenced by the yield of the burning fuels [140]. See diagram 
C192 [140,4,11,15,18,69,76,94,182]. The potential effect of 
smoke mass flow rate on escape is noted by Canter (1985)(28). 
This has also been noted by Rasbash (relative obscuration (132)) 
in relation to travel, and by Cooper as a criterion for available 
egress time (256,38,40,257,258). 
The influence of reduced visibility is to affect the ease of use 
of the building and escape route (unprotected or failed protected 
routes). Such aspects include location and route choice 
identification [69,76], and the choice of routes [94]. It may 
affect the availability of usable routes (see appendix 3). Smoke 
mass flow rate may influence the information available in a 
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number of media [4,11,15.18]. 
The performance of the design and size of smoke reservoirs will 
be subject to the imposed smoke load and the rate at which that 
load is imposed (particularly for removal) [182]. 
Nature of Smoke [277] 
The initial buoyancy of the smoke will be influenced by the rate 
of heat release from the fire (modelled by the factor fire 
temperature [142]) [141]. A small fire (with a low rate of heat 
release) will produce relatively cool smoke. - 
The space shape [143] and size and design of the reservoir [144] 
(or space) into which the smoke travel will be important (270), 
particularly where the smoke travels across and around barriers 
or protruberances. For example, smoke passing a balconied atrium 
takes up extra air as it passes across the obstacle (Hansell 
(1986)(305))[143,144 ]. See diagram C170 [143]. This increases 
the volume of the smoke and causes it to cool. This effect can be 
seen as having an interaction onto the reservoir itself also 
[183), and the contribution of a reservoir that accelerates the 
ageing process of the smoke to life safety will be reduced. 
Nature of smoke is considered to be a factor of high impact to 
life safety, confirmed by Copper (40), noting the importance of 
smoke energy to smoke movement [277]. 
The term nature of smoke refers to the ageing process, and is 
defined for the purpose of the modelling exercise as (Delphi) 
"Any cooling/ ageing effects." 
Sprinklers will limit or reduce the fire size, and cool the 
products of combustion [112]. In addition, convective heat loss 
to the ceiling may be significant, particularly in relation to 
glass domes with a high U value (see appendix 4) 
(Cooper)(1987)(267) 
The model of nature of smoke reflects the influence of other 
systems factors on the nature of smoke. See diagram C193. 
[141,142,143,144) 
Space Shape, Length, Breadth and Height [286/7,289,290,288] 
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Space shape and the associated dimensions are more important for 
dilution or removal systems than for smoke control by 
Containment. Note the different nature of the space for removal 
(the reservoir [286]) and for dilution or containment (the space 
itself [287]). 	The terms model the relative importance of the 
reservoir geometry for the effective control of smoke. 	Space 
shape is defined as (Delphi):- 
"A geometrical description of the spatial arrangement." 
The potential relative contributions of length [289] and breadth 
[290] are similar. This is because throughout the model the 
potential of a horizontal dimension (either length or breadth) to 
affect the reservoir is similar. 
For each technique of smoke control, the height [288] is the 
potentially most important factor. Particularly in cases of 
control by removal or dilution it will be a relatively important 
aspect of the smoke control effectiveness. Although the least 
potentially important factor, space shape [286/7] is significant 
in its own right. 
The geometry of spaces will also affect escape provisions, and 
inter-active relationships occur [148,340,149,342]. 
Wind Aspect [308] 
The wind may be separated into a number of functional sub-
factors. These are 4th level factors to smoke movement, but 
tertiary level factorsto smoke control. They were discussed in 
the smoke movement section. The difference in levels is a 
function of the factor relationships in each of the areas and the 
model structure. 
The factors determining the potential contribution of the wind 
are speed [279], direction [280], and height of the building in 
relation to the wind profile [281]. In addition, the local 




Surroundings - The hill and valley configurations of local 
surroundings will affect the wind. See diagram C194. Tables 1 
and 2 (extracted from BRE •digest 119 (1970)(272)) indicate 
aspects to take into account in calculating wind loads (for 
structural purposes). 
Change of classification of surface roughness is tnecessarily a 
gradual process. The wind must traverse a certain ground 
distance before equilibrium is established in a new velocity 
profile. The change starts first in the layers of wind nearest 
the ground, and the new profile extends to an increasingly deep 
layer as the distance increases. 
Wind speed is a function of height from the ground. 	At the 
surface the wind speed is nil (boundary effect) and rises rapidly 
with height becoming more uniform, and may be represented in 
terms of the velocity profile. Diagram C174. 
The flow of air near the surface is turbulent compared with the 
flow at higher levels. 	This turbulence is the result of 
interaction with the ground and surrounding terrain. 	A small 
conventional house may be completely within the lower region. 
Flow of wind is liable to be non-laminar, and difficult to 
predict. A taller building may have significance in both 
regions, and with very tall buildings the effect of the wind will 
be more laminar near the top. Wind tunnel studies are a useful 
comparative technique for analysing the expected performance of 
buildings in wind, by measuring the scaled pressure distributions 
of the wind at specific (controlled) angles of incidence and 
reasonably precise (relative) speeds. 	From this and comparison 
: 	with the real building there can be derived patterns of pressure 
distribution on the surfaces of buildings (Kandola (1980)(264)). 
The application of non-standard designs may be made using these 
techniques. The profile is affected by the surroundings, and so 
this must be taken into account in testing scale models. 	BRE 
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Digest 119 (1970)(272) suggests categories of surroundings. 
Estimation of the wind effect on a building and/ or scale 
modelling using wind tunnels must take account of it in some 
realistic manner. 
Height [281] 
Height of building for wind purposes is defined as (Delphi):- 
"The relative height of the building to the wind flow." 
The pressure coefficient created on the surfaces of a building 
when air passes around it varies with the shape of the building 
and with the height of the building. The contribution of the 
pressure will therefore vary across the surfaces, and have a 
complex effect on the induced pressures inside the building (for 
smoke movement or the disruption of smoke control). See diagram 
C174. 
The relative effect of the wind on the building surfaces depends 
on the point chosen. The location of the fire floor and position 
within, the floor of the fire may be influential in its 
significance for smoke movement and control effectiveness. 
The pressure coefficient of the wind effect on a building will 
also vary with the shape and angle of incidence between the wind 
and the building. Tests and mathematical modelling may be used 
to predict the pressure distributions across the surfaces (e.g., 
Kandola and Marchant (273), Evers and Waterhouse (333)). Scale 
tests may be carried out to compare and contrast these 
techniques. 
The height may be taken as appropriate to the total height of the 
structure above the level of surrounding ground. 	If the 
- - structure is on or near a cliff or escarpment an effective height 
should be determined (272). The pressure coefficient of the wind 
acting on the surface of the building will vary with height for 
any given wind situation. Pressure coefficients can be derived 
for a building by using mathematical models for fluid flow, or by 
testing at full or reduced scale. 
Direction [280] 
The direction of the wind and its relative angle of incidence 
onto the building will affect the pressure coefficients on the 
outside surfaces. This acts through the leakages in the exterior 
fabric and internal sub-divisions, setting up air movement 
patterns as the air flows through the building. The direction of 
the wind will influence the direction of flow tendency, and 
modified by the differences in leakage characteristics the flow 
within the building. Mean wind direction requires to be 
established (97). The implications of this for smoke movement 
are considerable, and also for smoke control. Fire Spread may 
also be affected [156]. 
Speed [279] 
Wind speed creates pressure. Any bluff body in a fluid flow will 
tend to create a disturbance in flow. This in turn will create 
pressUre differences, the scale of which are related to the 
fluid flow. 
The wind speed is important to smoke movement throughout the 
building, and within the building there will be potential 
significance of unacceptably high wind speeds for smoke control 
by each technique. Outside the building for removal purposes (as 
defined for this model, and also for the cross ventilation 
techniques, discussed earlier) the wind speed will be significant 
to the scavenging of the removal venting. An excessively calm 
day will leave the removal of smoke potentially dependent on the 
buoyancy of the smoke alone. Too strong a wind speed (or gusting 
problems (Mayne and Cook (1978)(306)) may create a pressure 
problem (depending also on direction) that either tends to push 
the smoke back into the space or extracts it at an excessive 
speed that is above the critical limit. This is discussed by 
Marchant and Morgan (1975)(277) in the context of natural removal 
from shopping malls (also Marchant (97)) (see also appendix 3). 
The effective wind pressure on a building and its consequence for 
the air/smoke movement inside depends on the leakage paths across 
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which it can act (145,307,144) [179,176]. No ordinary building is 
passively air tight (air infiltration can be affected by 
pressurisation - see smoke control section). The pressure 
differentials across the leakages will tend to cause air to flow 
in or out of the building. 
Leakage [309,310] 
Leakage is potentially critical for each technique of smoke 
control (307). 
There may be implications of changes in building layout for 
leakage. 	In turn this may affect the operation of the smoke 
control system. 	In particular, the potential influence of 
changes on passive (dilution) smoke control system requires 
careful consideration. Changes in internal layout may be better 
accommodated by active systems, because of the operating 
flexibility [292]. 
Similarly, the effect of in-situ variability in leakage may 
require a flexibility not always available with a passive smoke 
control system. 
Assumptions of insignificance of workmanship may not always be 
justifiable (Hopkinson)(1984)(269) [282,283]. 
Deactivation of the - potentially disruptive influence of an HVAC 
system is particularly important for smoke control by dilution. 
Containment 
Shavit (1974)(255) states that "Smoke containment is extremely 
important in the early stages of 	fire." 	The importance 
continues throughout the event. 	 / 
The model described in this thesis deals with,'smoke containment 
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by pressuriation. 	Pressurisation involves the protection of 
spaces by mechanically creating a pressure gradient [313]. 
Spaces which are to be kept smoke -free are maintained at a 
higher pressure than smoke-contaminated spaces (Marchant (97)). 
The pressure gradient acts through leakages in the separating 
walls / floors [310] to cause an air flow in this direction and 
contains the spread of smoke, thus creating a protected space 
(255,145). See diagram C195. 
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Containment techniques are applied to those spaces which 
constitute the escape routes [224]- in general this refers to 
vertical or horizontal travel routes for the protected stage of 
travel for escape (final stage of egress (T(relative safety) - 
T(safety)) - see diagram C26). 
The broad nature of the • definition of escape route used in this 
model, and the scope of pressurisation techniques (spaces, 
floors, and whole building) brings the concept of pressurisation 
in the general model to all spaces. In some circumstances - 
refuges or protection in place, it may be the initially occupied 
space. 
The use of containment as a smoke control technique particularly 
applies to tall buildings with problems of reliance on stairs for 
egress, and requirement to prevent vertical smoke spread 
problems. A computerised model for the design and analysis of 
pressurised stairwells has been developed (also Mote 
(1983) (308)). 
Klote (324) discusses the formation of a pressure sandwich by 
venting or exhausting the fire floor, with no resupply, and 
pressurising the adjacent floors with fresh air and no exhaust 
[292]. In many cases HVAC systems are switched to smoke control 
mode(s). Diagram C196. 
Partition systems may make selective pressurisation impractical. 
A whole building pressurisation system may be required (145). The 
effectiveness of a whole building pressurisation system relies 
entirely on the opening of venting on the fire floor only. This 
is an extension of the technique shown in diagram C195 (145). 
The requirements for effective smoke control by containment are 
discussed by Butcher and Parnell (144)(supported also by Hobson 
and Stewart (307)) [282,283,309,310,2921:- 
"(a) the integrity of the structure 
the integrity of the pressurisation system is maintained 
the flow is totally outward through the doors and other 
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operational openings 
(d) air can be vented to outdoors from unpressurised spaces." 
The design pressure for system operation will require to be 
sufficient to contain the smoke (designed to the criterion of no 
smoke infiltration) [313]. The height of the building will affect 
the required -pressure (279). The energy of the smoke has been 
discussed earlier [315]. Pressure to counteract smoke movement 
is mechanically developed. 
The Air Pressure Developed [313] depends on the Available Power 
[291] and the Operating Philosophy [292]. It is defined as 
(Delphi):- 
"The pressure developed for use across a leakage area whether by 
mechanical or natural means. The operating philosophy may 
determine how much pressure is developed and how it is 
distributed." [292] 
Diagram C197 gives design pressure differentials [33]. 
Determining the required air pressure to achieve the desired air 
flows is done by identifying all the likely leakage paths 
[309,310]. Butcher and Parnell suggest a 25% safety margin to 
allow for uncertainty in assumed leakages (refer also Shannon 
(289)). The potential effects of open doors and how pressure 
will escape from the building are important (144). Butcher and 
Parnell identify four ways of achieving the escape of 
pressurisation air:- 
by window leakage 
by specially provided vents at the building periphery 
by provision of vertical shafts 
by mechanically operated extraction. 
The available power is an important factor on which the air 
pressure developed, defined in terms of air handling power, 
depends [313]. It is defined as (Delphi):- 
"The available pressure difference for handling smoke." 
In addition to the fire stack [304], stack effect [303] and 
adverse weather conditions [306] may induce pressures (see smoke 
movement section) [185,189]. The pressurisation system must be 
capable of overriding these pressures (Butcher et al (1969)(300)) 
[229,19511. 
Too great a pressure is both costly in terms of initial plant 
size required and wasted resources in a fire. High pressures 
across doors can make opening them impractical (earlier). This 
problem will be occupancy related, the young, old, or disabled 
may have a lower level limit for opening doors against the 
pressure developed, and may be effectively trapped in the smoke 
container. Suggestions for a maximum force required to open a 
door have been made (such as 90N (144)). In evaluating this the 
force required to overcome any door closers must be taken into 
account. BS 5588 Pt4 1978 (279) recommends a maximum of 60Pa 
differential across  doors. In circumstances where doors open 
inwards from pressurised spaces (not in designated routes) the 
closers must resist and close against the induced pressure. 
This is likely to be particularly relevant in multi-space 
pressurising. 
It is important also that sufficient pressure is available to 
effectively function. Not less than 80% of the design pressure 
should be achieved. 
If multiple stairways exist and are each to be pressurised it is 
an element of good design to provide each with a separate unit 
for pressure development (144). 
It is necessary to the functioning of a pressurisation system 
that there is sufficient air supply for the creation of an 
over-pressure, and also that once this air has leaked away from 
the protected space ( the function of the dynamic equilibrium set 
up), it can then leak-out of the building in some way (144) 
[309]. Any significant resistance to this leakage will result 
in a build up of pressure in the containment space. The 
pressures in containment space(s) and protected zone(s) will tend 
to equate (bearing in mind the partial pressure contribution of 
the smoke if local to the fire); the system will fail. 
Leakage out of the building may be available as window crackage 
[283], or alternatively purpose made vents may be installed in 
the building (144) [282]. 
The location for injection of air into the stairwell is 
important:- multi-fan usage is preferable to single fan for 
provision of available power. The pressure near the single fan in 
order to maintain the necessary minimum pressure at the opposite 
end of the shaft is unacceptable (Webb (1976)(296)). 
It is important that the available power is used effectively 
[291]. This is modelled by the factor operating philosophy [292]. 
Operating philosophy [292] 
This is an important factor, and is defined as (Delphi):- "The 
way in which available power is used." 
The broad interpretation of this factor takes in aspects of 
switching of variable systems, activation of dedicated systems, 
and the tactics of usage that are employed to control the smoke 
(144). System flexibility will be potentially important (145). 
Such tactics will vary between systems (removal and containment). 
Passive dilution does not require forced pressure, hence 
operating philosophy does not appear in that model). 
Selective extraction may be used in multi-storey scenarios, with 
air input to the affected floor(s) and adjacent levels as over-
pressure buffers against spread in vertical directions. 
An automatic system with manual over-ride facility is a useful 
option in the hands of experts. Such experts include the fire 
brigade. Operating panels for the smoke control equipment may be 
situated in the plant room, with a repeater by the main entrance 
to the building. 
Location identification will be important for manual operation of 
smoke control systems [150]. 	See diagram C198 [150]. 	Users 
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(e.g., Fire Brigade) require to orientate themselves so that the 
consequences of introducing or varying the contribution of some 
power for control is clear. The use of schematic plans at the 
control box has been tried (cf; cognitive mapping). These must be 
unambiguous. The concept of location identification can be 
extended to include the circumstance of an intelligent system for 
detection and activation of the smoke control system. Such uses 
are now practicable, and with proper thought about the possible 
scenarios and a sufficiently flexible and self monitoring set of 
plans for contingencies built in the optimisation of smoke 
control may be more nearly achieved. A fully automated system 
relies on proper use of the building (cf; chocked fire doors). 
Manual override facility should be relinquished only with 
awareness of the limitation this could impose. 
Pressurisation systems may be single or two stage, and this will 
affect the degree of 	sophistication in operating regime. For 
instance - •a single stage system operates only in an emergency 
(144). It is dedicated. The two stage system operates in a low 
level phase of pressurisation for normal building usage and is 
switched to smoke control phase on activation to operate with a 
higher level of pressurisation. This is a variable system. 
It is preferable that the operating philosophy of the first 
(ordinary) stage tends to move air away from escape routes. This 
minimises the effect of any contribution to smoke movement [305]. 
If the modes of normal conditioning use corridors for exhausting 
air this must be closed off in the 	event of a fire. 	It is 
better to avoid this. 
The consequence of delay time to detection is apparent. 	In 
general the switching on of smoke control must either cancel 
ordinary air handling or the existing phase must be a 
satisfactory element of the pressurisation effect. 
Operating philosophy may encompass more than a switching 
criterion. A flexible approach to smoke control may be 
automatic, based on an intelligent system reviewing input 
information from a number of sensory sites and implementing a 
philosophy based on the most appropriate contingency [292]. 
Manual override 	facility may also occur. 	The operating 
philosophy intended and implemented will depend on the type of 
building/occupancy and the event - the environment. 
Leakage for Containment 
The leakage internally and externally will be potentially 
significant (Hobson and Stewart (1972)(307)). It is necessary for 
an external leakage to allow the flow to be relatively un-
impeded. 
In addition to those static leakages that may be included in an 
evaluation there will be an added change in leakage on escape 
routes during the event as people use doors for escape. The 
problem of doors and windows opening and altering the leakage 
properties of spaces can be modelled stochastically and has been 
dealt with by Heselden and Baldwin (235)(see also Ouden (268) 
(Butcher and Parnell (144), BS5588 Pt 4 (279)). 
The design of pressurisation systems requires to be based on the 
leakage loss from the space. Leakage is important to ensure that 
the system works. It is important that the leakage through the 
building fabric is minimised (144). Such leakage is wasteful and 
potentially detrimental in adverse wind conditions. This 
requires estimation of its scale (144):- 
"It is absolutely essential ... to ensure: 
That.. .the leakage areas assumed 	in the actual design 
calculations are reasonable for the particular items (doors, 
	
windows, etc.) to be used in the building. 	
Ii 
That when fitted, these items do conform to the leakage 
assumptions made." 
Small scale leakage coefficients are considered as permeability 
in this model (Newberry and Eaton (1974)(309)), defined as:- 
"Equivalent orifice area of a leaky surface, including cracks 
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around windows." 
Large scale openings between the 	pressurised space and 
neighbouring spaces are treated as aspects of the 	factor 
integrity (Delphi):- 
"This term relates to any large holes in a surface, open 
windows." 
Leakage both through internal and external walls should be 
considered. Included as large scale openings will be doors. Use 
of doors will occur in an event. Flexibility to cope with 
transient leakage changes of this sort should be included in the 
design of the pressurisation system (Klote and Fothergill (145)). 
Generally 
The requirements for effective smoke control by containment are 
different than for dilution. It is relatively unimportant what 
condition smoke is in for containment, unless the pressure is too 
great [189]. Dilution and Removal of smoke are more dependent on 
smoke energy for their effectiveness. 
Power supply requirements and plant stand-by are particularly 
important to ensure operation. Further, maintenance of all the 
pressurisation system 	must be considered essential in all 
circumstances (307). Diagrams C199, C200 are of an early 
conceptual model of smoke control. 	Note reliability and 
maintenance determining the contribution of air pressure 
developed (Containment and Removal). 
The design pressure for system operation will require to be 
sufficient to contain the smoke. The energy of the smoke depends 
on the smoke mass flow rate and the nature of smoke. 
Passive containment may occur before activation. 
Tamura and Shaw (283) have discussed stairshafts containment 
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systems. 	The significance of leakage is noted [309,310]; 
particularly problems of excessive leakage caused by too many 
doors being opened simultaneously (see also Ouden (1975)(268). 
Also the manner, in which the pressure is let into the shaft is 
important - multiple injections give a more uniform pressure 
distribution, with less likelihood of the over-pressure on some 
doors associated with single input. Butcher and Parnell suggest 
supply grilles at intervals not exceeding 3 storeys (144) [292]. 
Multiple fans or a single fan with a distributed output would 
suffice. Other aspects highlighted as being important are the 
outside temperature [268], and fire temperature [270] - these 
relate to smoke movement aspects in the model. The requirement 
to vent excess pressure is noted. 
Tamura and Shaw (1976)(283) also note from some field tests that 
stairshafts are liable to smoke contamination in summer 
(possibility of inverse stack) [303] when the stair door on the 
fire floor and the exit door of the same stairshaft are opened at 
the same time [273,274], illustrating the potential importance of 
stack and leakages. 
Butcher and Parnell summarise the design procedure for a 
pressurised system (containment) system. See diagram C201. 
Passive containment can occur to an extent in the early stages of 
the event simply as a result of the leakage characteristics of 
the walls. The factors contributing to containment in the early 
passive stage are (prior to activation of) identified in the 
model as leakages, smoke mass flow rate, and the nature of smoke. 
Active containment cannot occur until after detection has taken 
place. The delay between detection and activation will depend on 
actual circumstances, but a system requiring manual activation 
will depend on delay between detection and a person activating 
it. Automatic systems do away with his delay, are are important 
potential time savers. 
The reliability of detection is an aspect of the lower levels of 
the model (this does not imply low importance). 	Peacock and 




There are a number of techniques for removing smoke from 
occupiable spaces [229], based on similar principles. The 
natural or mechanical smoke removal techniques included in this 
model involve direct extraction to the atmosphere from buoyant 
smoke layers in purpose-built reservoirs [312]. 
Removal may also by made using purpose installed extract 
ductwork, or the HVAC ductwork with an alternative mode of 
operation (considered in appendix 4). The design or adaptation of 
a system for the extraction of this smoke should be designed 
accordingly. 
All rely on the extraction of smoke laden air, and its 
replacement with fresh air to maintain a clear layer for escape 
use. In addition, the early venting of hot smoke will reduce 
fire spread [235] caused by heat radiated downwards (144), and 
limit smoke and fire damage. Techniques include simple roof 
venting (driven by smoke buoyancy), and naturally or mechanically 
augmented removal. The technique chosen will be influenced by 
the building type [230], and the anticipated fire conditions. 
Single storey, or atrium buildings can generally be provided with 
roof vents [317](appendix  4). Venting smoke straight to 
atmosphere is a relatively straightforward method of removing the 
threat. Diagram C202. Extraction may be natural (wind-induced) 
or forced (mechanical). 
Multi-storey buildings require ducted mechanical extraction 
[317]. HVAC systems may be suitable in an appropriate mode. Some 
single storey buildings, where the likelihood of wind problems 
prevents ordinary venting, may be provided with ducted smoke 
removal [317]. 
This technique of smoke control requires adequate permanent vents 
or openable windows at the perimeter of the space [316]. 
Applicability to curtain walled, air-conditioned buildings may be 
restricted. Usage-related problems may occur. Use of cores or 
vertical smokeshafts may allow more flexibility in usage whilst 
maintaining safety (Webb (296), Coggan (1969)(310)).: 
Butcher and Parnell identify a number of relevant factors to 
consider in the design of roof venting (144). These are:- 
Fire size [175] 
Temperature of the layer of hot gases [307,277] 
Inlets for cold air [316] 
Size of individual roof vents [317] 
The effect of adverse wind conditions [347] 
Restriction of lateral spread [312] 
Venting directly above the fire may be done using the energy of 
the smoke [307] as the motivating force. The contribution of this 
factor to smoke removal is included in the model. The required 
vent size [317] will be related jc the fire size, and may be 
uneconomic (144). Also, large vents tend to draw clear air up 
the centre with smoke, and be ineffective. See diagram C202. As 
a consequence, this technique is suitable for relatively small 
fires. Uncertainty of fire location and size are problematical. 
Large fires will produce too much smoke for simple venting and 
spread will still occur. 
A more appropriate technique is to provide a number of (smoke) 
exhausts designed to vent smoke produced from a fire anywhere in 
the space. Diagram C203. Control of the spread of smoke will be 
required (144). 	Downstands (including architectural features) 
may be used to create reservoirs. 	Hot smoke collects in a 
buoyant layer, and once the exhaust system is activated (after 
detection of the fire), the smoke vents. 
The provision of vents for exhausting the smoke must be designed 
thoughtfully. The calculation of vent size is based on 
assumptions of the amount of smoke to be handled (in turn based 
on the probable fire size assumption - see earlier) [317]. 
The effectiveness of the extract vent to remove smoke is 
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dependent on its area [317] - 	an excessive area may lead to 
further air entrainment which could cool the smoke significantly. 
A number of smaller extract vents to provide the equivalent area 
should be used (144). 
Butcher and Parnell have identified a relationship between the 
vent and height of layer (312). Incorrect height will affect the 
contribution of exhaust area to removal and thus to Life Safety. 
This relationship should be modelled by an interaction, but was 
omitted from the model. 
Nevertheless, the high value of the potential relative 
contribution of height [288] to life safety is noted in the 
model. 
The exhaust area is defined as (Delphi):- 
"The area across which the pressure for removal of smoke will act 
to create a flow. The number of vents and sizes related to 
available pressure and in conjunction with a balanced inlet area 
will affect efficiency of a removal system." 
There is a requirement for an air inlet [316] to replace the air/ 
smoke drawn out of the space. This is critical to the operation 
of the removal system. 	Suitable alternatives for this may be 
doors, windows, or ventilators (natural or mechanical). 	Inlet 
ventilation should be low down and well distributed, roof vents 
for inlet should be avoided. 
The term inlet area is defined as (Delphi):- 
"The area available as a fresh air inlet for smoke control by 
removal system. Required to allow proper functioning of the 
system - the efficiency of the system is dependent on the 
distribution and positioning." 
This relationship between inlet and exhausted air (smoke) 
[196,198] is an important aspect in the performance of a removal 
system for smoke control (144). The interactivity is modelled, 
see diagram C204 [196,198]. Butcher and Parnell (144):- 
191 
"The area of the fresh air inlet openings should be at least 
twice the total area of the outlet vents in any single smoke 
reservoir" 
Power for removal may be natural or mechanical. The determinant 
factors of each technique are similar, vent sizes tend to be less 
sensitive. For example, the available over-pressure of 
mechanical removal may allow for the reduced inlet (144) [197]. 
This should not be considered as a design option. With either 
technique, it is important that the pressure developed is 
suitable for venting, and that it is used properly. 
Too small an induced pressure may leave the buoyancy of the smoke 
itself insufficient for extraction. A negative pressure is 
potentially more serious. 
Too great a removal pressure may cause the smoke extraction rate 
to exceed the critical flow rate. Air may, be drawn up from 
clear layers, and mixed into the smoke - removal will be 
ineffective. There are interdependent relationships of vent 
sizes and air pressure for venting [197,187,199,196]. 
The effects of wind on smoke venting may be contributory to 
partial or total failure [347]. Morgan and Marchant (1975)(277) 
have considered roof natural venting in shopping malls for 
failure. They note that the development of critical pressures 
may enhance or nullify control measures (97). 
The result may be an inflow of cold air, causing mixing and a 
disruption of the clear layer, or excessive scavenging if the 
speed is super-critical. 
Inappropriate wind direction may push smoke back into the 
building. It is sensible to design vents so that the wind tends 
to scavenge always. The building may restrict this. 
Of primary importance to the function of a removal smoke control 
system is the formation of a buoyant layer of smoke. Layer 
formation depends on the scale of the fire and is critical in the 
early stages of a fire. 
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Smoke buoyancy will depend on the temperature difference between 
the smoke and ambient air [277,311] (discussed earlier). The 
control of a buoyant layer [337,338] will depend on the shape and 
size of the reservoir [312] (298). This can be controlled by the 
use of downstands (screens) [288] which allow layer formation and 
control spread directly (313). Spaced in accordance with the vent 
provision (limited to 60m), the screens require to be fire 
resistant (as does all extraction equipment). The shape [286], 
length [289] and breadth [290] of reservoirs are less important 
than the height. 
The smoke removal rate is critical and depends on the 
backpressure caused by the build up of the buoyant layer [288]. 
It is independent of the size of the reservoir. There will be an 
influence of leakage on the effectiveness of buoyant layer 
formation and removal of smoke [309,310], and wind induced 
pressure (acting through the leakages) [308]. 
The interactive effect of sprinklers on buoyant smoke layers 
requires consideration. 	The cooling effect on smoke may be 
detrimental to natural venting (Morgan (1977)(314)) [277]. 	With 
mechanical exhaustion, it will be advantageous. 
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M.  Fire Spread 
Combustibles and air can coexist indefinitely (Drysdale 
(1976)(228)). All fuels will burn under appropriate conditions 	- 
(335). 	The reaction with oxygen in the air is exothermic, and 
generates products of combustion. 	
-- 	 -. 
Building fires are unwanted dynamic reactions. They have been 
defined as uncontrolled combustion (1987)(315). 
To start the combustion process an ignition source must raise the 
temperature of the surface of the material above a critical 
minimum value, termed the flashpoint (228). 	The range of 
ignition sources is discussed in the smoke release section. 
The flashpoint will vary between materials [154] (228). 	This 
be reflected by the ease of ignition [114], and the initial - 
nature of the fire [173,124]. Flaming combustion occurs in the 
gas phase. Liquids burn by evaporative boiling at the surface, 
subject to mixture in the correct proportions with air (335). 
Solids, however, tend to have large molecules. 	A chemical 
decomposition, termed pyrolysis is necessary to break down the 
large molecules and generate more volatile products [152] (335). 
Smouldering may occur [124,173]. 	Oxygen must migrate into the 
fuel and react on the surface (228) [318,264]], hence this 
combustion process is slow. At the other extreme, gaseous fuels 
may form a homogeneous quantity with air. Correctly proportioned, 
this combustion can be very rapid. 
A fuel with a high specific heat capacity requires more energy 
input to raise its temperature by the same amount as one of a low 
specific heat capacity. Fuels with a low thermal inertia * will - 
rise in temperature relatively quickly when heated. 	This will 
affect the ease of ignition [114] and flame spread 
characteristics [294]. 	______ 
Sustained ignition of the material occurs at a higher temperature 
than the flashpoint termed the firepoint. Between the flashpoirit 
and firepoint, the volatile vapours may be ignited, but will 
self-extinguish when the ignition source is removed (hence the 
significance of intensity and duration of ignition source 
[262,108]). 
* Footnote: Thermal inertia is the product of thermal 
conductivity, density, and thermal capacity (335). 
Once ignition occurs the characteristics of the fuel itself 
and the proximity of more fuel to ignite will help 
determine the fire growth. 	The factors to represent this are 
flame spread characteristics [294], fuel supply and distribution 
and geometry [293]. 
A fuel with low thermal inertia will tend to burn more  easily. 
In particular, low density will make ignition easier and produce 
a relatively rapid flame spread. Consequently, steady burning is 
rapidly achieved [153,157] (334). 
Acceptable flame spread characteristics are defined by regulation 
[294] (BS 476: Part 7 (316)). The spread will also be determined 
by the orientation. Factors to model this are surface 
characteristics [318] and its sub factors [293,294]. 
The initial growth of a fire is therefore dependent on the amount 
and type of heat energy [152,203] available to initiate the 
combustion reaction, and the characteristics of the fuel 
[294,114]. The continuing development of the fire will depend on 
these properties. 
A fire releases energy by convection, conduction, and radiation. 
The internal surfaces of the fire area will begin to heat up 
[158]. Also the air and the contents of the room (and any 
occupants) will get hotter. This pre-heating will make it easier 
to ignite fuels [152], and the likely scale of involvement in the 
fire increases [203]. The rate of burning will increase because 
of increased heat transfer to the fuel [260] (252). As a fire 
grows the total amount of energy released with time will increase 
towards the potential maximum for that space. 
Diagram C179 represents a fictitious fire curve - termed the free 
burn energy release rate for a semi-universal fire. The area 
under the curve is the total heat released. 
Oxygen is one of the principal requirements for fire (Martin and 
McKee (243)) [264]. If the fire area is enclosed, eg; a room, the 
replenishment of oxygen used in the reaction may be limited. In 
such instances a ventilation-controlled fire occurs (252) [329]. 
A fire in a small well-sealed compartment may suffer virtual 
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oxygen starvation, and could eventually self-extinguish (118). 
If there is sufficient oxygen available, and other factors (e.g., 
geometry [261,293]) are suitable, maximum fire intensity will be 
achieved. This is a relatively hot fire and the rate of burning 
• 	is limited by the amount of oxygen (Cooper (1981)(38)). 
• Fires in large compartments with excess ventilation will tend to 
burn as if in the open (252)[173, 124 ]. 	These are termed .-fuel --- 
controlled fires. 	The excess air and reduced effects of the 
compartment boundaries will produce a less severe fire. 
"Together, the degree of ventilation and the build-up of heat 
dominate the behaviour of a compartment fire." Drysdale 
(1979)(252). 
In the early stages of a compartment fire, termed the growth 
period (118), the temperatures in the compartment are relatively 
low, and escape may still be possible. The duration of this 
period is important for escape. 
• 	The average temperature will increase as the fire grows. 	A 
transition from the growth period to the fully-developed stage of 
a fire is termed flashover. This demarcates the change from 
localised flaming to flaming throughout the compartment. If the 
fire was not previously ventilation-controlled, it will be now. 
The fuel load will influence the duration of the fire 
[319,200,206]. The space becomes untenable. 
Hazardous conditions in compartments may occur at far lower 
temperatures than flashover (38,40). The application of the Life 
Safety model to such a scenario is accordingly restricted. 
Spread from the space will depend on the continued integrity of 
the boundary construction [158,159,160,295]. 
Depending on the manner in which fresh air is supplied to a fire, 
there may be a loss of integrity of the envelope [295,95]. This 
may threaten adjacent spaces in the building. Intentional roof 
venting is a technique used to limit the 1 severity of a 
(ventilation-controlled) fire. .' 
The amount of fuel in the space will determine the total amount 
of heat released by complete combustion. This is the area under 
the fire curve (refer diagram C179), and will be related to the 
usage of the space (Raes (250)). Design of the structure to 
resist the anticipated fuel load can be made [295,320] and 
comparatively tested using standard fire severity tests (BS 476 
pt. 8 (1972)) [158]. The requirements for fire stopping will 
depend on the anticipated fuel supply and distribution, and 
design limits this [201,202]. 
For fire resistance calculation purposes, it is usual to assume 
fires are ventilation controlled, since this is the more severe 
fire regime. 
Assessing fire resistance using comparative tests (e.g., BS 476 
Pt. 8) is problematic (Malhotra (1981)(248)). Particular 
problems arise with assessing the performance in-situ and in 
combination with other materials (38). 
Evaluation of the potential performance of a space must take into 
account the fire resistance of the structure, the means of 
actively controlling the fire [320,321] (e.g., sprinklers to 
limit fire size - discussed earlier [112]), the type of ignition 
sources available, and the nature of the fuel load [319]. This 
latter factor encompasses the quantity of fuel, the nature of its 
distribution and geometry [204,205,113,151]. As noted earlier, 
the size of the compartment and ventilation will influence the 
intensity of the fire. 
The spread of fires is 	controlled actively and/or passively 
[320]. Factors modelling this are.. 
Compartmentation 	- active or passive fire stopping [295,320] 
Suppression 	- automatic or manual [321] 
Detection based on heat sensors, may allow the fire to become 
relatively established, and more difficult to extinguish than at 
an earlier stage. Cooper notes that temperature detectors are 
far less effective for life safety than smoke detectors 
(1981)(38). 
Fire Spread [327] 
A number of key elements determining fire spread emerge. 	A 
distinction is made between factors which allow or promote fire 
spread, such as the materials [319] and their 	characteristics 
[294,293], and factors which contribute to the prevention [321] 
or limitation of growth and spread [295,320,321]. These include 
passive and active measures for fire stopping [320] and fire 
suppression [321]. 
"the rate of growth of a fire in a building is partly determined 
by the nature and disposition of the contents of the fire 
compartment and partly by the design of the building and the 
materials from which it is constructed." (1979)(318) [293, 
294,318,319,295,3201. 
"An important factor which influences the spread of fire within a 
compartment is the burning characteristics of the materials 
exposed." (1979)(318) [294,318]. 
See diagram C205. Fire spread is defined as (Delphi):- 
"The likelihood of fire spreading in the space of origin and the 
potential for fire spread between spaces. Fire spread includes 
the propagation of the flame boundary across materials within a 
space and/or across the surface materials of a space, and the 
potential for flame spread between spaces." 
Factors interacting with fire spread are shown in diagram C206 
[233-236,221,225,226]. Fire spread may influence the potential 
contribution of the escape route and the ability of the occupants 
to escape [221]. In addition, the release of smoke and fire 
condition are closely related, and an interdependent relationship  
occurs between these two factors [234,226]. Hot smoke may help 
spread fire (re-radiation) [235], and smoke control may therefore 
limit the extent of this [236]. 
Surface Characteristics [318] 
1st 
The surface characteristics of a fuel will determine the nature 
of burning [124], and the rate of burning [173] (Drysdale 
(228,252)). 	These relationships are modelled as interactions. 
See diagram C207. 	In a fuel controlled fire regime the surface 
area of fuel in contact with air is a determinant factor of 
burning rate (Raes) (250). The factor Surface Characteristics is 
defined as (Delphi):- 
"The characteristic of a fuel surface to allow spread of flame, 
depending on the flame spread characteristic and geometrical 
layout of the fuel (vertical/horizontal),." 
The rate at which the flame front advances across the surface of 
a burning material depends on the fuel density, orientation, and 
heat flux. Surface spread of flame classification [294] divides 
combustible materials according to the rate at which flame 
spreads over their surfaces when tested comparatively. It is 
accordingly defined (Delphi):- 
"the meaning as used in classifying materials for flame spread." 
For the interactions of Surface Characteristics see diagram C207 
[173,124,212,213]. 
Fuel Supply and Distribution [319] 
Availability of fuel is an important factor (Smith (1982)(319) 
The usage of buildings will result in potentially uncontrolled 
imposed fuel loads that may be occupancy related (40). The amount 
of fuel will be influence by the capacity of the compartment 
[200,206]. 	Measures to limit the amount of fuel becoming 
involved in a fire include fire stopping [201,202,207,208]. Note 
that fire stopping will not prevent spread within the 
compartment. The actual fuel present will be important for the 
effectiveness of the compartmentation [162]. 	Fuel Supply and 
Distribution is defined as (Delphi):- 
- 	"This term relates to the continued supply of fuel for combustion 
I" 
and the proximity of other materials to provide fuel for the fire 
spread." 
It 	has a number of interactions, see diagram C208 [200- 
209,113,151,162]. 	The involvement of fuel in a fire will be 
influenced by the intensity of the fire [203] and the geometry 
and orientation of the fuel [204,205]. 
Fire Stopping [320] 
Fire stopping is achieved by compartmentation [295], and may be 
passive or active in nature [320]. The effectiveness of fire 
stopping will be influenced by the leakage characteristics of the 
compartment [210,211], and also the surface characteristics of 
the compartment and the fuels within it [212]. 
Passive Fire Stopping relates to traditional compartmentation by 
constructi pn, including the use of cavity barriers. The factor 
Active Fire Stopping relates to maintenance of barrier integrity 
using doors, shutters, dampers. These measures generally require 
activation, and are subject to potential failure caused by use 
and misuse (cf. Victoria Nurses' Home, doors chocked open 
(appendix 3)). Both approaches to fire stopping influence, the 
extent of fuel involved in the fire [201,202]. 
The minimum time requirement for a rated wall is 1 hour. The Life 
Safety aspects of events are assumed to be completed in this time 
(refer (4)). In the absence of other criteria, acceptability 
must be considered in relation to rating. 
The two factors are defined as (Delphi):- 
"Passive Fire Stopping - Any element of the building structure 
that provides a resistance to the spread of fire without needing 
to be activated, e.g., compartment walling, fire door (unless 
chocked open!)." 
"Active Fire Stopping - Any part of the building or its fittings 
that provide a resistance to the spread of fire when activated, 
e.g., roller shutter, on escalator, doors. this cannot be active 
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until T(detection)  at the earliest." 
The function of barriers is to separate the space to be protected 
from potential fire zones (other potential fire zones). This 
serves to limit the fuel supply by altering the effective 
distribution [201,202], and to enhance Life Safety in the 
protected spaces near to the fire zones. Such protected spaces 
may be stairs or refuges where occupants may await rescue. This 
is potentially important in buildings with excessive time 
requirements for escape (because of occupancy load and/ or size). 
In a paper discussing an hotel fire, Hopkinson (151) notes that 
the contribution of poor performance of self closing doors [159] 
(exacerbated by excessive gaps under the doors (cf. appendix 3) 
to smoke spread resulted in smoke logging of a corridor and the 
staircases leading from it [95] (also Klote and Fothergill 
(145)). 
Passive and Active Fire Stopping depend on Compartmentation 
[295]. Compartmentation is defined as (Delphi):- 
"The restriction by enclosure of fire spread." 
Potential interactions of Compartmentation - see diagram C209 
[158-163,2,5,13,16,19,95]. 
The Life Safety function of compartmentation is to maintain 
tenability of routes (or refuges) for escape use by limiting fire 
spread [95]. Structurally, this may be achieved in a number of 
ways (Wilson (1977)(320)), and will be strongly influenced by the 
integrity of the building [159,160]. The importance of 
compartmentation is reflected in the relative contributions - it 
is the most important aspect of fire spread. 
Enclosure of spaces to protect against fire spread may have 
beneficial consequences for smoke spread  also. 
A consequence of compartmentation will be attenuation of all 
types of information between spaces [2,5,13,16,19]. This may 
have consequences for the required level of (alarm) sounds at 
source to ensure acceptability of sound level at all locations. 
This must be considered in siting of alarms, and when changes of 
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layout are made. 
Lack of compartmentation may present significant problems, 
particularly in large spaces (cf., Standard Life Proposed 
Building, lack of floor integrity (appendix 4) [159]). 
Fire Suppression [321] 
The distinction between stopping and suppression of fire is made 
in the model. Fire suppression is defined as (Delphi);- 
"Any activity, whether automatic or manual, to try and put out 
the fire. The use of extinguishers, sprinklers." 
Rasbash, discussing fire suppression (321), states that fire is 
an exothermic reaction that depends on fuel [319] and air supply 
[264]. 	Removal 	or supply of excess of either may stop the 
reaction (eg; oxygen [115]). 	Cooling the reaction below the 
critical temperature will also stop it [112]. Water may be used 
to cool the fuel, however this has comparatively little effect. 
on the flame. Carbon Dioxide cools the flame,with no cooling of 
the fuel (334). Inhibitors such as BCF may be used. 
Fire suppression means may be automatic or manual. 	The 
contribution of manual fire suppression relies on the 
effectiveness of the operator. The level of fire safety 
knowledge will be important [214,215], together with the 
capability for the movement required [216]. See diagram C210 
[213-216,112,353,115]. 
The most common automatic suppression technique is the use of 
sprinklers. Activation depends on breakage of a bulb at a 
particular temperature, and the temperature range at which this 
occurs may be selected on the basis of likely threat and other 
scenario factors. The sensitivity of the sprinkler head to heat 
may produce a delay in activation. Other automatic suppression 
systems involve the use of gas flooding techniques using carbon 
dioxide or vaporising liquids (to absorb heat). Gas flooding is 
associated with property protection, not Life Safety. 
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Automatic suppression techniques may have beneficial consequences 
for Life Safety in general. Until the recent development and 
application of Life Safety sprinklers this has been incidental. 
The contribution of the sprinkler to life safety will depend on 
the type of installation - and thought behind the design. There 
may be implications of sprinklering for the nature of smoke. The 
heat absorption properties of the suppression medium will tend to 
cool any smoke that it passes through and may disturb the 
buoyancy of the layer. The significance of this is disputed. 
In addition, the Surface Characteristics [318] of the fuel 
influences the effectiveness of suppression {213]. This factor 
is dependent on the factors Flame Spread Characteristics [294] 
and Geometry [293]. 
The factor Geometry is defined as (Delphi):- 
"This term deals with the vertical/horizontal orientation of the 
fuel surface and the impact this may have on flame spread." 
The interactions of geometry are shown in 	diagram C211 
[151343,121,205]. 
Models 
The discussion of models relates both to smoke release and fire 
growth. Like the production and movement of smoke, fire spread 
is an important aspect of flows to model. The understanding of 
threat development is a useful tool if designing to combat it. 
Also similarly, it recognises that fire has occurred. 
Many of the models for fire spread are used for total fire 
development, which may not apply to Life Safety, and many are 
orientated to property loss. The importance of the growth of 
the fire is in the context of its interaction with the building 
and the people - the manifestation of threat. 
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A fire (history) model, discussed by Rockett (1970)(322) relates 
the aspects of fire growth, taking the effect of sprinklers into 
account. Rockett notes though that:- 
"Another, rather more "blue sky" application is the use of such a 
program, perhaps modified, to receive and respond to physical 
changes during the course of a fire for use in conjunction with 
fire suppression activity." 
Modelling Fires and Products 
Statistically meaningful full-scale tests require excessive 
resources. The use of scale models for fire modelling is an 
alternative (233). However, problems occur because of scale of 
the fire and combination of materials, and it is not possible to 
attain complete similarity between small scale modelling and 
full-scale fires. 
An alternative is to create mathematical models. 	The use of 
computers can make their use more practicable, and is necessary 
in some instances to make it feasible. As computational power 
increases with technological advancement, accompanied by cost 
reductions, so computerised modelling becomes a more attractive 
application of knowledge. 
Computerised models for fire-related topics such as people 
behaviour (e.g., Fires (31)) and route usage (e.g., Evacnet+ (46-
51), smoke movement (e.g., SCICON (39), and control (e.g., Mote and 
Fothergill (146), and fire growth and products (CFC V (74)) have 
been created. 	Some sub-systems of the Life Safety System are 
more amenable to mathematical modelling than others. 
Cox describes the types of models created (1983)(323): 
A field model genera1lysolves the underlying equations of motion 
and conservation for the system. The validity of the model is 
generally greater than the zone models, but requires greater 
computing time for the calculations. 
Cox points out that the generality of the model allows its 
application to a wide range of scenarios (a similar philosophy 
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has been adopted here) (e.g., The Field Model (Cox)(323)). 
Deterministic models predict behaviour (e.g., fire) for a 
prescribed situation (ie; similar to a lab test) (e.g., ASET 
(Cooper)(38)). 
Stochastic models rely on a set of probabilistic values for 
relationships (e.g., Beard (34)). 
Cox notes in relation to modelling building design and material 
specification against probable fire scenarios that:- 
"The use of such a model would be essential for reliable decision 
making where, for example, a trade off might be made between 
active and passive fire protection measures." 
Harvard Mark 5 (27,74,292) and its derivatives are single space 
models, with the exception of Harvard Mark 6 (multi-room up to 5 
spaces). This is a multi-room model. Each of the models 
simulate fire in compartments (to burn-out). 
Mitler (292) gives an overview of modelling of compartment fires 
and includes the factors identified as contributory. The Harvard 
fire models are discussed in terms of physical assumptions (and 
numerical handling). Input for each of the Harvard models is 
concerned with size of room(s) (this relates to the air/oxygen 
supply), surface materials, and fuel types and loads. Multiple 
fuels may be represented. Material properties are included as a 
sub-system. The type of material requires specifying. An initial 
ignition source is assumed. 
A number of the factors identified and included irf the Harvard 
models are common with the factors included in the model 
described in this thesis. 
The Harvard models calculate energy output and radius of the 
fire, and temperatures of the internal surfaces. These are 
assumed uniform. The depth, temperature, and composition of a hot 
layer are also calculated (it is assumed to be a two layer 
model). This relates to the factors rate of heat release, oxygen 
supply. 
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Also the type and size of the fire, a factor related to the fuel 
geometry and orientation and mode of burning is recognised by 
inclusion. The effect of forced venting can be incorporated into 
the model and the time to (photo-electrically) detect the fire 
derived. 
Emmons and Mitler also note the importance of geometry - but 
modelling vertical fire burning is not included. Surface re-
radiation is a factor in the progression of fire (by items), to 
flash-over (these factors were considered as 4th level factors to 
ignition source assuming first item was the ignition source for 
the second, etc.). See diagram C131. 
A single space model to predict the conditions in a room subject 
to crib fires has been developed by Quintiere et al (1984)(290). 
Output is temperature versus time curve, mass flow rates (at a 
doorway) and gas concentrations within the space during the 
event. 
In general, the representation of fires using fire growth models 
will depend on physical assumptions, and the quality of the 
universal handling procedure. 
Tradeoffs 
Allowable floor area may be doubled in some circumstances (e.g., 
shops) if sprinklers are provided. Such a trade-off may not 
recognise the full interactive consequences. 
There may be a significant delay in activation of sprinklers. 
Fire growth rate may be sufficient to overcome sprinkler 
intervention. Improved speed and reliability with automatic 
detection and other factor contributions may interact for a 
trade-off. 
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Development - An Abstract 
A brief abstract of the developmental process is presented here. 
It is described in detail in appendix 2, and the two should be 
read in conjunction. Wherever practical, reference is made to 
diagrams in the developmental section, to avoid repetition. 
The objective of the developmental process was to create a model 
for Life Safety in Fires based on the conceptual relationships 
identified in the preceding (conceptual) section of the thesis. 
By applying quantitative values, a general tool was created for 
the evaluation of Life Safety in building/people/environment 
scenarios, using the model as a base. 
The development process was carried out over a period of 11, 
months. It was based on a structured group process (termed the 
'Delphi group'), conducted using a series of eleven meetings. 
This allowed input from the eight group members working in a 
number of fire-safety related fields to the evaluation of 
concepts, development of qualitative and quantitative values for 
relationships, and review of the progress during and at the end 
of the developmental process. 
The meetings were used to present the members of the Delphi group 
with specific concepts for discussion and development. These 
were interspersed with feedback and introductory details of the 
forthcoming developmental stages. 
Quantitative development decisions were based on the contribution 
of each member of the group, averaged to produce a group result. 
The averaged values were then discussed with the group for 
approval before moving onto the next stage. 
In the latter stages of the developmental process the scale of 
quantitative work began to make excessive demands on members' 
time. 	This resulted in the emergence of a discussion and 
approval oriented role of the Delphi group. 	Values derived by 
the author were presented to the group for discussion. Following 
approval, and subject to any changes considered necessary, these 
values were adopted for the model. 
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The qualitative and quantitative development of the model was 
restricted to factors in the tertiary and higher levels (as 
described in the conceptual section). See development sections 
1 and 2 , and diagrams C11-C19. A number of factors at lower 
levels in the hierarchy have been identified, but problems of 
scale limited the formalised structure of factors (and 
relationships) used for the developmental process to the tertiary 
level. 
Two main types of relationship 	have been identified in the 
conceptual section. Both are linear and assumed directional, and 
are termed Impacts and Interactions. Impacts were defined as 
direct vertical relationships between factors in the hierarchy:- 
"An impact occurs between a lower and a higher factor in the 
hierarchy. The levels must be adjacent, and existence of an 
impact between two factors implies dependence of the higher on 
the lower." 
The developmental work on these relationships was carried out 
prior to developing the second type of relationship, the 
Interaction. See development section 5 
Delphi group members initially provided values (anonymously) to 
represent the potential importance of impact values, based on the 
assumption that factors were performing optimally (the concept of 
deficient performance is not considered until the final stages in 
the development of the evaluation tool). These values were 
averaged to provide the first sets of original impact values for 
the potential impacts of the tertiary level factors on the 
secondary factors; the secondary factors on the primary factors; 
and the primary factors on the Life Safety. These correspond to 
the relationships defined in the conceptual section, eg; diagram 
C65. The mean values were categorised according to contribution 
(diagram C212) and re-presented to the group. Following 
discussions and rationalisation (some required as a result of 
initial misconceptions), amended values were agreed upon and 
adopted. 
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Diagram C213 (a reproduction of 0191) is an "Original Impact 
Vector" depicting these averaged values for the potential impact 
values of the secondary level factors on the primary level 
factors. The value of 0.80 for Exit Route Capacity [300] means 
that its averaged potential impact value on Escape Route Layout 
was 8/10. 
A number of time stages for a general fire event were agreed upon 
and defined. See developmental section 4 . Each time stage was 
characterised by people-orientated activities. Five time stages 
were defined - see diagram C214. 
The original impact values (described above) were for one time 
stage only. This was time stage three, T(perception) - 
T(actiàn)s notionally considered as being at 1 minute into the 
event. The range of potential impact values was next expanded to 
form a set of values for each stage. Diagrams for the potential 
impact throughout a notional event were produced for each factor 
in the model. See diagrams D61-D188. After discussion with the 
group and approval, these values were also transferred to 
original impact vectors (eg; diagrams D189-D193 for secondary 
level factors). See developmental section 6 . Generally, the 
potential of any factor was considered constant; differences in 
actual performance are the result of interference (+/-) from 
other factors. 
A number of factors make no contribution (+/-) to Life Safety in 
the early stages of an event (eg; Escape Route Layout [323], 
diagram 062). Such factors were identified and assigned a nil 
potential contribution to the model at these stages. 
In addition, a few factors appeared in the model more than once 
(summarised in developmental section 14). This was deliberate, 
and was done to avoid any confusion caused by cross-referencing 
within the model at the early developmental stage. Factors 
contributing in more than one area of the system were inserted 
where necessary (eg: Wind, which may affect smoke movement, and 
each technique of smoke control appears in each). Refer diagrams 
C11-C18. 
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Also at this stage of the developmental process the model was 
divided into three sub-models, based on the three smoke control 
techniques described in the conceptual section (smoke control by 
dilution, containment, and removal). One technique only was 
assumed to applied to any given scenario, and the nature of 
factor relationships and systemic influence meant it was simplest 
to have three parallel models with fixed relationships rather 
than one model with variable relationships. This increased the 
scale of developmental work threefold. 
From these Original Impact Values, 'Modified Impact Values' were 
established. This was a lengthy and complex stage in the 
developmental process, described in developmental sections 
fT , 8 ,Vg  , and :io. The process was designed to produce sets 
of values for the factors in the model, which would represent the 
potential contribution to Life Safety at each of the live time 
stages, and reflect the influence of systemic inter- 
 
- 
relationships. This would produce a more realistic model of the 
Life Safety System. 
Potential 	inter-relationships 	between 	factors, 	termed 
Interactions, were identified. These were defined as being 
directional. For example, diagram C118 indicates the potential 
interactions of Ease of Use [171] and Choice of Alternative 
Routes [172] onto Exit Route Capacity. It also shows the 
potential interactions of Exit Route Capacity onto Mobility [167] 
and Ease of Use [169]. The relationship between Ease of Use and 
Exit Route Capacity happens to be reciprocal. An interaction is 
defined as:- 
"An interaction is between two factors in the model framework. 
It describes the potential knock-on effect between two factors, 
but note that interactions are considered as being directional, 
ie; there may be an interaction of A on B whilst there is no 
interaction of B on A." 
These relationships were assumed to occur only when the factors 
make an impact on Life Safety. Hence factors having no potential 
impact on Life Safety in the early stages of an event neither 
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make an interaction, 	nor are influenced by any other 
interactions. 
This exercise was carried out for each factor in each of the 
three (smoke control) models. See developmental section 7. 
The qualitative relationships and values are summarised for each 
factor, see diagrams D199-D284. After presentation to the Delphi 
group, discussion and approval, the potential interactions were 
summarised in a number of 'Interaction Matrices'. - Diagrams D285-
D289 are the interaction matrices for the secondary level factors 
at each of the five time stages. See developmental section 8 
The qualitative and quantitative potential interactions were then 
combined with the Original Impact Values using the formula 
reproduced in diagram C215 to produce the sets of 'Modified 
Impact Values'. This is described more fully in developmental 
section 9 
These 'Modified Impact Values' represented the potential impact 
of factors to those vertically above them in the hierarchy, ie; 
the modified impact values of the tertiary factors on the 
secondary factors; the modified impact values of the secondary 
factors ion the primary factors and; the modified impact values 
of the primary factors on Life Safety. 
These values were tabulated (diagrams D295-D301) and summarised 
in a set of 'Interaction Matrices', eg; diagrams D294-D305 for 
the secondary level factors (smoke control by containment model). 
See developmental section 10. 
However, the objective of the development process was to produce 
relative contributions for each of the factors to Life Safety 
directly. These were developed using a matrix multiplication 
process (eg; diagram D306) to produce modified impact vectors for 
the secondary factors to Life Safety, and the tertiary level 
factors to Life Safety. See diagrams D307-D311. This process is 
described in developmental section 11 (also referred to by 
Shields and Silcock (1987)(118))? 
The values of the contributions to Life Safety were expressed as 
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a proportion of 1.000 and termed 'Relative Contributions to Life 
Safety'. A diagram was derived for each factor in the model to 
represent the potential relative contributions at each time 
stage. See diagrams D409-D505. Following ordering, these values 
were summarised in tables for each (smoke control) model, each 
time stage, and each level in the hierarchy. These are 
reproduced in the development section. 
The evaluation of Life Safety requires that factors contributing 
to safety and threat are differentiated, and treated accordingly 
in any calculations. Hence Mobility [297] is considered as being 
a 'pro-safety' factor, a deficiency in which lessens its actual 
contribution to safety; and Obstructions [256] is a 'pro-threat' 
factor, a deficiency in which increases its actual contribution 
to the threat. 
Developmental section 12 deals with the differentiation between 
'pro-safety' factors and 'pro-threat' factors. Diagram C216 is a 
summary. The tables of relative contributions were recast to 
reflect this, and each summed to give a net safety/threat level 
at that time stage and for that level in the appropriate model. 
See developmental section. 
These values may be displayed graphically as a net safety/threat 
diagram, illustrating the 'optimal' datum level of safety at each 
time stage and for each model. This is discussed in 
developmental section 131. Refer diagram D506-D508. 
Evaluation of actual performance is made by modifying the the 
potential contribution by the evaluated deficiency, for each 
factor. Algebraic summation provides an overall view of the 
performance. For example diagram C217 shows an unsatisfactory 
performance of a case study (Victoria Nurses' Home). In stages 1 
and 2 there is a net threat to Life Safety. In stages 3,4 and 5 
the net level of safety is unsatisfactory. 
The net safety/threat level gives only an overview. 	The 
analysis of performance failure (or success) in a scenario 
requires analysis of the individual factors. 
A concept of criticality was developed for this purpose. 
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Developmental section . 14 includes a listing of the factors and 
their associated criticality. Critical factors may occur at any 
level. The failure of a factor identified as having a critical 
contribution to the Life Safety System will result in the failure 
of the factor dependent on it. For example Width of Route is 
considered as a critical factor. Its failure will cause the 
failure of Exit Route Capacity, itself a critical factor, and so 
an identifiable chain occurs. Identified interactions of width 
are shown in diagram C119 (Mobility [168], Obstructions [82], 
Breadth [149], and Volume of Space and Design [1381), and so it 
can be expected that the performance of these factors will also 
suffer. 
Analysis of the performance of critical factors and their inter-
relationships with the rest of the system allows the evaluation 
of modes of failure, and the consequences of this failure for 
other factors in the system. This approach was used successfully 
in the second test application (Standard Life proposed office 
building). 
A further developmental aspect is the identification of the 
relative importance of factors within a group to Life Safety. 
For example, the factors Location Identification, Route Choice 
Identification, Obstructions, and Choice of Alternative Routes 
form a group of factors determining the Ease of route Use (see 
diagram C218). Comparison of the relative contributions allows 
these to be put into order and their relative importance 
calculated. See diagrams D350-D372. 
The end result of the development of the model is a tool for the 
analysis of building/people/environment scenarios at both the 
macro and micro level (currently limited to the tertiary level). 
Analysis of the deficiencies of individual factors, and the input 
of these values into the model allows the analysis of the overall 
performance of a specific scenario, the identification of 
deficient factors and their relative contribution (and thus 
quantitative importance to Life Safety), factor criticality and 
the implications for the rest of the system, and so the chain of 
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(partial or total) failures occurring.. 	See diagram C219 for 
model usage schematic. 
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Applications - An Abstract 
Life Safety scenarios were tested by analysing two buildings 
using the evaluation tool. It was necessary to establish that 
the subjectivity of an evaluation exercise provided results of a 
satisfactory and similar nature to general design and evaluation 
techniques. A building in use and a proposed building were 
chosen for analysis.  
Both applications are individually detailed in appendices 3 and 4 
that accompany the thesis. It is not intended to discuss the 
exercises in depth here, rather to give an outline. 
(1) Victoria Nurses' Home 
The objective of this exercise was to establish whether the 
evaluation of a scenario would correlate with results of an 
actual fire. 
Theoretically the model could be used re-iteratively to evaluate 
all spaces in the building individually for the complete range of 
variable factors. This would be laborious and so the test was 
limited to the one specific scenario of the event. A computerised 
version of the model would considerably reduce this problem. 
Information about the event was abstracted from official reports, 
witness statements and newspaper cuttings and used to create the  
scenario just prior to the occurrence of the fire. 	This was 
based on the defined variables in the model. 	The scenario was 
then evaluated to establish the expected Life Safety performance, 
and compared against the actual event. 
The Victoria Nurses' Home, Kirkcaldy was a 1959 six-storey block 
used by 87 nurses. Floors B-F are of a similar layout, the plan 
for C floor is shown in diagram C220 (reproduction of diagram 
A3). The fire occurred at approximately 1 am. on Friday the 13th 
November 1981. This resulted in the death of one occupant, and 
the serious injury of eight others, mostly caused by jumping from 
the building to escape the rapid growth and spread of the fire. 
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A fatal accident inquiry was held. 
The report of the ElSE to HM Principal Inspector noted that the 
building would probably not have meet current standards in 
respect of:- 
Ceiling Lining 
Unstopped service ducts with insufficient fire resistance. 
Design of corridor outside rooms 12,12A,14 (fire resistance). 
Lounge furnishings directly onto main corridor (now 
considered as protected routes) not considered to have played 
a part in death or injuries. 
Bedroom doors poor. 
Laxity in control of fire doors (influencing spread or escape 
from upper floors). 
Alarm failure. 
Fire Brigade access. 	 - 
The evaluation of the building using the Life Safety Systems 
model identified a• number, of factors that would fail in a 
scenario' representing the fire incident. 	These 'are shown in 
diagram A39. 	Some factors. failed as a result of knock-on 
effects. 	From these failing factors and the evaluated 
deficiencies of the other factors on the model a net 
safety/threat values for each of the time stages in the event 
were derived. Refer dia gram .A37. This was done for the corridor 
and the bedrooms. The detailed calculations are contained in the 
appendix 3. 
Further analysis of those factors defined as critical to Life 
Safety predicted a serious deficiency of the Life Safety level 
for the scenario. A strong correlation between the predicted 
problems factors (diagram A39) and the evaluated deficiencies 
occurred. Many deficiencies are the result of interactions 
involving deficient factors. 
Specifically, the predicted problems with Existence of 
Information [237-241] for detection of the fire, about the event 
and for escape were upheld by the delay in alarm activation (and 
also the premature failure of the alarm), the general 
unpredictability of cues about the fire (eg; shouting, sounds of 
flames, smelling smoke) and ambiguity of information. 
Predicted critical failure of Mobility sub-factors physical and 
physiological capability [248,249] occurred producing a death and 
injuries (eg; room 12A), and the need to jump to avoid the 
impending threat. Breathing problems and burns were reported. 
An evaluated deficiency in Event Knowledge [251] occurred; 
confusion as a result of the misinterpretation of ambiguous cues 
resulted in incorrect actions, and general ignorance of the 
event. - 
The factor Route Choice Identification [255] was identified as 
likely to fail. Smoke and fire spread across routes limited 
identification and usage; one occupant (room 12A) became lost 
travelling between her room and the west stairwell, mistakedly 
entering the kitchen (refer diagram C220). Obstructions [256] 
caused by the fire and products of combustion, exacerbated by 
improper use of the building chocked fire dqors) resulted in 
unusable routes (eg: The east stairwell) and te consequent need 
to jump from windows. In addition, t'hè exit from the 
infrequently used west staiyweli was obstructed 'by glass bolts 
(an occupant required to return up the stair to get a shoe to 
break the bblt).  
The Choice of Alternative Routes [257] was also identified as a 
likely source of failure of route provision. In the event the 
conventional choice of alternative routes dropped to nil as the 
fire developed in the corridor. Spread to the east stairwell was 
unrestricted, causing escape problems for occupants from other 
floors. 
Several aspects of the fire were identified as deficient. These 
included the rate of heat release [260], fuel geometry and 
orientation [261], mode of burning [265], and fire temperature 
[270], which encouraged the spread of smoke (only mode of burning 
is not critical). In the event unusable corridors, and untenable 
rooms rapidly created Life Safety problems (the tendency to open 
doors to investigate did not help). Retracing the east stairwell 
was impractical early in the fire (Hopton et al), and early 
flashover occurred in a number of rooms (C4,C7,C17 and corridor) 
[260]. 	This had implications for the smoke yield in the fire 
[265]. Smoke spread throughout the building was rapid, and 
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occurred throughout the stairwells and unstopped ducts running 
the height of the building (An early ambiguous cue was the smell 
of smoke on F floor). 
The growth of the fire was aided by easy spread of flame across 
poor surfaces (eg: ceiling, painted surfaces, door skins), 
particularly horizontal. Flame spread characteristics was 
another factor identified as deficient [294]. 
The performance of some key building components was poor. Doors 
and ductwork had been evaluated as deficient, and were shown to 
be major contributory factors in the spread of fire between 
compartments. This resulted in a number of untenable bedroom 
spaces as doors failed prematurely. 
The Volume of Space and Design [275] was (obviously) too small 
for effective smoke control by dilution and was evaluated as 
such. It was easily filled with smoke. Unfortunately t)iis was 
not contained. 
Cornpartmentation had been analysed as deficient, and in the event 
the rapid spread between spaces confirmed the inadequate 
performance. Refer appendix 3, diagrams A42-A45. 
The comparison of the actual event and the predicted deficiencies 
arising from the evaluation show an encouraging correlation. 
this was seen as strong support for the representativeness of the 
model by the Delphi group, and the application was considered a 
successful exercise. -- - 
(2) Standard Life Assurance Company Administration Offices 
Following the application of the evaluation tool to an existing 
building scenario, it was considered necessary to test the 
applicability of the model to the other type of scenario it had 
been designed for; a proposed building. 	In such instances, the 
main problem is the lack of definite information, and the 
requirement to evaluate factors on the basis of assumptions. 
A relatively novel building was chosen, still at the design 
stage, and evaluated from the information provided in a 
presentation set of plans. 	The information available was of a 
general nature. The building is a proposed Edinburgh development 
for the Standard Life Assurance Company. It is intended to be a 
prestige office building comprising two floors of workspace based 
on an open plan concept, with three domed atria rising from 
ground floor level to the roof. The roof is to be used as 
recreational garden and will house a restaurant. The basement is 
to be a 332 car park, and include a sports facility. The overall 
workspace of the building is 200,000 sq.ft., intended to house 
1,200 employees. The workspaces are to be enclosed in a double 
glazed envelope, which serves also as air conditioning ductwork. 
Access stairways are located at the perimeter of the workspaces. 
See diagram C223 for a site layout. 
The evaluation of the building, based on assumptions where 
necessary, is discussed in detail in the appendix 4. 
For this exercise, the building was considered for suitability of 
smoke control by dilution or removal. Consequently the extent of 
calculations was considerably greater than for Victoria Nurses' 
Home. The relevant details are presented in appendix 4. Smoke 
control by containment was not considered because of the layout 
and interconnectivity of the spaces (whole building 
pressurisation may have been practical, but was not included in 
the evaluation). 
Similarly to the first test application it is intended to discuss 
the evaluation only briefly here. 
A number of key problem factors were identified from the initial 
evaluation. Diagram C224. Further problems were predicted from 
systemic interactions. Consequently, a number of factors emerged 
as failures as a result of inadequacies in design or assumed 
usageTjhese were:. 
Choice of Alternative Routes [257] 
Length of Route [259] 
Fuel Geometry and Orientation [261] 
Height (Ambient Stack) [269] 
Air Pressure Developed [272] 
Smoke Mass Flow Rate [276] 
Heat Gain of Space [285] 
Geometry [293] 
Obstructions [256] 
Rate of Heat Release [260] 
Oxygen Supply [264] 
Fire Temperature [270] 
Internal Leakage [274] 
Nature of Smoke [277] 
Height of Space [288] 
Compartmentation [295] 
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Internal Integrity [282] 
Internal Permeability [283] 
Length of Space (Removal model) [289] 
Ability to Perceive * [242-246] 
Operating Philosophy (Removal model) [292] 
Physical Capability * [248] 
Existence of Tactile Information * [239] 
Existence of Gustatory Information * [240] 
Existence of Olfactory Information * [241] 
Physiological Capability * [249] 
*factors not considered practical to improve 
A specific problem related to the undivided size of the 
workspaces and the problems that!this would provide for escape 
[259]. Additionally, the distance to travel to routes and the 
limited choice of routes [257] (partly because of this travel 
distance), may provide problems for the disabled and other 
escapees. There were no other facilities for vertical travel 
[165]. Other obstructions [256] may arise with the layout and 
use of the space. Changes to the layout (a feature of an open 
plan design) could have significant orientation and wayfinding 
consequences. 
A large undivided space has significant potential for rapid 
spread of fire [293,295,261]. The size of the workspace also has 
implications for the spread of smoke and the practicality of its 
control [289]. There is inadequate height [288] for collection 
of smoke and the loss of integrity between floors (atria) 
[282,283] would allow smoke and fire in one space to affect the 
whole of the workspace area (1,200 occupants). An additional 
consequence of the geometry was that a practical and flexible 
operating philosophy [292] for a (removal) smoke control system 
was considered impractical. 
In addition to the identification of the problem factors (some of 
which are critical) a net safety/threat level for the building 
was derived. See diagram C225. The seriousness of deficiencies 
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of several important factors produced a poorer evaluated Life 
Safety level than that produced for Victoria Nurses' Home. 
A further function of the model is to allow the user to review 
changes in the design or usage of a building and re-evaluate the 
Life Safety. This was also tested with this application. The 
identified factors failing in the initial evaluation were 
considered for possible improvements. Five improvement measures 
were considered and reviews of the Life Safety of the building 
produced as each was added. The improvements were: 
Sterile Tube or Remove Atria. 
Extraction System for Smoke Removal + (1). 
Compartmentation + (2). 
Central Stairway + (3). 
Life Safety Sprinklers + (4). 
The modification of the atria to sterile tubes (fire-resisting 
glass enclosures) or their removal improved the deficiencies in 
factors associated with the movement and control of smoke (eg; 
[264,269,274,276,277,285,292,2951). The adoption of an extract 
system (based on a variable the HVAC system) improved 
deficiencies in relation to the geometry of the workspaces and 
smoke movement related sub-factors (eg; [272,276,277,288,289]). 
Compartmentation further improved the problems with smoke and 
fire spread (eg; [260,261,264,270,274,276,277,282,283,289,293, 
295]). 
The central stairway improved the facilities for escape (eg: 
[248,249,256,257,259,276]). Coupled with Life Safety sprinklers 
which reduced the potential threat of fire and smoke (eg; 
[260,261,270,276,293]) the residual deficiencies lay broadly with 
aspects of individual capability. 
The application of these improvement measures produced new net 
safety/threat values and, importantly, improved (or removed in 
some cases) the deficiencies of many of the factors identified 
as failing in the original evaluation. 
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The evaluation exercise appeared to produce a meaningful set of 
results based in some areas on a significant amount of 
assumption. Where relevant, such assumptions are detailed in 
appendix 4. 
Presented to the Delphi group, the evaluation was received 
favourably. Following the evaluation, and independently, 
architectural changes to the proposed building were made which 
included the installation of a central stairway and separation of 
the workspaces into three separate spaces (1986)(327). This was 
also seen as vindicating the evaluated deficiency and the testing 
of possible improvements. 
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Discussion 
A conceptual model for the analysis of Life Safety in Building 
Fires has been created, and quantitatively developed into a 
systemic evaluation tool, to satisfy a number of specific 
requirements:- 
The potential contributions of any building, its occupants 
and internal environment can be systemically modelled. 
The general basis of the model allows flexibility for 
application to any specific scenario. 
The tool may be used to evaluate Life Safety levels of 
existing or proposed buildings. 	It may be used when 
comparing scenarios for equivalency, and analysing changes 
to design and/ or mode of use of buildings. 
There is a clear identification of the Life Safety System 
factors. 
Potential inter-relationships between factors are clearly 
identified and modelled. 
The dynamic nature of inter-relationships and potential 
contributions of factors for different time stages in an 
event are modelled. 
Factors are differentiated on the basis of their potential 
contribution to continuing safety or threat. 
Factors critical to the functioning of the Life Safety 
System are identified. 
Factors evaluated as deficient, and potential implications 
of deficiencies, may be individually identified. 
The model architecture is suitable for expansion and 
computerisation. 
In the conceptual section of the thesis the factors determining 
Life Safety in Fires, and their potential relationships within 
the system, have been identified and discussed. A hierarchical 
network has been used to model direct and indirect relationships. 
The scale of the system required this to be limited to three 
tiers. This simplification limits the potential representivity 
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of the model. 	However, this is not considered to be a 
significant restriction on the usefulness of the model, bearing 
in mind that:- 
The creation of the model was restricted by the qualitative 
and quantitative fire safety knowledge available. 
The fire safety knowledge used 	for design and use of 
buildings tends to fall into the tertiary and secondary 
levels of the system. 
General use of the model is restricted by the knowledge 
generally available. 	The use of a deeper model would be 
more complex, and probably less repeatable, whilst 	the 
increased complexity of output would not necessarily enhance 
its value. 
Further, the scale of conceptual and developmental work involved 
in creating a four tier model was impractical in the time 
available. Extension to greater depths is not restricted by the 
structure of the model. 	This would be a straightforward but 
extensive process. 	Even minor alterations to the model will 
involve a large amount of re-calculation work. 
Suitable expansion of the scope of the model could include the 
other main Fire Safety goal, Property Protection. The two goals 
of Life Safety and Property Protection may conflict (eg; egress 
facilities and compartmentation for property protection), and the 
two sub-systems may require incompatible modelling structures. 
Further work is necessary. 
The dynamic nature of fires is a 	function of the dynamic 
contributions of the determinant factors. This has been modelled 
by using five time stages based on people's activities in fires, 
and defining the potential contributions of each factor during 
each time stage. The nature of the contribution of factors to 
Life Safety alters throughout fire events, and so the potential 
relative contribution varies between time stages. 
A number of factors have been identified as having no potential 
contribution to Life Safety during the early stages of an event, 
(e.g. Width of Route [258]). All factors make a potential 
contribution in stages 4 and 5 (post action for escape). 
Adequate Life Safety will result from an adequate performance of 
the system during each time stage of an event. The early stages 
are particularly important for safety. An inadequate performance 
is not redressed by a potentially superoptimal performance later 
in the event. 
All factors contributing to Life Safety were assumed to 
potentially interact with other factors in the system. The 
potential interactions have been identified, and tend to occur 
within tiers. Interactions between factors at different levels 
mostly occurred between tertiary and secondary level factors. In 
a deeper model it cannot be expected that all factors will 
continue to fall clearly into tiers. There may also be a degree 
of overlap in levels between areas in the system. This is hinted 
at by the occurrence of the common factors Ambient Temperature 
(secondary level) and Internal Temperature (tertiary level). In 
such instances interactions between level 'n' and level 'n+i' 
factors will tend to occur more often. This complicates the 
matrix multiplication process for deriving relative contributions 
to Life Safety, but is not a modelling problem otherwise. 
The scale of interactivity varies widely throughout the system. 
A few factors, such as Height (Ambient Stack) [269], Wind Speed 
[279], have no potential interactions and are assumed discrete to 
tertiary level. Some factors tend to be influenced by others 
predominantly (e.g., Choice of Alternative Routes [257]), whilst 
some are predominantly influential (e.g. Rate of Heat Release 
[ 260]). A few are both (e.g. Location Identification [254]). 
The potential consequences of a deficiency in an influential 
factor are widespread. The magnitude of the interaction value 
will determine the significance of each interaction. 
It should be noted that only when a factor makes a potential 
contribution to Life Safety can it be involved in a potential 
interaction. Hence the factor Operating Philosophy [292], which 
has no potential contribution in stage 1 of the event (prior to 
detection), cannot be involved in any interactions during that 
time stage. It may be involved in interactions in all the other 
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stages. 	The only factor that interacts onto Operating 
Philosophy, Location Identification [150], has no potential 
contribution until stage 3 however. Hence there is no potential 
interaction until stage 3. 
Additionally, a number of factors have been identified as being 
critical to the Life Safety System. Partial or total failures of 
these factors will result in partial or total failure of the 
system. There is no obvious link between criticality and the 
potential interactivity of factors, however all interactions 
involving deficient critical factors will be particularly 
important. 
As a result of interactivity, a chaining effect can occur. The 
performance of a factor in the chain will be modified by those 
preceding it. 	In turn it will influence the performance of 
factors further along the chain. 	Some inter-relationships were 
identified as potentially reciprocal (e.g.; Ease of Use and Exit 
Route Capacity [171,170]). A vicious or vicarious circle may 
emerge, producing total failure or maximum potential contribution 
of both (all) factors. 
Modelling chaining effects is a straightforward re-iteration 
process using the identified relationships (see appendix 4). 
Modelling chaining effects is important for extra realism. 
However this is a large scale operation, and only practical if 
computerised. Computer-handling problems related to scale are 
foreseeable in the short term. 
The interactivity within the Life Safety System also emphasises 
the requirement for whole system performance. Aspects of 
building provision cannot replace adequate training, or control 
of fire and smoke spread, for example. 
Comments on the relative contributions of factors are included in 
the developmental section. The general trends emerging are 
discussed here, ranking refers to the relative positions of 
factors within the whole tier. There is a general trend for the 
potential contributions (and rank) of the pro-threat factors to 
decrease with the duration of the event, whilst the pro-safety 
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factors tend to increase in potential, following a lag associated 
with detection, perception, and or planning. This correlates 
well with accepted trends in real fire events, and gives support 
to the minimisation of wasted time in detection, perception, and 
planning for escape (ie; all aspects of the event prior to 
action). 
Minor differences in ranking occur as a consequence of the 
different numbers of factors in each smoke control related model 
(e.g. dilution 62 factors; containment 62; removal 64). Overall 
trends are discussed. 
Mode of Escape 
This factor is one of the highest ranking primary level factors. 
In time stage 1 it is 2nd, rising to first place in time stages 2 
and 3. This reflects the potential contribution of people to Life 
Safety in the early time stages of an event (prior to action). 
In the latter stages it ranks close second to the escape route 
layout, reflecting the continuing importance of people's ability 
and Life Safety. 
The secondary level factors determining mode of escape are 
communication, mobility and training. 	Training was defined as 
making no contribution in stage 1. 	Communication and mobility 
are of medium ranking. In stage 2 the step from detection to 
perception relies on communication. This factor is second to 
volume and energy of smoke (smoke control by removal! 
containment). In the smoke control by dilution model it is 
identified as the most important factor (volume and energy of 
smoke is passively controlled and designed for). For the third 
stage it ranks highest (information for planning). In the latter 
stages, communication is modelled as being potentially less 
important (4th), replaced by factors related to route provision 
(ease of use and exit route capacity). 
The contribution of mobility ranks medium in stages 1 and 2 
(discovery of fire or investigation). The potential importance 
increases in the latter stages with the increased dependency on 
movement for escape. Training makes a fairly constant medium 
potential contribution throughout the event (less than maybe 
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expected , particularly in the stages involving perception and 
planning). 
Tertiary level analysis shows no contribution of training sub-
factors in the first time stage. Building Knowledge and Specific 
Fire Safety Knowledge make a potential contribution in stage 2, 
and all training sub-factors potentially contribute in the 
remaining stages, with medium potential contribution only. This 
drops by the end stages to a medium/low ranking. In contrast, 
the sub-factors associated with mobility and certain perception-
of-information factors (visual, olfactory) become quite important 
towards the event. Correspondingly, the existence of visual and 
olfactory information rank similarly (just lower). The 
perception of visual information is the most important factor in 
all stages following detection. In time stage 2 it is displaced 
by physical and physiological capability. 
Psychological capacity is a surprisingly low-ranking factor, of 
medium importance early on and rising to a medium/ high potential 
importance in the latter stages (14th/15th). Aural perception is 
of medium/high import following detection, other information-
related factors are of medium ranking. 
Escape Route Layout 
There is no potential contribution of escape route layout in the 
first two time stages. Planning requires some information on 
escape facilities, and the factor is of high potential 
importance. In the latter stages Life Safety relies heavily on 
escape route provision, and the factor is correspondingly most 
important. Similarly, the secondary factors ease of use and exit 
route capacity make no potential contribution in time stages 1 
and 2. In time stage 3 ease of use ranks highly as a need for 
information on route availability contributes to planning. Exit 
route capacity is of medium potential importance. In Stages 4 
and 5 (post T(action)) the factors are the two highest. Ease of 
use is of marginally higher potential importance than exit route 
capacity, emphasising the need for considerations of use of 
routes in addition to flow capacity. 
Exit route capacity sub factors make no potential contribution in 
the first three stages. Ease of use sub-factors rank moderately 
highly from stage 3 onwards, providing information about route 
availability and continuing status. The factor width of route is 
of significantly higher potential importance than the length 
(for most single space applications, although see appendix 4 for 
an exception). 
Smoke Release 
This pro-threat factor consistently makes less potential 
contribution than the movement and control of smoke (since 
without movement of smoke the effects of release are strictly 
limited). 
In the smoke control by dilution and removal models the secondary 
factors rate of burning and smoke yield are of medium potential 
importance throughout the event (rate of heat release is the more 
important). The smoke release is designed for and the 
contribution catered for. In the containment model smoke yield 
also ranks medium importance, however the potential contribution 
of the factor rate of burning tends to be slightly higher 
(importance of energy of smoke). 
The tertiary level factors rate of heat release, fuel geometry 
and orientation, ignition source, and oxygen supply are of high 
potential importance in the first time stage. The potential 
decrease, and all smoke release sub-factors are only of medium/ 
low importance in the latter stages. 
Smoke Movement 
This factor is consistently of less potential importance than 
smoke control (which overcomes smoke movement). Smoke movement is 
a medium ranking factor. 
The secondary factor Fire stack is of medium ranking throughout 
the events, but shows as the potentially most important smoke 
movement sub-factors in each (single space) model. Other 
secondaries; Ambient Stack makes potentially less contribution 
than mechanically-induced flows (which are used to overcome 
conventional air movement forces, including wind induced flow, 
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which is consistently the lowest smoke movement factor). 
Tertiary level contributions of these sub-factors are dominated 
in the first stage by internal temperature for the models where 
proposed control will be by removal or dilution. Otherwise, all 
the smoke movement sub-factors are of medium/low or low ranking 
only, with the same overall trend of fire stack importance 
continuing. 
Smoke Control 
At the primary level different techniques of smoke control are 
not distinguished. Control of smoke is more important than its 
release and movement (hence smoke control overcomes the threat of 
smoke). In the first time stage this makes the greatest 
potential contribution to Life Safety (reflecting the importance 
of passive control prior to detection of the fire). 
At the lower levels the differentiation between the three 
techniques of smoke control produced some interesting results. 
The secondary factors Internal and external leakage are of high 
potential importance early in the event, dropping to medium 
importance in the latter stages. 	External leakage is the more 
important factor for smoke control by dilution, the lesser for 
smoke movement in containment and removal models. 
Designing for fire size and smoke characteristics suggests that 
the energy and volume of smoke would be the most important 
factor, and this emerges in the model. Of importance also in the 
smoke control by dilution and removal models are the sizes of the 
enclosures for smoke dilution or formation of layers for removal 
(high potential contribution). 	The volume and design of the 
space is less important than the internal leakage characteristics 
for a smoke containment model (both medium potential import). 
In each model the wind is of a moderately low potential 
contribution and the least important factor (a surprise for 
dilution). 	Ambient temperature (removal and dilution models 
only) is of medium potential contribution in the dilution 
scenario (stratification potential), and of slightly lower rank 
in the removal model. 
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Space shape and its associated (dimensional) factors make a 
higher potential contribution for dilution and removal systems 
than for smoke control by containment. The greatest significance 
of space shape is in the early stages, dropping to medium/low 
importance in the final stages for containment as more factors 
begin to make a potential contribution, but still maintaining its 
importance for the removal or dilution of smoke. The potential 
relative contributions of the factors length and breadth are of 
similar, and medium ranking. The height of the space makes the 
potentially most important contribution to Life Safety 
(especially with removal and dilution techniques). 
Another factor associated with internal conditions, heat gain of 
space, makes a higher potential contribution to Life Safety in 
dilution scenarios than removal. 
In each model smoke mass flow rate is initially the most 
important factor. It drops away in potential contribution 
throughout the event - more obviously so in in the containment 
model, as the systems become activated and pro-safety factors 
begin to contribute. 
Similarly, nature of smoke, another very important (pro-threat) 
factor in the early stages (particularly for dilution and removal 
techniques) drops in a markedly greater manner in the containment 
model (smoke nature is less important when being contained). In 
dilution and removal scenarios the smoke mass flow rate and the 
nature of smoke are more important to continued control in the 
space being used. 
Available power and operating philosophy are not relevant to 
smoke control by dilution and do not have any contribution in 
stage 1 of the removal and containment models (passive). In 
stages 3,4, and 5 Operating philosophy is the higher ranking 
factor, particularly in containment models. However in stage 2 it 
makes lower potential contribution to Life Safety than available 
power (no location identification influence on operating 
philosophy until stage 3). 
All leakage sub-factors are important in each smoke control 
model. 	Integrity and permeability are considered to be more 
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important in each model for the interior walls (problems of smoke 
spread within the building). The potential contributions of 
integrity and permeability are slightly lower for the smoke 
control by removal model than for dilution or containment. In 
each case the ranking declines from moderately high to medium. 
This implies that the removal technique is less sensitive than 
containment and dilution to external leakages. Note though that 
the potential contribution of internal leakage sub-factors is 
significantly higher for smoke control by containment - the 
potential importance of internal leakage to function is 
reflected. In stage 1 (passive) it is particularly important 
(the only guard against spread before activation). In all cases 
the integrity is of potentially higher importance than 
permeability. Gross leakage is an even greater problem to smoke 
control effectiveness. Fire spread may also be a problem with 
poor integrity. 
The significance of wind sub-factors ranks low in each of the 
models. Containment reflects the greatest potential impact, 
consistent with the corresponding importance of the leakage sub-
factors. 
Speed and direction are the most important factors. 	The 
potential contributions are similar, but rank low in the tier. 
Fire Spread 
Fire spread ranks as the least important primary level factor. 
Note that it is less important than smoke (confirmed by the 
statistical breakdown of deaths in fires). 
At the secondary level the most important factor is fire 
suppression (stage 2 onwards). Ranking just lower is fuel supply 
and distribution (a medium/high ranking). Passive and Active 
fire stopping are of medium rank (passive slightly higher). 
Surface characteristics is a consistently low ranking factor. 
Fire spread factors tend to be displaced in the latter stages of 
the event by the higher ranking smoke movement and control sub-
factors. 
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Tertiary level factor compartmentation is initially a medium/ 
high ranking factor. It decreasesin importance as more factors 
(related to escape, and smoke control) become important (and the 
building becomes used), but remains a steady, medium-ranking 
factor. 
Geometry and Flame Spread characteristics are of similar medium/ 
low importance, fire spread characteristics showing a slightly 
higher potential contribution than geometry (cf. surface 
characteristics). 
Use of the Model 
- Evaluation of the performance of factors is done by comparing the 
factor in the scenario against performance criteria. These 
criteria may be personally set or minimum regulatory standards, 
the evaluated level relates to the chosen standard. For this 
reason it will be important to state the criteria against which 
• evaluations have been made. 
The use of the model provides a statement of functional 
deficiency (or overprovision) of the scenario. This may be used, 
as the design basis for changes to the scenario. This makes the 
model particularly suitable for use with the performance-oriented 
Building Regulations. 
• 	Following evaluation, identification of deficient factors can be 
analysed for best choices for upgrading. This will depend on the 
specific scenario, which will determine the relevance of a 
deficiency, and the manner in which the user has assigned 
deficiency (a user-specific aspect). 
There may also be cost considerations. Use of the model in 
conjunction with cost indices could provide a tool for the cost 
minimisation of safety provisions (and their identified 
contributions to the Life Safety System). 
Limitations of the usefulness of the information generated by the 
model are related to the inherent assumptions of the model and 
• the user characteristics. The output validity of the tool 
depends on:- 
233 
The quality of the modelling assumptions. the care and 
accuracy of usage, and the completeness of the systemic 
model. 	The quality of conceptual (qualitative) and 
developmental (quantitative) input. 
User familiarity and care, and the quality and consistency of 
evaluation decisions (expertise). 
The model in its current form is unsuitable for use by unfamiliar 
users. Expert judgement is essential to the evaluation input and 
output analysis. Planned work to develop an 'Expert System' is 
aimed at reducing the problems caused by lack of familiarity and 
easing the requirements for expertise in some areas (not input 
and output), so increasing applicability. There will also be 
benefits of automatic calculation and re-calculation. See later. 
The model is currently applicable to single space scenarios only. 
This is not always a limitation (e.g. appendix 4). However, 
modelling multi-space scenarios (e.g. appendix 3) by multiple 
applications of the model, to each space, is laborious and of 
limited representivity. Extension of the model to a multi-space 
tool would be a straightforward but extensive operation. 
Modelling the interactivity of the system is further complicated 
by the need for input and output across space boundaries. 
The net safety/ threat balance (and diagram) for each time stage 
allows the Life Safety profile for the scenario to be analysed, 
identifying the stages in the event which fail (or fail worst!). 
It does not indicate partial or total failures of factors. 
The potential level of safety represented by the net safety/ 
threat values (aggregated acceptable values) will depend on the 
level of safety (or threat) associated with acceptable 
performance criteria for each factor. 
Note that the early stages of the event are accompanied by a net 
threat (except the dilution model). 	This corresponds to the 
predominant threat in the early stages of an event. 	Note the 
large number of pro-threat factors with high relative 
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contributions in the early stages (eg). Following detection, an 
increasing potential contribution of the factors associated with 
the pro-safety elements of the system tend to match and over-
balance the pro-threat factors, creating a net safety level. 
The final stages of the event have the full complement of factors 
contributing to Life Safety. The most important factors during 
these time stages tend to be those associated with escape - the 
Exit Route Capacity and Ease of Use at secondary level, and the 
level factors indicates a corresponding change from the smoke-
related factors to the escape factors during the optimal event. 
Fire spread tends to of relatively low importance, confirmed by 
the lower incidence of deaths attributable to the fire itself. 
The increasing total number of factors contributing in the latter 
stages of the event results in lower individual potential 
relative contributions (smaller parts of the cake). This occurs 
at each level, but does not imply that factors become any less 
critical. 
The model may be used at any of the three levels of the hierarchy 
for making an evaluation, and for any or all of the time stages 
of an event. Further the model may be used with any of the three 
smoke control techniques, and for any scenario. 
One formula was used for the manipulation of the interactions and 
impacts to produce modified impact values. This produced useful 
results that were easily interpreted, so satisfying its function. 
The comparative evaluation of suitable formulae was not a short 
term objective of the exercise. 
However, a tendency for the formula to minimise the magnitude of 
a modification of a factor by a large number of interactions 
compared with one factor is noted. This may be a suitable area 
for further work. 
The values of interactions were assumed constant in the event and 
were not modelled as changing to reflect the evaluated 
performance of factors. The values of interactions were 
integrated prior to evaluation (at the modified impact stage). 
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But deficiencies in factors are modelled as reduced relative 
contributions. Hence factors are still assumed to make an 
interaction of normal magnitude. 
Extension of the model could include development of a consistent 
range of values for each interaction depending on the performance 
of the factors interacting. Thresholds values may occur. This 
will require further structured group input, preferably using the 
same group members for consistency. The values produced could be 
integrated during evaluation, producing a more dynamic model (and 
a better representation of chaining effects). The problems of 
data availability and manual manipulation this creates required - 
it to be omitted from the current model. 
The structured group process worked well, producing a consistent 
set of values to meet the data requirement. Some minor problems 
arose, concerned in the early stages with misinterpretation of 
the concepts. Another, recurring, problem in the early stages 
was confusion between the specific and general (abstract) 
scenario. 	It was essential that the model was developed 
generally if it was to be applicable to any scenario. 	Minor 
confusion occurred with definitions of factors, rectified by the 
provision of the definitions notes included in the thesis. Each 
of these problems were easily identified and corrected because of 
the interactive nature of the group meetings. 
In the later stages of the developmental process, group members 
had increasing difficulty with the fine detail required. This 
was a problem caused by lack of familiarity: meetings were 
generally at least a month apart, and members were sometimes 
unable to attend (particularly Fire Brigade Personnel involved 
with the inspection of Sports Grounds following the Bradford 
fire)). 
Additionally, the scale of work involved increased greatly with 
the inclusion of potential interactions. It was noted that the 
contribution of the Delphi group to the decision making, and 
assignation of values, became less as the complexity of the model 
increased. As the number of interactions and value judgements 
required to be made increases so the amount of time that can be 
spent on each decreases. One member commented that he felt he 
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could not always devote as much time outside meetings to the 
Delphi associated work as he felt it needed. 
The potential problems of this were overcome by group discussion 
and assignation of values in the meetings. 
Applications 
The objective of the application exercises was to establish that 
the model would perform satisfactorily in the evaluation of a 
building in-use and at the proposed stage. The results of the 
analysis of the Victoria Nurses' Home appear to correlate well 
with the event, and are encouraging. The Standard Life building 
appraisal was particularly satisfactory in respect of the degree 
of assumption required and the follow up improvements made 
independently by the architect. It is concluded that the model 
is usable in both contexts. The degree of assumption required 
for the evaluation of a proposed building corresponds to the 
normal design conditions, however this places a greater onus on 
familiarity with the model. The model is particularly 
advantageous because of the rigour imposed by its use. The 
systematic and systemic approaches will be beneficial, and 
educational. 
Errors 
A. number of minor errors have emerged. A potential interaction 
of the factor Air Pressure Developed onto Obstructions was not 
included in the model. It is felt that the potential for 
pressurisation systems to create problems with opening of doors 
should be modelled. 
Numerically, this omission is not 	significant. 	Recalculation 
following discovery of an earlier error (misreading the original 
impact value for Choice of Alternative Routes) altered the final 
values only marginally. Further studies should be made using a 
corrected model however. 
The assignment of potential contributions to the factor Ignition 
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Source provided problems. 	The initial concept, that the first 
item could be modelled as an ignition source for the second (and 
so on), was replaced (by Delphi group decision) by the conceptual 
assumption that the initial ignition source only would be 
modelled. Following this the contribution would drop to zero. 
Further work 
The creation of the model has confirmed a number of shortages of 
qualitative and quantitative knowledge about fire safety already 
noted by other researchers. These include the relationship of 
people and fires; interactivity of people, building and 
environmental features of fire events (eg smoke toxicity, travel 
through smoke, wayfinding and experience). A further area is the 
relationship between design and in-use (management) safety 
provisions. 
Further studies of the usability of the model may be made by:- 
analysing the same building using a number of workers and 
analysing similar buildings to assess sensitivity of the 
model. 
following a-building through from the design stage to in use 
and re-evaluate it. This may give valuable information about 
the nature of usage and design on performance. 
The scale of the model was the limiting factor in its 
development over the three year research study. A number of 
suitable areas for further conceptual and developmental study 
emerge. Several possibilities have been mentioned already:- 
Extension to Multi-space (conceptual and developmental) 
Variable Interaction Values (developmental) 
Depth of Model (developmental) 
Scope of Model (conceptual and developmental) 
Other possibilities include:- 
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Expert System (largely developmental) 
Performance Thresholds (conceptual and developmental) 
Each of these areas will involve a large amount of work. 	The 
development-only areas would be straightforward. A particularly 
promising area for further study is in the development of an 
'Expert System'. 
'Expert Systems' are a relatively recent development in computer 
tools, with a number of features that distinguish them from 
conventional computer programs. 
(1) Architecture. The expert system is based on 
a series of rules which are overlaid onto a standard 
logic 'shell'. 	The rules are generally termed 
'heuristics'; and 
a database containing 	information about the 
quantitative relationships of the heuristics. 
This is the embodiment of the 'expert knowledge', the 
collection of which is the most difficult part of creating 
an expert system. 
(2) Additional data, specific to the problem in question, is 
input interactively by the user. Heuristics and data from the 
database are manipulated by an inference engine (part of the 
expert system shell) to make decisions. Where necessary the 
expert system draws on information from other expert systems or 
conventional computer programs. The result is a decision based on 
the embodied expert judgements and database. 
(3) 	Such programs can often work with uncertainty and give 
decisions with confidence statements. 	They can amend their 
rules, so learning from experience. 
The benefit of an 'Expert System' is to provide expertise on 
specific problems in the absence of experts, who may be few and 
expensive. 	Consistent advice is available to all who use the 
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system. The systems allow effective dissemination of information 
(frequently a problem). 
The relationships comprising the conceptual model could be used 
directly as a set of heuristics for an expert system, and the 
quantitative values developed using the structured group 
processes could form the database. 
Users evaluating scenarios, at the design or in-use stage, would 
input performance evaluations for each factor in response to 
questions posed by the 'Expert System'. Criteria for performance 
evaluation could be embodied in the expert system, and presented 
to the user at evaluation stage. Alternatively, a set of 
conventional worksheets representing each factor could be 
provided, and the data transferred. 
The 'Expert System' would manipulate the data using the 
predefined rules (replacing the manual manipulation), with an 
increased consistency, speed and ease of use. The result would 
be a statement of the the net safety/ threat level. 
Additionally, •heuristics about criticality could be used to 
provide a list of factors requiring attention and suggestions for 
improvement. Incorporating the potential developments discussed 
earlier (variable interactions, expansion of the scope and depth 
of the tool, and also the identification of thresholds for the 
performance of factors) would be reduced to adding further rules 
and increasing the database accordingly. 
The Expert System should operate on a micro-computer for ease of 
availability and widespread use. The computing power of the 
micro-computers currently in use would seriously restrict the 
scale of the Expert System (probably to a primary level model). 
Development using a 'mainframe' computer would be required whilst 
developments in the micro-computer field catch up. 
A three year research program to develop an expert system based 
on the evaluation tool described in this thesis commences October 
1987. Further aspects of expert systems are discussed in 
appendix 7. 
An alternative potential extension of the evaluation tool is to 
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represent it as a Life Safety manual - a series of worksheets 
which a designer or evaluator could work through, assessing the 
performance of each factor in turn. Net  values maybe derived, and 
critical factor implication identified. 
The development of Performance Thresholds would be a useful 
feature in a systems model. Where a factor is interacted onto 
by a number of other factors there may be a synergistic effect. 
In addition, as the performance of the interacting factors varies 
the changes in the interaction values may not be linear - 
thresholds, accompanied by sudden changes in interaction values 
may occur. Further, the effect of variable interactions on the 
subject factors may be non-linear. 
Such non-linear relationships have been identified in a number of 
areas (e.g.; phase changes, understanding a joke), and a complex 
mathematical model for the description of these occurrences, 
termed 'Catastrophe Theory', has been developed (328-331). The 
validity of the mathematical theory is inconclusively disputed, 
but may provide a useful conceptual aid to the development of 
performance thresholds. 
Conclusions 
A model of the Life Safety System has been created, developed 
into an evaluation tool, and successfully applied to existing and 
proposed buildings. The tool is based on a conceptual 
representation of the Life Safety System, rather than a 
mathematical representation of parts (as is currently available). 
A large number of important criteria for representivity are 
satisfied, particularly that the model is applicable to any 
scenario. 
The tool allows the expert familiar with its conceptual 
assumptions to make consistent, thorough, Life Safety evaluations 
of any building, people and environment scenario, both 
systematically and systemically. Performance oriented design, 
equivalence, trade-off considerations and required consistency in 
evaluation demand such ,a model. 
Limitations of use will lie predominantly with familiarity with 
the model, the knowledge encapsulated, and the data used for 
quantitative development. Only further research and collection 
of vast amounts of data will replace this as a limitation of many 
fire safety models, and any systemic model. 
In addition,, the scale and complexity of the model restrict's' 
manual use. Successful studies in the field of Expert Systems 
would reduce this problem. 
A number of limiting assumptions of the current model have been 
discussed (viz; depth, scope, and single space). These are the 
result of a short development period. These and other extensions 
to the model may be accommodated. 
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